United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
se Plaintiff Richard Sears (“Plaintiff”),
who is currently confined at the State Correctional
Institution in Albion, Pennsylvania (“SCI
Albion”), initiated the above-captioned action by
filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on
January 9, 2017, against numerous employees of the Department
of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional
Institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania (“SCI Coal
Township”). (Doc. No. 1.) On September 25, 2017,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, asserting claims of
interference with his right to use the grievance system,
retaliation, interference with his right of free speech,
defamation, denial of access to the courts, unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, deliberate indifference to his
medical needs, due process violations, equal protection
violations, and excessive force in violation of the First,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, as well as claims alleging violations of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various state
torts. (Doc. No. 33.)
engaging in discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 84) and supporting materials (Doc. Nos.
85, 86, 99). Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to exclude
alleged evidence of his deposition (Doc. No. 89) and a motion
to strike Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc.
No. 92). On February 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Carlson denied
Plaintiff's motion to strike. (Doc. No. 96.) After
receiving two (2) extensions of time (Doc. Nos. 101, 102,
103, 104), Plaintiff filed a response to Defendants'
statement of facts (Doc. No. 105) and brief in opposition
(Doc. No. 106). Defendants then filed a reply brief (Doc. No.
110) after receiving an extension of time to do so (Doc. Nos.
107, 109). Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 84) and Plaintiff's motion to exclude
(Doc. No. 89) are ripe for disposition.
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the Court to render
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[T]his standard provides that the
mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the
parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be
no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
disputed fact is “material” if proof of its
existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the
case under applicable substantive law. See id. at
248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070,
1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v.
Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
determining whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact, the Court must view the facts and all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Moore v.
Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir.
1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56,
59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the
nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated
allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party seeking
summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56 of
identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party is
required to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories or the like in order
to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a
genuine issue. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing the motion
“must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production
to the nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to
show the existence of every element essential to its case
that it bears the burden of proving at trial, for “a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of
the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
323; see also Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846,
851 (3d Cir. 1992).
determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the
Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See White, 862 F.2d at 59.
In doing so, the Court must accept the nonmovant's
allegations as true and resolve any conflicts in his favor.
See id. (citations omitted). However, a party
opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local
Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party
to submit a “statement of the material facts,
responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the
statement required [to be filed by the movant], as to which
it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be
tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll
material facts set forth in the statement required to be
served by the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted.” See L.R. 56.1. A party cannot evade
these litigation responsibilities in this regard simply by
citing the fact that he is a pro se litigant. These
rules apply with equal force to all parties. See Sanders
v. Beard, Civ. No. 09-1384, 2010 WL 2853261, at *5 (M.D.
Pa. July 20, 2010) (stating that pro se parties
“are not excused from complying with court orders and
the local rules of court”); Thomas v. Norris,
Civ. No. 02-01854, 2006 WL 2590488, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8,
2006) (explaining that pro se parties must follow
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Alleged Evidence of
submitted a transcript of Plaintiff's deposition in
support of their motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No.
86-1.) Plaintiff moves to exclude his deposition, arguing
that upon his review of the transcript, he “discovered
a plethora of pertinent testimony did get erroneously or
illegally omitted from the recording or transcription of said
deposition.” (Doc. No. 89 at 2.) He maintains that he
“listed as many changes and corrections as he could
list on the single ‘errata sheet' provided to him,
” and has attached the errata sheet to his motion.
(Id. at 2, 6.) Plaintiff believes the transcript
“has [the] tendency to cause unfair prejudice to [him],
create confusion of the issues, and mislead the Court at
summary judgment.” (Doc. No. 90 at 2.)
review of the errata sheet, the Court observes that Plaintiff
takes issue with misspelled words and the omission of words
and phrases in the transcript. (Doc. No. 89 at 6.) Evidence,
however, “should not be excluded on summary judgment on
hypertechnical grounds.” See Fowle v. C & C
Cola, 868 F.2d 59, 67 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court is not
persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that the transcript
causes unfair prejudice, confuses the issues, and misleads
the Court. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff's
motion to exclude. (Doc. No. 89.) To the extent the errata
sheet is relevant, the Court will consider it when evaluating
Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Motion for Summary Judgment
Statement of Material Facts 
9, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to a hard cell within SCI
Coal Township's Restricted Housing Unit
(“RHU”). (Doc. No. 85 ¶ 1.) A hard cell is
“used for observation purposes for inmates who display
some type of mental instability or might harm
themselves.”(Id. ¶ 3.) Unlike a regular
cell, hard cells do not have tables and stools, and they have
wickets that are used to pass items, such as food trays,
through the doors. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was
never provided an explanation of why he was placed in the
hard cell. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff stayed in the
hard cell for eighty-five (85) days. (Id. ¶ 2.)
experienced disruptions in his daily activities while
assigned to the hard cell. (Id. ¶ 5.) He
complained about his placement “and sent request slips
to the sergeants to be moved to a different cell but his
requests were ignored.” (Id. ¶ 6.) On
August 4, 2014, Plaintiff asked Defendant McDonald to use his
fingernail clippers, and Defendant McDonald responded that
“the clippers were not there.” (Id.
Plaintiff's time in the hard cell, Plaintiff experienced
issues as to the cell's plumbing. (Id. ¶
10.) Specifically, the water was leaving “dark traces
around the inside of his cup and was making his throat
irritated.” (Id.) Inmates in neighboring
cells did not have the same issue with their water.
(Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff complained about the
plumbing issues to RHU officers, including Defendants
Kistler, Shipe, Drucis, Howel, Burrows, Heistand, and
Krzykowski. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendants
Kistler, Shipe, Krzykowski, Drucis, and Howel had the
authority to move Plaintiff, but Defendant Heistand did
(Id. ¶ 13.)
was moved to a regular cell on September 4, 2014.
(Id. ¶ 14.) Nothing of note occurred with
respect to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was assigned to that
cell. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was moved to
another regular cell on September 29, 2014. (Id.
¶ 16.) At lunchtime on that day, Defendant Lenker and
another officer placed Plaintiff's meal tray on the
wicket, but before Plaintiff could reach for the tray, the
wicket was closed, and the tray fell to the floor.
(Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff called out and the
unnamed officer returned, saw the tray on the floor, and
stated that he would notify Defendant Lenker. (Id.
¶ 18.) Later that day, Defendant McDonald came to
Plaintiff's cell. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff asked
Defendant McDonald to look at the tray on the floor and
stated that he needed a new tray, but Defendant McDonald
refused to do so and walked away. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Plaintiff heard Defendant McDonald report that he had refused
to give up his tray. (Id. ¶ 21.) Defendant
Baker then made a racially charged comment to Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff complained to Defendant
Novalis about the tray and complained to Defendant Peters
about Defendant McDonald because Defendant Peters was
Defendant McDonald's supervisor. (Id.
subsequently received a misconduct for refusing to give up
the tray. (Id. ¶ 25.) Defendant
Scicchitano signed off on the misconduct. (Id.
¶ 31.) Later that day, Defendant Howel walked past
Plaintiff “at mealtime, laughing, and did not give him
a tray.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff
heard other officers, including Defendants Shipe, Heistand,
and Hayes, laughing while they were standing at the bottom of
the tier, so he wrote a grievance. (Id. ¶ 27.)
Plaintiff “went about 20-some hours without
food.” (Id. ¶ 28.) The next morning,
Plaintiff received a food loaf meal. (Id. ¶ 29.)
He was also placed on movement restriction for seven (7)
days, meaning that he could not shower or go to the exercise
yard. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff
received the food loaf for nine (9) meals over a three
(3)-day period. (Id. ¶ 32.)
October 14, 2014, Plaintiff was moved to another regular
cell, which had a leaking toilet and sink. (Id.
¶¶ 33-34.) Plaintiff complained about the leaks to
Defendant Gilbert, but the leaks were not
fixed. (Id.) Plaintiff would use
toilet paper or cloth to prevent the leaks from spreading.
(Id. ¶ 35.) Further, Plaintiff observed an
“awful smell” in connection with the leaking.
(Id. ¶ 36.) The toilet was also
“back-flushing, ” and sometimes “other
people's feces would flush into the toilet even when it
was not in use.” (Id. ¶ 37.)
December 12, 2014, the sink and toilet flooded
Plaintiff's cell. (Id. ¶ 39.) When
Plaintiff “got out of bed to pray, he slipped, fell,
and hurt his knee, which had an open
wound.”(Id.) No. one responded when
Plaintiff pressed the call button in his cell. (Id.
¶ 40.) When Defendant Gilbert conducted rounds of the
unit, Plaintiff informed him of his injury, and Defendant
Gilbert responded that he would notify the medical
department. (Id. ¶ 41.) The medical
department did not respond immediately, but, rather, arrived
during normal rounds, which occurred hours after
Plaintiff's incident. (Id.) Plaintiff was given
a Band-Aid for the wound. (Id.) Additionally,
Plaintiff complained to officers in the RHU about the
plumbing issue, which went unresolved. (Id.
January 6, 2015, a major flood occurred, with feces and urine
coming out of Plaintiff's sink and toilet. (Id.
¶ 43.) The flood spread to about four (4) other cells.
(Id.) The extension cords and electrical wires for
Plaintiff's typewriter, radio, and television were on the
floor and were submerged in the water. (Id.
¶ 44.) Plaintiff complained to Defendant Gilbert during
rounds, and Defendant Gilbert responded that he would call
maintenance. (Id. ¶ 45.) Hours later,
staff from the maintenance department arrived, and Plaintiff
was moved to the shower while they worked on the plumbing and
cleaned the cell. (Id. ¶ 46.) When Plaintiff
was moved back to his cell, it flooded again, prompting staff
to go “through the same process to have the cell
cleaned.” (Id. ¶ 47.) That time, the
issue was fixed to the extent that the cell did not flood
again. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Claims Against Defendants Mooney, Varner, Kelley, Shomper,
Merritt, Weikel, Scicchitano, and Peters
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mooney, Varner,
Kelley, Shomper, Merritt, Weikel, Scicchitano, and Peters
violated his rights by “systematically denying or
dismissing every grievance” submitted by Plaintiff and
by “actively failing or refusing to address all
issues” raised by Plaintiff in his grievances. (Doc.
No. 33 ¶ 202.) Defendants assert that they are entitled
to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not described how
they had any personal involvement in the alleged violations
of his rights.
may not be imposed under § 1983 on the traditional
standards of respondeat superior. See Capone v.
Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d
1017, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976)). In Capone, the court
noted “that supervisory personnel are only liable for
the § 1983 violations of their subordinates if they knew
of, participated in or acquiesced in such conduct.”
See id. at 106 n.7. The plaintiff must allege that
the defendant was personally involved in the events or
occurrences that underlie the claim. See Atkinson v.
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2003); Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)
(“A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal
involvement can be shown through allegations of personal
direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.
Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and
acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate
particularity.”). Moreover, the filing of a grievance,
participation in “after-the-fact” review of a
grievance, or dissatisfaction with the response to an
inmate's grievance, does not establish the involvement of
officials and administrators in any underlying constitutional
deprivation. See Pressley v. Beard, 266 Fed.Appx.
216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The District Court properly
dismissed these defendants and any additional defendants who
were sued based on their failure to take corrective action
when grievances or investigations were referred to
them.”); Brooks v. Beard, 167 Fed.Appx. 923,
925 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that allegations that prison
officials responded inappropriately to inmate's
later-filed grievances do not establish the involvement of
those officials and administrators in the underlying
constitutional deprivation); Ramos v. Pa. Dep't of
Corr., No. 06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
July 27, 2006) (“[C]ontentions that certain
correctional officials violated an inmate's
constitutional rights by failing to follow proper procedure
or take corrective action following his submission of an
institutional grievance are generally without merit.”);
Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(noting that a complaint alleging that prison officials
failed to respond to the inmate-plaintiff's grievance
does not state a constitutional claim), aff'd,
142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Rode, 845 F.2d
at 1207 (concluding that where a defendant, after being
informed of the violation through the filing of grievances,
reports, or appeals, failed to take action to remedy the
alleged wrong is not enough to show that the defendant had
the necessary personal involvement); Ayers v.
Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding
that a mere “linkage in the prison chain of
command” is not sufficient to demonstrate personal
involvement for purposes of a civil rights action).
opposition, Plaintiff maintains that these Defendants
“had knowledge of the violations or past misbehaviors
through [his] grievances and acquiesced in the violations by
failing or refusing to address or correct [them].”
(Doc. No. 106 at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that
they had notice “of the repeated failure or refusal to
take preventative action and have the plumbing [in the cells]
fixed, repaired, or replaced and of the repeated failure or
refusal to protect and immediately remove him from the
hazardous living conditions of those cells.”
(Id. at 5.) While the review of grievances will not
establish personal involvement in an underlying violation,
several courts have concluded that a supervisory official may
be held liable stemming from the review of a grievance
alleging an ongoing violation because the official “is
personally involved in that violation because he is
confronted with a situation he can remedy directly.”
See Mayo v. Oppman, No. CV 17-311, 2018 WL 1833348,
at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, 2018 WL 943528 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2018);
Gibbs v. Univ. Corr. Healthcare, No. CV 14-7138
(MAS) (LHG), 2016 WL 6595916, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2016);
Whitehead v. Rozum, No. 11-102, 2012 WL 4378193, at
*2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2012). In the instant case, however, the
evidence before the Court indicates that Plaintiff did not
present these Defendants with grievances intended to correct
ongoing violations, but, rather, submitted grievances only
with the intention of addressing past violations. Cf.
Talley v. Wetzel, No. 2:18-cv-0230, 2018 WL 6198364, at
*2-3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2018) (concluding that the
inmate-plaintiff had stated plausible supervisory liability
claims because he submitted grievances for each day he was
subjected to the challenged conditions). Thus, as a matter of
law, Defendants Mooney, Varner, Kelley, Shomper, Merritt,
Weikel, Sccichitano, and Peters cannot be held liable based
upon their participation in after-the-fact review of his
grievances. See Brooks, 167 Fed.Appx. at 925.
Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor
of these Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims against
Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims
Right to Redress Grievances
also maintains that Defendants interfered with his First
Amendment right to seek redress of his grievances, presumably
due to their failure to his grievances in a way that was
favorable to him. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 187, 190, 193,
196, 199, 202.) Prisoners, however, do not have a
constitutional right to prison grievance procedures. See
Heleva v. Kramer, 214 Fed.Appx. 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2007).
Thus, a prison official's failure to investigate or
respond favorably to an inmate's grievances does not
constitute a constitutional violation. See Stringer v.
Bureau of Prisons, Fed. Agency, 145 Fed.Appx. 751, 753
(3d Cir. 2005); Thibodeau v. Watts, No.
1:CV-05-2505, 2006 WL 89213, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006).
Moreover, while “[p]risoners do have a constitutional
right to seek redress of their grievances from the
[G]overnment, . . . that right is the right of access to the
courts, and this right is not compromised by the failure of
the prison to address his grievances.” See Wilson
v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights
to access the courts, he cannot maintain such a claim. In
order to sustain such a claim, an inmate must allege facts
demonstrating an “actual injury” to his
litigation efforts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 349 (1996). To establish an actual injury, an inmate
must demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim had been
frustrated or was being impeded. See id.; see
also O'Connell v. Williams, 241 Fed.Appx. 55, 57 (3d
Cir. 2007). “[A]n inmate cannot establish a relevant
actual injury simply by establishing that his prison's
law library or legal assistance . . . is subpar in some
theoretical sense.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351;
see also Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir.
2008) (observing that a “claim rest[ing] solely on the
ground that the defendants confiscated . . . legal
materials” is insufficient on its face to support a
denial of access to the courts claim). Rather, to establish a
right of access to the courts claim, a plaintiff must plead
that he lost an opportunity to file a case in court and that
he could not subsequently file that case after the
interference with the right of access to the court ceased.
See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415
(2002). In the instant case, nothing in the record
establishes that Plaintiff either lost an opportunity to file
a case in court or that he could not subsequently file a case
after the alleged interference with his right of access to
the courts ceased. Thus, the Court will grant Defendants
summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants
violated his First Amendment right to redress his grievances.
Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression
next suggests that Defendants' actions violated his First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression. (Doc.
No. 33 ¶¶ 187, 190, 193, 196, 199, 202.)
“[I]mprisonment does not automatically deprive a
prisoner of certain important constitutional protections,
including those of the First Amendment.” Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006). The Constitution,
however, “sometimes permits greater restriction of such
rights in a prison than it would allow elsewhere.”
See id. To recover under § 1983 for a violation
of this First Amendment right, a plaintiff “must allege
that the defendant intended to inhibit speech protected by
the First Amendment, and that his ‘speech was in fact
chilled or intimidated.'” See Proverb v.
O'Mara, No. 08-cv-431-PB, 2009 WL 368617, at *14
(D.N.H. Feb. 13, 2009) (quoting Sullivan v. Carrick,
888 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989)). Here, nothing in the record
establishes that Defendants acted in any way intended to
inhibit Plaintiff's right to free speech or expression.
Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment to
Defendants as to these claims.
Right to Be Free from Defamation
Plaintiff maintains that Defendants' actions violated his
First Amendment right to be free from defamation of
character. (Doc. No. 33 ¶¶ 187, 190, 193, 196, 199,
202.) Defamation, however, is actionable under § 1983
only “if it occurs in the course of or is accompanied
by a change or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed
by state law or the Constitution.” See Clark v.
Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus,
“to make out a . . . claim for deprivation of a liberty
interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a stigma to his
reputation plus deprivation of some additional right
or interest.” See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown,
455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006). This showing has become
known as the “stigma plus” test. See Graham
v. City of Phila., 402 F.3d 139, 142 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).
“To satisfy the ‘stigma' part of the test, it
must be alleged that the purportedly stigmatizing
statement(s) (1) were made publicly, and (2) were
false.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 236. “To
satisfy the ‘plus' requirement, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the alleged defamation harming [his]
reputation ‘occurs in the course of or is accompanied
by extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by law or
the Constitution.'” Mun. Revenue Servs., Inc.
v. McBlain, No. 06-4749, 2007 WL 879004, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 19, 2007).
nothing in the record before the Court suggests that
Defendants made public false statements about Plaintiff.
Likewise, nothing in the record suggests that any alleged
defamation extinguished a right or status guaranteed to
Plaintiff by law or the Constitution. Accordingly, the Court
will grant Defendants summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
First Amendment claims regarding defamation.
also raises retaliation claims against Defendants.
Specifically, he asserts that: (1) Defendants Kistler, Shipe,
Krzykowski, Howel, Drucis, Burrows, and Heistand retaliated
against him by subjecting him to the hard cell conditions;
(2) Defendant McDonald retaliated against him by refusing him
use of his nail clippers, writing a false misconduct, and
placing him on food loaf and movement restriction, which
meant he could not shower or go to the exercise yard for a
week; (3) Defendants Lenker, McDonald, Baker, Novalis, Shipe,
Heistand, Hayes, and Howel retaliated against him by denying
him a food tray; (4) Defendant Gilbert retaliated against him
by refusing to fix the leaks in his cell and by not
immediately removing him from the cell when it flooded on
January 6, 2015; (5) Defendant Kelley retaliated against him
by designating Defendant Scicchitano to serve as the officer
responding to his grievance; and (6) Defendants Scicchitano,
Mooney, Weikel, Shomper, Kistler, Peters, Varner, and Merritt
retaliated against him by dismissing his grievances. (Doc.
No. 33 ¶¶ 190, 193, 196, 199, 202.) According to
Plaintiff, all of these actions were taken in retaliation for