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Rice v. Electrolux Home Products, Inc.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

January 15, 2020

ELAINE RICE, ALEX KUKICH, ERIKA MENDOZA, JAMES HUNT, and DEAN MAURO, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC., SHARP MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF AMERICA, a division of SHARP ELECTRONICS CORPORATION; SHARP APPLIANCES THAILAND LIMITED; MIDEA AMERICA CORP.; MIDEA MICROWAVE AND ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES MANUFACTURING CO., LTD; LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC; MODESTO DIRECT APPLIANCE, INC.; and ABC CORP. 1-10, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Matthew W. Brann, United States District Judge

         I. BACKGROUND

         On October 3, 2018, Plaintiffs Elaine Rice, Alex Kukich, Erika Mendoza, James Hunt, and Dean Mauro (as well as other consumers similarly situated) filed an Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 174; the “Instant Complaint”) against seven Defendants. The Instant Complaint springs from alleged defects in the stainless-steel handles of certain microwaves that consumers install above their stove burner. According to Plaintiffs, these offending microwave handles conduct too much heat from the stoves below.

         Plaintiffs Rice and Kukich bring the following claims against Defendant Electrolux Home Products, Inc. (“Electrolux”).

1. Declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
2. Strict liability under theories of a design defect and failure to warn.
3. Negligent failure to warn.
4. Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Products Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (the “Magnuson-Moss Act”).
5. Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
6. Breach of an express warranty.
7. Negligence.

         Plaintiffs Mendoza and Hunt bring the following claims against Defendants Electrolux, Midea America Corporation (“Midea America”), Midea Microwave and Electrical Appliances Manufactured Company, Limited (“Midea China”), Sharp Manufacturing Company of America (“Sharp America”), Sharp Appliances Thailand Limited (“Sharp Thailand”), Lowe's Home Centers, LLC (“Lowe's”), and Modesto Direct Appliance, Inc. (“Modesto”).

1. Violation of California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750.
2. Violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.
3. Violation of California's Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1791 (the “Song-Beverly Act”).

         Plaintiff Mauro brings the following claims.

1. Against Defendants Electrolux, Midea America, Midea China, and Lowe's: violation of New York's General Business Law §§ 349 and 350.
2. Against Defendant Lowe's: violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
3. Against Defendant Lowe's: breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
4. Against Defendants Electrolux, Lowe's, and Midea China: unjust enrichment.

         On September 9, 2019, all Defendants filed motions to dismiss the Instant Complaint. Defendants' motions are now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, I resolve Defendants' motions as such:

1. Sharp America's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 206, is GRANTED.
2. Sharp Thailand's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 208, is GRANTED.
3. Midea China's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 209, is GRANTED.
4. Midea America's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 210, is GRANTED.
5. Electrolux, Lowe's, and Modesto's Partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 211, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

         II. DISCUSSION

         A. Standards for a Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the Court dismisses a complaint if it lacks the “very power to hear the case.” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “If a party asserts several objections and defenses to a complaint, including a F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) defense for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ‘the cases are legion stating that the district court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined by the judge.'”[1]

         Additionally, “[t]he procedure under a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is quite different” from the familiar procedure under Rule 12(b)(6).[2] “At the outset we must emphasize a crucial distinction, often overlooked, between 12(b)(1) motions that attack the complaint on its face and 12(b)(1) motions that attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings.”[3] “The facial attack does offer similar safeguards to the plaintiff: the court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true.”[4] “The factual attack, however, differs greatly, for here the trial court may proceed as it never could under 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.”[5] “Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction (its very power to hear the case) there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.”[6] “In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”[7] “Moreover, the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.”[8]

         B. Standards for a Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

         Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A motion to dismiss “tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading”[9] and “streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.”[10] “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”[11] This is true of any claim, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one.”[12]

         Following the Roberts Court's “civil procedure revival, ”[13] the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly[14] and Ashcroft v. Iqbal[15]tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.[16] These cases “retired” the lenient “no-set-of-facts test” set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting “plausibility” standard.[17]

         Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”[18] “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”[19] “Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”[20] Moreover, “[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing].”[21]

         The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”[22] No. matter the context, however, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'”[23]

         When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].”[24] However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”[25] “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”[26]

         As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.[27]

         “Generally, consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to consideration of the complaint itself.”[28] Typically, to consider materials outside the complaint, a motion to dismiss must be converted to a motion for summary judgment.[29] However, “[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint is not entirely foreclosed on a 12(b)(6) motion.”[30] It is permissible to consider the full text of documents partially quoted in the complaint.[31] It is also permissible to consider documents relied upon by plaintiff in drafting the complaint and integral to the complaint.[32] “However, before materials outside the record may become the basis for a dismissal, several conditions must be met.”[33] “For example, even if a document is ‘integral' to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document.”[34] It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.[35] In this matter, I find that these conditions have been met, and will consequently consider Defendants' attachments.

         C. Relevant Facts Alleged in the Instant Complaint

         The facts alleged in the Instant Complaint that are relevant to my analysis in disposing of Defendants' above motions to dismiss are as follows. I must accept these as true for the purposes of Defendants' motions.

         1. The Microwaves and the Handle Defect

         Plaintiffs have brought this class action to redress a defective condition (the “Handle Defect”) in the stainless steel handles of particular over-the-range microwave ovens.[36]

         Electrolux has designed, manufactured, assembled, and sold a wide range of home appliances for nearly one hundred years.[37] Electrolux sells these appliances to consumers throughout the United States through retailers such as Lowe's and Modesto.[38]

         As noted above, among the home appliances Electrolux sold are stainless steel, over-the-range microwave ovens (the “Microwaves”). The Microwaves are, as the name suggests, designed, manufactured, and intended to be used and installed on a vertical wall directly above the cooking surface.[39]

. Rice purchased one Frigidaire Gallery Over-The-Range Microwave Oven, bearing model number FGMV174KFC, containing the Handle Defect.[40] She purchased this Microwave from a Pennsylvania Lowe's on October 13, 2013.[41]
. Kukich is the owner of a Frigidaire Gallery Over-The-Range Microwave Oven, model number FGMV174KFC, containing the Handle Defect. He purchased this Microwave from retailer HHGREGG in Catonsville, Maryland in October 2013.[42]
. Mendoza purchased a Frigidaire Professional Microwave Oven, model number FPMV189KFC and containing the Handle Defect, from Modesto in December 2014.[43] Sharp Thailand manufactured Mendoza's Microwave. Sharp America tested Mendoza's Microwave in its testing facility in Memphis, Tennessee.[44]
. Hunt purchased a Frigidaire Gallery Over-The-Range Microwave Oven, model number FGMV175QFA and containing the Handle Defect, from a Lowe's in November 2016.[45] Midea China manufactured Hunt's Microwave in January 2016. Midea America tested Hunt's Microwave.[46]
. Mauro owns a Frigidaire Gallery Over-The-Range Microwave Oven, model number FGMV175QFA, containing the Handle Defect. He purchased this Microwave from a Lowe's in Cicero, New York in December 2014.[47]

         All five Plaintiffs here allege that the Microwaves they purchased contain the Handle Defect. The Handle Defect operates as follows: when installed at the recommended height, the Microwave handles absorb heat and can reach temperatures exceeding 168 degrees Fahrenheit. Indeed, when tests were conducted on Rice's Microwave, the handle temperature exceeded 168 degrees Fahrenheit in the time it took to bring water to a boil.[48]

         Per the American Society of Testing Materials' Standard for Heated System Surface Conditions that Produce Contact Burn Injuries, [49] skin contact with metallic surfaces which exceed temperatures of 140 degrees Fahrenheit causes burns resulting in irreversible injury.[50] California has a like standard, requiring that all metals be “covered thermal insulating material or otherwise guarded against contact” if they have “an external surface temperature of 140 degrees F . . . or higher” and are “located within 7 feet vertically from floor or working level.”[51]New York City's Administrative Code provides that “[a]ll accessible piping in habitable and occupiable rooms carrying steam, water, or other fluids at temperatures exceeding one hundred sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit shall be insulated to prevent the temperature at the outer surface of the insulation from exceeding sixty degrees Fahrenheit above the ambient temperature.”[52]

         The conduction of this excessive temperature renders the Microwaves' handles unfit to use when opening the Microwave door-its intended and ordinary purpose.[53]

         2. Plaintiffs' Operation of the Microwaves

         Rice purchased her Microwave from a Pennsylvania Lowe's on October 13, 2013 for $269.10, and paid an additional $180 to have the Microwave professionally installed in her home in accordance with the Installation Instructions provided by Electrolux.[54] At some point thereafter, Rice was cooking on her stovetop and reached for the Microwave handle to open the door.[55] The temperature of the handle had reached an “exceedingly high” temperature, resulting in burns to Rice's hand.[56]

         Kukich purchased his Microwave from a Catonville, Maryland HHGREGG on October 27, 2013 for $249.99.[57] The retail cost of his Microwave's handle, which bears part number 5304471830, is approximately $86.81.[58] His Microwave was properly installed per Electrolux's installation instructions.[59] When the stovetop below his Microwave was on, Kukich grabbed the handle to open his Microwave. By touching the handle, Kukich discovered that the handle was hot enough to expose him to a serious risk of injury.[60]

         Mendoza purchased her Microwave from a Modesto in December 2014.[61]The retail cost of her Microwave's handle, which bears part number 5304472053, is approximately $102.98.[62] After installation, while cooking at her stove, Mendoza reached for her Microwave's handle to open it. As a result of Mendoza's very brief contact with her Microwave's handle, she discovered its exceedingly high temperature.[63]

         Hunt purchased his Microwave from a California Lowe's in November 2016.[64] His Microwave was installed over Hunt's cooking range per Electrolux's installation instructions.[65] The retail cost of his Microwave's handle, which bears part number 5304481502, is approximately $124.56.[66] After installation, while cooking at his stove, Hunt reached for his Microwave's handle to open it. As a result of Hunt's very brief contact with his Microwave's handle, he discovered its exceedingly high temperature.[67]

         Mauro purchased his Microwave from a Cicero, New York Lowe's on December 3, 2014 for $224.10.[68] The retail cost of his Microwave's handle, which bears part number 5304481502, is approximately $124.56.[69] His Microwave was installed over Mauro's cooking range per Electrolux's installation instructions. When the stovetop below his Microwave was on, Mauro grabbed the handle to open his Microwave. By touching the handle, Mauro discovered that the handle had an “exceedingly high temperature exposing him to a serious risk of injury from the Handle Defect.”[70]

         All Plaintiffs in this litigation understood that retailers Lowe's and Modesto, in selling these microwaves, were acting with the knowledge and approval of Electrolux, and/or as Electrolux's agent.[71] Lowe's and Modesto adopted and represented Electrolux's representations that these Microwaves could be used “over-the-range.”[72] When they purchased their Microwaves, Plaintiffs saw the representation that these Microwaves were “over-the-range” microwaves by Electrolux, Midea China, and Sharp Thailand (who created and affixed the microwaves' packaging) and by Lowe's and Modesto (the retailers that advertised, marketed, promoted, and sold the microwaves).[73]

         Had Plaintiffs known of the handles' high temperature and the associated risk of burns, Plaintiffs would not have purchased their microwaves or would have paid less.[74]

         3. Defendants' Conduct

         From 2011 to 2018, Electrolux's call center received complaints from customers whose Microwaves had the Handle Defect.[75] Electrolux documented these complaints in internal business records that acknowledged the Handle Defect.[76] In 2013, Rice filed a warranty claim with Electrolux about the Handle Defect.[77] In June 2015, an Electrolux field inspection measured the Handle Defect temperature as over 200 degrees Fahrenheit.[78] In August 2015, two Electrolux employees sent internal instant messages about the Handle Defect.[79]

         On September 23, 2015, Electrolux advised Sharp America about the Handle Defect via email. Since at least December 30, 2015, counsel for Electrolux and Sharp America have communicated extensively about this litigation and about the Handle Defect.[80]

         On January 26, 2016, Electrolux sent a letter to Midea China and Midea America informing them that Rice had filed her action and that her proposed classes could potentially cover Microwaves that Midea China manufactured for Electrolux. In that letter, Electrolux sought to coordinate document production of Midea China's responsive documents.[81] In May 2016, in a communication to Midea China, Electrolux stated that it would prefer its Microwaves to have handles coated with plastic instead of stainless steel. Per Electrolux, plastic coating would reduce the issue of the handle's temperature becoming hot from the cooktop below.[82] Electrolux ultimately told its senior project manager for cooking to eliminate “SS / aluminum handles and replace with plastic metallic painted handles.”[83] In a November 2016 communication, Electrolux stated that a national home builder, David Weekly Homes, was moving from certain Electrolux to GE microwaves “because they feel we do not have a solution for homeowners who have complained about the handles getting too hot.” Electrolux stated that “we do the installations and they are installed at appropriate height from cooking surface per the spec.”[84] Electrolux routinely denies warranty claims that putative Class Members submit.[85]

         Sharp America performs the product testing required for the Microwaves that Sharp Thailand manufactures.[86] In April 2017, Midea America opened a research and development facility in Louisville, Kentucky. The facility featured test kitchens and other testing facilities.[87]

         4. Warranties

         The final page of the “Use & Care Guide” for the Microwaves contains a section on “Major Appliance Warranty Information” (the “Warranty Information”) All Microwave models include this same Warranty Information.[88] The Warranty Information is printed overseas in Asia prior to shipping to the United States. For Electrolux microwaves that Midea China manufactures, the Warranty Information is printed in China.[89]

         The Warranty Information document is sealed into the microwave's box at the point of manufacture (Thailand or China), imported into the United States, distributed by Electrolux, and then purchased by Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members. The actual terms of the Warranty Information are not disclosed to the microwave purchaser until they have purchased their microwave and opened the box.[90] No. other warranty information, or any disclaimer or limitation of any warranty, was printed or displayed on the exterior of the boxes containing these microwaves.[91]

         Electrolux provides the below express limited warranty (“Limited Warranty”):[92]

Your appliance is covered by a one year limited warranty. For one year from your original date of purchase, Electrolux will pay all costs for repairing or replacing any parts of this appliance that prove to be defective in materials or workmanship when such appliance is installed, used and maintained in accordance with the provided instructions.

         The Limited Warranty expressly provides that “[s]ervice under this warranty must be obtained by contacting Electrolux at the addresses or phone numbers below.” Warranty service is not provided by the seller.[93] In the United States, the sole entity responsible for warranty service under the express warranty is Electrolux Major Appliances, North America in Augusta, Georgia at 1.800.944.9044, a division of Electrolux Home Products, Inc.[94]

         The Warranty Information includes a section with language seeking to exclude or modify the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. This section is titled “Disclaimer of Implied Warranties; Limitations of Remedies.” It is not available to buyers prior to purchase. There is no disclaimer of any implied warranty visible at the point of sale, as it only appears on the last page of the Use & Care Guide that is sealed within the microwaves' box.[95] The Warranty Information's Disclaimer is not conspicuous and is not separately acknowledged by any Plaintiff or proposed Class Member.[96]

         Every one of these Microwaves, when they left Defendants' control, had a handle that heated up as described above.[97] Lowe's and Modesto sell other microwave models with handles that do not heat up in this way.[98]

         5. Procedural History[99]

         On February 18, 2015, Rice filed the initial complaint with this Court.[100] On January 24, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland transferred an action filed by Kukich to this Court.[101] On November 2, 2017, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California transferred an action filed by Mendoza and Hunt to this Court.[102] On March 6, 2018, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York transferred an action filed by Mauro to this Court.[103] On August 20, 2018, this Court consolidated all subcomponent actions.[104]

         D. Analysis[105]

         1. Standing

         a. Whether Plaintiffs Mendoza and Hunt have standing to seek injunctive relief against Defendants

         Mendoza and Hunt request “equitable and/or injunctive relief” as part of their Unfair Competition Law claim.[106] Because such relief is prospective relief, Mendoza and Hunt must show they are “likely to suffer future injury” from Defendants' conduct. McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 223 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). They have not made this showing. The injury they plead is economic, [107] and they have not shown that they are likely to suffer future economic injury from Defendants' conduct. Therefore, Mendoza and Hunt do not have standing to seek “equitable and/or injunctive relief” as part of their Unfair Competition Law claim.

         b. Whether Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims regarding microwaves that they did not purchase

         Defendants argue that Plaintiffs here lack standing to pursue claims across their Proposed Class for microwaves that the Plaintiffs did not themselves purchase. In a companion case in the District of New Jersey, District Judge Renee Marie Bumb found, in a decision addressing motions to dismiss, that she would “not address these arguments as they are more appropriately set forth in response to a motion for class certification.”[108] The Court finds Judge Bumb's logic compelling. It won't consider this argument, and like arguments concerning the appropriateness of Plaintiffs' class allegations, [109] by Defendants at this stage.

         c. Whether Hunt has standing

         Midea China argues that Hunt lacks standing because (a) he does not allege injuries during the period when he owned his Microwave, and (b) he eliminated the potential risk of future injury by removing his Microwave from his home.[110] The Instant Complaint provides that “[h]ad Plaintiffs known of the Handle Defect in the Microwave and the substantial risk of burns resulting from use of the Microwave due to the Handle Defect, Plaintiffs would not have purchased their Microwaves or would have paid less.”[111] This economic injury suffices as an injury-in-fact. Hunt has standing.[112]

         2. Jurisdiction

         Defendants Sharp Thailand and Midea China argue that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. The Court agrees.

         a. Personal Jurisdiction over Sharp Thailand

         According to Plaintiffs, the Court can impute Sharp America's registration to do business in Pennsylvania to Sharp Thailand because Sharp Thailand is Sharp America's alter ego. This argument fails.

         Plaintiffs allege that Sharp America and Sharp Thailand “are vertically integrated and controlled by Sharp.” Plaintiffs do not allege, however, that either Sharp America or Sharp Thailand is a parent company of the other. Without this allegation, “many of the elements of” the Court's standard test for determining alter ego status are “inapplicable.”[113] The remaining factors are as follows.[114]

(1) Commonality of officers or directors;
(2) A “unified marketing image, ” “including common branding of products”;
(3) The sharing of “uniform trademarks or logos”;
(4) The sharing of employees; and
(5) Whether “the corporations exchange or share managerial or supervisory personnel.” Here, Plaintiffs allege that (a) Sharp America performed all testing for Microwaves sold in the United States, including those with the Handle Defect; (b) Sharp America addressed certain issues relating to the Defect-laden Microwaves that Sharp Thailand had manufactured; and (c) Sharp Thailand directed Sharp America to oppose, on Sharp Thailand's behalf, Plaintiffs' motion for alternative service in Mendoza's original case. These three allegations, taken together, do not demonstrate the level of day-to-day business control necessary for the Court to make a finding of alter ego.[115]

         Plaintiffs also claim that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Sharp Thailand because of Sharp Thailand's contacts with Pennsylvania. This argument also fails. The Instant Complaint shows no Sharp Thailand contacts with Pennsylvania.

         The Court lacks jurisdiction over Sharp Thailand. Thus, the Court dismisses Mendoza and Hunt's claims as to Sharp Thailand.

         b. Personal Jurisdiction over Midea China

         According to Plaintiffs, the Court can impute Midea America's consent to personal jurisdiction in this Court to Midea China because Midea China is Midea America's alter ego. This argument fails. Like with Sharp Thailand and Sharp America, Plaintiffs do not allege that either Midea America or Midea China is a parent company of the other. Therefore, the above factors apply.

         Here, Plaintiffs allege that (a) a Midea China employee supplied Midea America's interrogatory answers; (b) Midea China directed Midea America to oppose, on Sharp Thailand's behalf, Plaintiffs' motion for alternative service in Mendoza's original case; and (c) “Midea America shared employees and management with Midea China to handle the obligations” under Midea China's Finished Product Purchase Agreement with Electrolux.

         Midea China presents evidence that the so-called Midea China employee was a Midea America employee.[116] This adequately contests Plaintiffs' first allegation. Plaintiffs provide no facts in support of their third allegation. As with Sharp Thailand, Plaintiffs' second allegation does not demonstrate the level of day-to-day business control necessary for the Court to make a finding of alter ego.[117]

         Plaintiffs also claim that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Midea China because of Midea China's contacts with Pennsylvania. This argument fails. The Instant Complaint shows no Midea China contacts with Pennsylvania.

         The Court lacks jurisdiction over Midea China. Thus, the Court dismisses Mendoza and Hunt's claims as to Midea China.

         c. Remedying the Court's Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

         Plaintiffs offer that if the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over these foreign defendants, the following procedural vehicles provide an acceptable remedy.

a) Re-transfer of the offending subcomponent cases to different federal jurisdictions under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
b) Exercising jurisdiction over these foreign defendants based on their contacts with the United States under Federal ...

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