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Avery v. Cercone

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

December 23, 2019

ANDREA AVERY Appellant
v.
BRANDON CERCONE AND HARRY SPADAFORA

          Appeal from the Judgment Entered, January 24, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division at No(s): GD 13-022334.

          BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

          OPINION

          KUNSELMAN, J.

         Plaintiff, Andrea Avery, appeals from the judgment entered in this car-accident case, after a jury awarded her $18, 500 for lost wages and pain and suffering. We vacate that judgment, reinstate the original verdict of $8, 500 for lost wages against Defendant Harry Spadafora, and remand for the filing of new post-trial motions on a weight-of-the-evidence claim regarding the pain and suffering award, because the trial court must resolve this question in the first instance.[1]

         On February 1, 2012, Mr. Cercone let Mr. Spadafora borrow his pick-up truck to run some errands. Mr. Spadafora unwittingly merged Mr. Cercone's truck into a funeral procession on an interstate highway.

         Not recognizing that the procession was driving below the speed limit, Mr. Spadafora rear-ended Ms. Avery and propelled her car into the vehicle in front of her. Mr. Spadafora admitted his fault at the scene and has stood by that admission ever since. Ms. Avery sued Mr. Spadafora for negligence; she sued Mr. Cercone for negligent entrustment, on the grounds that the pick-up truck's brakes were faulty when he loaned it to Mr. Spadafora.

         The jury found only Mr. Spadafora negligent. It initially returned a verdict against him of $8, 500 for lost wages and $0 for pain and suffering. However, both parties had contended at trial that Ms. Avery deserved some compensation for pain and suffering; they disputed the dollar figure on that question.

         Defense counsel asked the trial court to send the jury back to reconsider its pain-and-suffering award. Ms. Avery's attorney responded that returning the jury to the deliberation room was improper. The trial court agreed with defense counsel and directed the jury to resume deliberations and to award something for pain and suffering. The jury returned a second verdict adding $10, 000 for pain and suffering. Thus, the new verdict totaled $18, 500.

         Ms. Avery filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed. She raises four issues on appeal, which we have rephrased and reordered for simplicity of disposition:

1. Did the trial court err by returning the jury to deliberations with instructions to award some amount of compensation for pain and suffering?
2. Did the trial court err by refusing to strike the unverified Answer filed by Mr. Spadafora and Mr. Cercone and to enter a directed verdict against them?
3. Did the trial court err by failing to conduct a Frye hearing before it concluded that Ms. Avery's expert neurologist's use of DTI (Diffuse Tensor Imaging) to confirm his diagnosis of a brain injury was inadmissible?
4. Did the trial court err by excluding evidence of the business relationship between the defense's expert and a referral service to show potential bias of the defense expert with regard to his opinion on damages?

See Ms. Avery's Brief at 19, 33, 46, 64. A. The Verdict on Pain and Suffering

         In her first appellate issue, Ms. Avery challenges the rejection of the original $0 verdict for pain and suffering and the trial court's instruction that the jurors resume deliberations. She argues the trial judge confused an inconsistent or illogical verdict with a verdict that is against the weight of the evidence. In her view, it was "reversible error for [the] trial judge to intervene to correct a verdict which was against the weight of the evidence by instructing the jury to reconsider its prior findings." Id. at 14. Instead, Ms. Avery believes the "only remedy available to the court when a jury returns a verdict which is against the weight of the evidence is to grant a new trial." Id.

         Mr. Spadafora argues that the trial judge correctly returned the jury to deliberate further. He claims:

Based on undisputed medical evidence, [Ms. Avery] suffered a mild, traumatic, brain injury (a concussion) in the subject accident, which is normally associated with some degree of pain and suffering (headaches and dizziness, etc.). Therefore, it was arguably inconsistent, as a matter of law, for the jury to have awarded past wage loss, but no amount for pain and suffering.

Mr. Spadafora's Brief at 10.[2]

         When reviewing a trial court's denial of post-trial motions, we follow a two-step process.

[First, we] review the [trial] court's alleged mistake and determine whether the court erred, and, if so, [we then ask] whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial. If the alleged mistake concerned an error of law, we will scrutinize for legal error. Once we determine whether an error occurred, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the request for a new trial.

ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds and Co., 939 A.2d 935, 939 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted), affirmed, 971 A.2d 1121 (Pa. 2009).

         Here, the trial court agreed with defense counsel's identification of the $0 award for pain and suffering as an inconsistent verdict and rejected the plaintiff's view that this was a weight of the evidence issue. Whether a court has correctly identified the legal issue before it is itself a legal issue. The "identification and application of the proper legal principles . . . are questions of law . . . ." Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007). As with all questions of law, "our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunal." Casselbury v. American Food Serv., 30 A.3d 510, 512 (Pa. Super. 2011).

         To put this issue in perspective, we must differentiate between an inconsistent verdict and a verdict that is against the weight of the evidence. An inconsistent, irrational, or problematic verdict is a verdict that does not clearly report the jury's factual findings on its face. The inconsistency or problem of such a verdict appears within the four corners of the verdict slip. When this occurs, a trial court should - if a party objects before the jury is dismissed - return that jury to the deliberation room and instruct it to clarify (not reconsider) the verdict. By contrast, a verdict that is against the weight of the evidence is a verdict that shocks the conscience of the trial court in light ...


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