United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
F. KENNEY, JUDGE
Court previously granted Defendant Transport Workers Local
#234 's Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice, and signed
an Order that included instructions for Pro se
Plaintiff Angelique Jenkins to follow if she chose to file an
amended complaint. ECF No. 19. Jenkins filed her Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 20) and, now, before the Court is
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and
failure to join a party under Rule 19, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(7). ECF No. 21. Jenkins did not file a
the Court's instruction that the "[a]mended
[c]omplaint shall be a complete document that does not rely
on the initial [c]omplaint or other papers filed in this case
to state a claim ... [w]hen drafting the [a]mended
[c]omplaint, Plaintiff should be mindful of the Court's
reasons for dismissing the claims in the initial [c]omplaint
as explained in the Court's Memorandum,"
see ECF No. 19, Jenkins' Amended Complaint,
see ECF No. 20, is styled as a narrative letter to
the Court. Jenkins' Amended Complaint does not include
additional facts or new information. Accordingly, Jenkins has
failed to correct the deficiencies in her initial complaint.
Nevertheless, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro
se, the Court liberally construes her pleading.
Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339
(3d Cir. 2011).
first paragraph of Jenkins' Amended Complaint, she
mentions "Title VII the Defendants [sic] Duty of Fair
Representation and the Civil Rights Act of 1964." ECF
No. 20 at 2. She alleges, "[i]t is the defendant's
obligation to enforce the Collective Bargaining [sic]."
Id. Jenkins gives a cursory recitation of the Last
Chance Agreement she entered with her employer, SEPTA, and
the violation that resulted in her termination. Id.
According to Jenkins, the Defendant's decision to not
"take [her] case to arbitration [...] [was] intentional
and discriminatory because of [her] decision to run in
upcoming election [sic] against them." Id. at
liberally construing Jenkins' Amended Complaint, the
Court interprets that Jenkins was party to a Last Chance
Agreement and she suffered a subsequent violation that
resulted in her termination. Jenkins alleges Defendant
violated its duty of fair representation when it refused to
pursue arbitration, which, according to Jenkins, was fixed by
her candidacy in an upcoming union election.
contends that the Amended Complaint "does nothing more
than restate the allegations and arguments advanced in her
dismissed Complaint." ECF No. 21-2 at 1. Defendant
relies on its previous memorandum and adds an argument under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(7) that "this Court cannot compel
SEPTA to arbitrate Plaintiffs termination unless SEPTA is
joined as a party." Id. at 7.
Court dismisses Jenkins' Amended Complaint, with
prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim.
Standard of Review
evaluating "the sufficiency of a pro se
complaint, the court must be mindful to construe it liberally
in favor of the plaintiff." Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). The Court "accept[s] as
true all allegations in plaintiffs complaint as well as all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and [the
court] construes them in a light most favorable to the
non-movant." Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC,
882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Sheridan v. NGK
Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010)).
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts
to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face when the
factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
other hand, a motion to dismiss will be granted if the
plaintiff has not articulated enough facts "to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level."
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. It is not enough for a
plaintiff to allege mere "labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do." Id. "The plausibility
determination is 'a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and