United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Chris Howard, proceeding pro se, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Curran-Fromhold
Correctional Facility (“CFCF”). Howard also seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We shall grant
Howard leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
dismiss his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
vague complaint, Howard appears to be bringing constitutional
claims under § 1983 based upon his conditions of
confinement while incarcerated at CFCF in 2005. He alleges
that he was “in a boat, ” an=qq“when the
room was meant for two the boat was put in to make it a three
man.” Howard also claims that he injured his
pinky finger in an accident while “in a different cell
room” with his cellmate and seeks
it appears that he is not capable of paying the fees to
commence this civil action, we grant Howard leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), we must dismiss the
complaint if it fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint
fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d
Cir. 1999). A court may dismiss all or part of an action for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(6).
complaint must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The
plaintiff must allege facts that indicate “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. Pleading only “facts
that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability” is insufficient and cannot survive a motion
to dismiss. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557). Because Howard is proceeding pro se, we
construe his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y
Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
claims are time-barred. He asserts claims based on acts and
omissions that occurred beyond the statute of limitations.
statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is governed by
the limitations period applicable to personal injury actions
of the state where the cause of action arose. Kach v.
Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009). The Pennsylvania
statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two
years. 42 Pa. C. S. § 5524.
Pennsylvania statute of limitations for personal injury
actions begins to run when the plaintiff knows of his injury,
its operative cause, and the causal connection of the injury
to the operative cause. Anthony v. Koppers Co., 425
A.2d 428, 431 (Pa. Super. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 A.2d 181 (Pa. 1981). In most cases,
knowledge of the injury and its cause are contemporaneous.
the limitations period began to run when Howard “knew
or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is
based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of
Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). The conditions
and injuries of which Howard complains were obvious and known
when they occurred.
complains of conditions at CFCF in 2005. He did not file this
action until October 22, 2019, over fourteen years after his
claims accrued. Therefore, his claims are time-barred.
Howard's claims are time-barred, we shall dismiss the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Howard will not be granted ...