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Sears v. Mooney

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

December 11, 2019

RICHARD SEARS, Plaintiff
v.
VINCENT MOONEY, et al., Defendants

          MEMORANDUM

          Kane Judge

         I. BACKGROUND

         Pro se Plaintiff Richard Sears (“Plaintiff”), who is currently confined at the State Correctional Institution in Albion, Pennsylvania (“SCI Albion”), initiated the above-captioned action by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on January 9, 2017, against numerous employees of the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania (“SCI Coal Township”). (Doc. No. 1.) On September 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting claims of interference with his right to use the grievance system, retaliation, interference with his right of free speech, defamation, denial of access to the courts, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, deliberate indifference to his medical needs, due process violations, equal protection violations, and excessive force in violation of the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as claims alleging violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various state torts. (Doc. No. 33.)

         After engaging in discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 84) and supporting materials (Doc. Nos. 85, 86, 99). Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to exclude alleged evidence of his deposition (Doc. No. 89) and a motion to strike Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 92). On February 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carlson denied Plaintiff's motion to strike. (Doc. No. 96.) After receiving two (2) extensions of time (Doc. Nos. 101, 102, 103, 104), Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants' statement of facts (Doc. No. 105) and brief in opposition (Doc. No. 106). Defendants then filed a reply brief (Doc. No. 110) after receiving an extension of time to do so (Doc. Nos. 107, 109). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 84) and Plaintiff's motion to exclude (Doc. No. 89) are ripe for disposition.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to render summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

         A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. See id. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

         When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party seeking summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56 of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party is required to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing the motion “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case that it bears the burden of proving at trial, for “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).

         In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See White, 862 F.2d at 59. In doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant's allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor. See id. (citations omitted). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a “statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [to be filed by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” See L.R. 56.1. A party cannot evade these litigation responsibilities in this regard simply by citing the fact that he is a pro se litigant. These rules apply with equal force to all parties. See Sanders v. Beard, Civ. No. 09-1384, 2010 WL 2853261, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2010) (stating that pro se parties “are not excused from complying with court orders and the local rules of court”); Thomas v. Norris, Civ. No. 02-01854, 2006 WL 2590488, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006) (explaining that pro se parties must follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

         III. DISCUSSION

         A. Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Alleged Evidence of Deposition

         Defendants submitted a transcript of Plaintiff's deposition in support of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 86-1.) Plaintiff moves to exclude his deposition, arguing that upon his review of the transcript, he “discovered a plethora of pertinent testimony did get erroneously or illegally omitted from the recording or transcription of said deposition.” (Doc. No. 89 at 2.) He maintains that he “listed as many changes and corrections as he could list on the single ‘errata sheet' provided to him, ” and has attached the errata sheet to his motion. (Id. at 2, 6.) Plaintiff believes the transcript “has [the] tendency to cause unfair prejudice to [him], create confusion of the issues, and mislead the Court at summary judgment.” (Doc. No. 90 at 2.)

         Upon review of the errata sheet, the Court observes that Plaintiff takes issue with misspelled words and the omission of words and phrases in the transcript. (Doc. No. 89 at 6.) Evidence, however, “should not be excluded on summary judgment on hypertechnical grounds.” See Fowle v. C & C Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 67 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the transcript causes unfair prejudice, confuses the issues, and misleads the Court. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion to exclude. (Doc. No. 89.) To the extent the errata sheet is relevant, the Court will consider it when evaluating Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

         B. Motion for Summary Judgment

         1. Statement of Material Facts [1]

         On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to a hard cell within SCI Coal Township's Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”). (Doc. No. 85 ¶ 1.) A hard cell is “used for observation purposes for inmates who display some type of mental instability or might harm themselves.”[2](Id. ¶ 3.) Unlike a regular cell, hard cells do not have tables and stools, and they have wickets that are used to pass items, such as food trays, through the doors. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was never provided an explanation of why he was placed in the hard cell. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff stayed in the hard cell for eighty-five (85) days. (Id. ¶ 2.)

         Plaintiff experienced disruptions in his daily activities while assigned to the hard cell. (Id. ¶ 5.) He complained about his placement “and sent request slips to the sergeants to be moved to a different cell but his requests were ignored.”[3] (Id. ¶ 6.) On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff asked Defendant McDonald to use his fingernail clippers, and Defendant McDonald responded that “the clippers were not there.”[4] (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)

         During Plaintiff's time in the hard cell, Plaintiff experienced issues as to the cell's plumbing. (Id. ¶ 10.) Specifically, the water was leaving “dark traces around the inside of his cup and was making his throat irritated.”[5] (Id.) Inmates in neighboring cells did not have the same issue with their water. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff complained about the plumbing issues to RHU officers, including Defendants Kistler, Shipe, Drucis, Howel, Burrows, Heistand, and Krzykowski.[6] (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendants Kistler, Shipe, Krzykowski, Drucis, and Howel had the authority to move Plaintiff, but Defendant Heistand did not.[7] (Id. ¶ 13.)

         Plaintiff was moved to a regular cell on September 4, 2014. (Id. ¶ 14.) Nothing of note occurred with respect to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was assigned to that cell. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was moved to another regular cell on September 29, 2014. (Id. ¶ 16.) At lunchtime on that day, Defendant Lenker and another officer placed Plaintiff's meal tray on the wicket, but before Plaintiff could reach for the tray, the wicket was closed, and the tray fell to the floor. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff called out and the unnamed officer returned, saw the tray on the floor, and stated that he would notify Defendant Lenker.[8] (Id. ¶ 18.) Later that day, Defendant McDonald came to Plaintiff's cell.[9] (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff asked Defendant McDonald to look at the tray on the floor and stated that he needed a new tray, but Defendant McDonald refused to do so and walked away. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff heard Defendant McDonald report that he had refused to give up his tray.[10] (Id. ¶ 21.) Defendant Baker then made a racially charged comment to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff complained to Defendant Novalis about the tray and complained to Defendant Peters about Defendant McDonald because Defendant Peters was Defendant McDonald's supervisor.[11] (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.)

         Plaintiff subsequently received a misconduct for refusing to give up the tray.[12] (Id. ¶ 25.) Defendant Scicchitano signed off on the misconduct. (Id. ¶ 31.) Later that day, Defendant Howel walked past Plaintiff “at mealtime, laughing, and did not give him a tray.”[13] (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff heard other officers, including Defendants Shipe, Heistand, and Hayes, laughing while they were standing at the bottom of the tier, so he wrote a grievance. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff “went about 20-some hours without food.” (Id. ¶ 28.) The next morning, Plaintiff received a food loaf meal.[14] (Id. ¶ 29.) He was also placed on movement restriction for seven (7) days, meaning that he could not shower or go to the exercise yard.[15] (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff received the food loaf for nine (9) meals over a three (3)-day period.[16] (Id. ¶ 32.)

         On October 14, 2014, Plaintiff was moved to another regular cell, which had a leaking toilet and sink. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) Plaintiff complained about the leaks to Defendant Gilbert, but the leaks were not fixed.[17] (Id.) Plaintiff would use toilet paper or cloth to prevent the leaks from spreading. (Id. ¶ 35.) Further, Plaintiff observed an “awful smell” in connection with the leaking. (Id. ¶ 36.) The toilet was also “back-flushing, ” and sometimes “other people's feces would flush into the toilet even when it was not in use.”[18] (Id. ¶ 37.)

         On December 12, 2014, the sink and toilet flooded Plaintiff's cell. (Id. ¶ 39.) When Plaintiff “got out of bed to pray, he slipped, fell, and hurt his knee, which had an open wound.”[19](Id.) No. one responded when Plaintiff pressed the call button in his cell. (Id. ¶ 40.) When Defendant Gilbert conducted rounds of the unit, Plaintiff informed him of his injury, and Defendant Gilbert responded that he would notify the medical department.[20] (Id. ¶ 41.) The medical department did not respond immediately, but, rather, arrived during normal rounds, which occurred hours after Plaintiff's incident. (Id.) Plaintiff was given a Band-Aid for the wound. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff complained to officers in the RHU about the plumbing issue, which went unresolved.[21] (Id. ¶ 42.)

         On January 6, 2015, a major flood occurred, with feces and urine coming out of Plaintiff's sink and toilet.[22] (Id. ¶ 43.) The flood spread to about four (4) other cells. (Id.) The extension cords and electrical wires for Plaintiff's typewriter, radio, and television were on the floor and were submerged in the water.[23] (Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff complained to Defendant Gilbert during rounds, and Defendant Gilbert responded that he would call maintenance.[24] (Id. ¶ 45.) Hours later, staff from the maintenance department arrived, and Plaintiff was moved to the shower while they worked on the plumbing and cleaned the cell.[25] (Id. ¶ 46.) When Plaintiff was moved back to his cell, it flooded again, prompting staff to go “through the same process to have the cell cleaned.” (Id. ¶ 47.) That time, the issue was fixed to the extent that the cell did not flood again. (Id. ¶ 48.)

         2. Claims Against Defendants Mooney, Varner, Kelley, Shomper, Merritt, Weikel, Scicchitano, and Peters

         In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mooney, Varner, Kelley, Shomper, Merritt, Weikel, Scicchitano, and Peters violated his rights by “systematically denying or dismissing every grievance” submitted by Plaintiff and by “actively failing or refusing to address all issues” raised by Plaintiff in his grievances. (Doc. No. 33 ¶ 202.) Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not described how they had any personal involvement in the alleged violations of his rights.

         Liability may not be imposed under § 1983 on the traditional standards of respondeat superior. See Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1017, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976)). In Capone, the court noted “that supervisory personnel are only liable for the § 1983 violations of their subordinates if they knew of, participated in or acquiesced in such conduct.” See id. at 106 n.7. The plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in the events or occurrences that underlie the claim. See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2003); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.”). Moreover, the filing of a grievance, participation in “after-the-fact” review of a grievance, or dissatisfaction with the response to an inmate's grievance, does not establish the involvement of officials and administrators in any underlying constitutional deprivation. See Pressley v. Beard, 266 Fed.Appx. 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The District Court properly dismissed these defendants and any additional defendants who were sued based on their failure to take corrective action when grievances or investigations were referred to them.”); Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed.Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that allegations that prison officials responded inappropriately to inmate's later-filed grievances do not establish the involvement of those officials and administrators in the underlying constitutional deprivation); Ramos v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006) (“[C]ontentions that certain correctional officials violated an inmate's constitutional rights by failing to follow proper procedure or take corrective action following his submission of an institutional grievance are generally without merit.”); Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that a complaint alleging that prison officials failed to respond to the inmate-plaintiff's grievance does not state a constitutional claim), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (concluding that where a defendant, after being informed of the violation through the filing of grievances, reports, or appeals, failed to take action to remedy the alleged wrong is not enough to show that the defendant had the necessary personal involvement); Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that a mere “linkage in the prison chain of command” is not sufficient to demonstrate personal involvement for purposes of a civil rights action).

         In opposition, Plaintiff maintains that these Defendants “had knowledge of the violations or past misbehaviors through [his] grievances and acquiesced in the violations by failing or refusing to address or correct [them].” (Doc. No. 106 at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that they had notice “of the repeated failure or refusal to take preventative action and have the plumbing [in the cells] fixed, repaired, or replaced and of the repeated failure or refusal to protect and immediately remove him from the hazardous living conditions of those cells.” (Id. at 5.) While the review of grievances will not establish personal involvement in an underlying violation, several courts have concluded that a supervisory official may be held liable stemming from the review of a grievance alleging an ongoing violation because the official “is personally involved in that violation because he is confronted with a situation he can remedy directly.” See Mayo v. Oppman, No. CV 17-311, 2018 WL 1833348, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 943528 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2018); Gibbs v. Univ. Corr. Healthcare, No. CV 14-7138 (MAS) (LHG), 2016 WL 6595916, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2016); Whitehead v. Rozum, No. 11-102, 2012 WL 4378193, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2012). In the instant case, however, the evidence before the Court indicates that Plaintiff did not present these Defendants with grievances intended to correct ongoing violations, but, rather, submitted grievances only with the intention of addressing past violations. Cf. Talley v. Wetzel, No. 2:18-cv-0230, 2018 WL 6198364, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2018) (concluding that the inmate-plaintiff had stated plausible supervisory liability claims because he submitted grievances for each day he was subjected to the challenged conditions). Thus, as a matter of law, Defendants Mooney, Varner, Kelley, Shomper, Merritt, Weikel, Sccichitano, and Peters cannot be held liable based upon their participation in after-the-fact review of his grievances. See Brooks, 167 Fed.Appx. at 925. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of these Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims against them.[26]

         3. Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims

         a. Right to Redress Grievances

         Plaintiff also maintains that Defendants interfered with his First Amendment right to seek redress of his grievances, presumably due to their failure to his grievances in a way that was favorable to him. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 187, 190, 193, 196, 199, 202.) Prisoners, however, do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures. See Heleva v. Kramer, 214 Fed.Appx. 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, a prison official's failure to investigate or respond favorably to an inmate's grievances does not constitute a constitutional violation. See Stringer v. Bureau of Prisons, Fed. Agency, 145 Fed.Appx. 751, 753 (3d Cir. 2005); Thibodeau v. Watts, No. 1:CV-05-2505, 2006 WL 89213, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006). Moreover, while “[p]risoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress of their grievances from the [G]overnment, . . . that right is the right of access to the courts, and this right is not compromised by the failure of the prison to address his grievances.” See Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997).

         To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights to access the courts, he cannot maintain such a claim. In order to sustain such a claim, an inmate must allege facts demonstrating an “actual injury” to his litigation efforts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). To establish an actual injury, an inmate must demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded. See id.; see also O'Connell v. Williams, 241 Fed.Appx. 55, 57 (3d Cir. 2007). “[A]n inmate cannot establish a relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's law library or legal assistance . . . is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; see also Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2008) (observing that a “claim rest[ing] solely on the ground that the defendants confiscated . . . legal materials” is insufficient on its face to support a denial of access to the courts claim). Rather, to establish a right of access to the courts claim, a plaintiff must plead that he lost an opportunity to file a case in court and that he could not subsequently file that case after the interference with the right of access to the court ceased. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). In the instant case, nothing in the record establishes that Plaintiff either lost an opportunity to file a case in court or that he could not subsequently file a case after the alleged interference with his right of access to the courts ceased. Thus, the Court will grant Defendants summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to redress his grievances.

         b. Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression

         Plaintiff next suggests that Defendants' actions violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 187, 190, 193, 196, 199, 202.) “[I]mprisonment does not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important constitutional protections, including those of the First Amendment.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006). The Constitution, however, “sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it would allow elsewhere.” See id. To recover under § 1983 for a violation of this First Amendment right, a plaintiff “must allege that the defendant intended to inhibit speech protected by the First Amendment, and that his ‘speech was in fact chilled or intimidated.'” See Proverb v. O'Mara, No. 08-cv-431-PB, 2009 WL 368617, at *14 (D.N.H. Feb. 13, 2009) (quoting Sullivan v. Carrick, 888 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989)). Here, nothing in the record establishes that Defendants acted in any way intended to inhibit Plaintiff's right to free speech or expression. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment to Defendants as to these claims.

         c. Right to Be Free from Defamation

         Next, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants' actions violated his First Amendment right to be free from defamation of character. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 187, 190, 193, 196, 199, 202.) Defamation, however, is actionable under § 1983 only “if it occurs in the course of or is accompanied by a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or the Constitution.” See Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, “to make out a . . . claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest.” See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006). This showing has become known as the “stigma plus” test. See Graham v. City of Phila., 402 F.3d 139, 142 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005). “To satisfy the ‘stigma' part of the test, it must be alleged that the purportedly stigmatizing statement(s) (1) were made publicly, and (2) were false.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 236. “To satisfy the ‘plus' requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged defamation harming [his] reputation ‘occurs in the course of or is accompanied by extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by law or the Constitution.'” Mun. Revenue Servs., Inc. v. McBlain, No. 06-4749, 2007 WL 879004, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2007).

         Here, nothing in the record before the Court suggests that Defendants made public false statements about Plaintiff. Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that any alleged defamation extinguished a right or status guaranteed to Plaintiff by law or the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants summary judgment as to Plaintiff's First Amendment claims regarding defamation.

         d. Retaliation

         Plaintiff also raises retaliation claims against Defendants. Specifically, he asserts that: (1) Defendants Kistler, Shipe, Krzykowski, Howel, Drucis, Burrows, and Heistand retaliated against him by subjecting him to the hard cell conditions; (2) Defendant McDonald retaliated against him by refusing him use of his nail clippers, writing a false misconduct, and placing him on food loaf and movement restriction, which meant he could not shower or go to the exercise yard for a week; (3) Defendants Lenker, McDonald, Baker, Novalis, Shipe, Heistand, Hayes, and Howel retaliated against him by denying him a food tray; (4) Defendant Gilbert retaliated against him by refusing to fix the leaks in his cell and by not immediately removing him from the cell when it flooded on January 6, 2015; (5) Defendant Kelley retaliated against him by designating Defendant Scicchitano to serve as the officer responding to his grievance; and (6) Defendants Scicchitano, Mooney, Weikel, Shomper, Kistler, Peters, Varner, and Merritt retaliated against him by dismissing his grievances. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 190, 193, 196, 199, 202.) According to Plaintiff, all of these actions were taken in retaliation for ...


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