United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM
Kane
Judge
On
September 16, 2019, pro se Plaintiff John Doe
(“Plaintiff”), who is presently confined at the
Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida (“FCC
Coleman”), initiated the above-captioned civil action
by filing a complaint pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”) in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff
also filed a motion for leave to proceed using the John Doe
pseudonym (Doc. Nos. 2, 6) and a copy of his prisoner trust
fund account statement (Doc. No. 3). In an Order dated
September 24, 2019, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania transferred the case to this
Court because Plaintiff's complaint concerns events that
occurred while he was incarcerated at USP Lewisburg, which is
located within this judicial district. (Doc. No. 4.)
In an
administrative Order dated October 2, 2019, the Court
directed Plaintiff either to pay the requisite filing fee or
submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 9.) The
administrative Order was returned as undeliverable with a
note that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) required
Plaintiff's actual name to deliver his mail from the
Court. (Doc. No. 10.) On October 21, 2019, the Court issued
another administrative Order, addressed with Plaintiff's
actual name, directing him either to pay the requisite filing
fee or submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 11.) The
Court received Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis on October 31, 2019. (Doc. No.
12.) Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PLRA”), [1] the Court will perform its mandatory
screening of the complaint and, for the reasons set forth
below, will grant Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, direct service of his complaint
upon the Government, and grant his motion for leave to
proceed under the John Doe pseudonym.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on November 12, 2015, Ryan
Smith, a case manager at USP Lewisburg, told other prisoners
that Plaintiff was a “rat” and a rapist. (Doc.
No. 1 at 1.) Prisoners subsequently began researching
Plaintiff using electronic sources and “began reading
aloud Plaintiff's case orders and opinions on the open
range.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that he was
“perpetually threatened, taunted[, ] and sexually
harassed.” (Id.) On November 17, 2015,
Plaintiff was attacked by his cellmate. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that various groups of prisoners continued
to research his case information and threaten and harass him
until he was transferred from USP Lewisburg on April 24,
2017. (Id. at 2.)
On May
3, 2017, Plaintiff arrived at USP McCreary, where he was
“physically confronted by prisoners [who] transferred
from USP Lewisburg” on several occasions.
(Id.) Plaintiff had to “physically defend
himself” on several occasions. (Id.) On August
3, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred to USP Lewisburg, where he
was assigned to G-Unit and was again confronted for being a
“rat” and a rapist. (Id.) Approximately
one (1) month later, Plaintiff was reassigned to E-Unit,
where he was threatened, taunted, and labeled as a
“rat” and a sex offender by prisoners in that
unit. (Id.)
Plaintiff
maintains that he has filed numerous motions with the
respective courts to have his case information sealed and/or
redacted, but that those motions have been denied.
(Id.) He alleges that “[p]rison officials
ha[ve] failed miserably with containing this issue as well as
addressing it.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff asserts
that he has requested to be placed in protective custody or
to be transferred to state custody or “designated
institutions that address his security concerns, ” but
his requests have been “ignored.” (Id.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $1, 000, 000.00 in damages as well
as a Court Order directing that he be transferred to either
state custody or a federal correctional institution.
(Id.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal district courts must
“review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer
or employee of a governmental entity.” See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If a complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, the Court must dismiss the
complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
District courts have a similar screening obligation with
respect to actions filed by prisoners proceeding in forma
pauperis and prisoners challenging prison conditions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he
[C]ourt shall dismiss the case at any time if the [C]ourt
determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to
state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .”);
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) (“The Court shall on its
own motion or on the motion of a party dismiss any action
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility if the [C]ourt is
satisfied that the action . . . fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”).
In
dismissing claims under §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and
1997e, district courts apply the standard governing motions
to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Smithson v.
Koons, No. 15-01757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa.
June 26, 2017) (“The legal standard for dismissing a
complaint for failure to state a claim under §
1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c)(1)
is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696
F.Supp.2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (explaining that when
dismissing a complaint pursuant to § 1915A, “a
court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). To avoid
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a civil complaint must set out
“sufficient factual matter” to show that its
claims are facially plausible. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The
plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility
that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' -
‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint,
the Court accepts as true all factual allegations and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; In re
Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d
Cir. 2010). However, the Court must not accept legal
conclusions as true, and “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” will not survive a
motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
Based
on this standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a
district court must take when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations
contained in the complaint that are “not
entitled” to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine
whether any “well-pleaded factual allegations”
contained in the complaint “plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster
Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). In addition, in
the specific context of pro se prisoner litigation,
a district court must be mindful that a document filed
pro se is “to be liberally construed.”
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A
pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,
” must be held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff's Complaint
As
noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Ryan Smith, a Unit
Manager at USP Lewisburg, told other inmates that Plaintiff
is a “rat” and a rapist and that ever since then,
he has been threatened, assaulted, and taunted by other
inmates. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff maintains further that BOP
officials have not done anything to address his concerns.
(Id.) Liberally interpreting Plaintiff's pro
se pleading, the Court ...