United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM
JUAN
R. SANCHEZ, C.J.
In a
prior Memorandum and Order entered on September 18, 2019 in
Civil Action Number 19-4238 (ECF Nos. 4, 5; hereinafter
"the Hope Caffae case"), the pro se
Complaint filed by Plaintiff Peter Charles was dismissed
without prejudice and Charles was granted leave to file an
amended complaint. The Court similarly dismissed Civil Action
Number 19-4469 with leave to amend in a Memorandum and Order
entered on October 4, 2019. (ECF Nos. 4, 5; hereinafter the
"Green Street Coffee case".) Charles filed a Motion
to Amend and an Amended Complaint ("AC") in the
Hope Caffae case on October 23, 2019 (ECF Nos. 7, 8), and a
Motion to Amend in the Green Street Coffee case on the same
day (ECF No. 7), which the Court will construe as an amended
complaint.[1] For the following reasons, both ACs will
be dismissed since Charles has again failed to raise any
plausible claims. Having given Charles an opportunity to
correct the defects the Court previously noted in his
pleadings, the dismissal of each AC will be with prejudice
with one exception noted below.
I.
FACTS
In the
Hope Caffae case, Charles has again named numerous private
businesses, hospitals, and homeless shelters claiming that
they violated his civil rights by making him leave their
premises. In his Motion, he claims he was denied "as a
legal resident to sit in there [sic] places of
business." (Civ. A. No. 19-4238, ECF No. 7 at
1.)[2]
In the caption of his AC, he asserts that the was "put
out" or "kicked out" of each named private
businesses and shelter Defendant, and was denied medical
treatment at Defendants Lankenau Hospital and Wills Eye.
(Id., ECF No. 8 at 1.) He alleges his civil rights
were thereby compromised by each Defendant. (Id.)
The body of the AC only describes events that occurred in the
winter of 2017, when Charles was denied access to Hope
Caffae/Coffee Shop - which Charles describes as a homeless
shelter - after he became involved in a physical altercation.
(Id., ECF No. 8-1 at 1.) When he complained to the
police about being barred from the premises, he was allegedly
told by officers that a private shelter had the right to
refuse him services. (Id. at 3.) Finally, he alleges
that he was also "turned away" in 2018, without
specifying where this occurred. (Id. at 4.)
In the
Green Street Coffee case, Charles asserts that "I have
done nothing according to the rules and regulations of the
requirements 1st of the (law) and the binding
rules and regulations of the business establishments as well
as the Shelters" (Civ. A. No. 19-4469, ECF No. 7 at 1.)
He also asserts that "I got force [sic] to take a needle
when by behavior did not require for me to have it. I was
ruffed up by Staff and placed in unsafe place of
residence." (Id.)[3]
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As the
Court previously granted Charles leave to proceed in
forma pauperis in both these civil actions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to dismiss the ACs,
among other things, if they fail to state a claim. Whether a
complaint fails to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable
to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,
240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine
whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Id. As Charles is
proceeding pro se, the Court again construes his
allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655
F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
When
allowing a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis
the Court must also dismiss the matter if it determines,
inter alia, that the action fails to set forth a
proper basis for this Court's subject matter
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action."); Group Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v.
Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016)
(explaining that "an objection to subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may
raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte"). A
plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the
burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln
Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d
Cir. 2015) ("The burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its
existence." (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006))).
III.
DISCUSSION
A
review of the AC in the Hope Caffae case shows that Charles
has again failed to assert a basis for the exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction. While he again asserts civil
rights violations, the Court has previously explained to
Charles that he may not assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 unless the defendant can be deemed to be a
"state actor." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988) ("To state a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
under color of state law."). None of the named
Defendants against whom Charles makes substantive allegations
appear to be "state actors" subject to liability
under § 1983. As there is no other basis for the
exercise of federal question jurisdiction, the Court will not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims.
Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over
any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a
district court jurisdiction over a case in which "the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between... citizens
of different States." As Charles and each Defendant
appear to be in Pennsylvania, there is no basis to exercise
diversity jurisdiction.
In
addition, a claim under § 1983 is subject to a two-year
statute of limitations. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626,
634 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that the timeliness of a §
1983 claim is governed by the limitations period applicable
to personal injury actions of the state where the cause of
action arose); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2) (providing
two-year limitations period). Accordingly, any claim based on
an incident occurring in the early winter months of 2017
would be time barred because Charles did not file this case
until September 2019.
The
Court reaches the same jurisdictional conclusion regarding
the AC in the Green Street Coffee case as to all Defendants
other than "Social Security." Each Defendant
appears to be a private entity and not a "state
actor" for purposes of § 1983, and there is no
other basis for the exercise of federal question
jurisdiction. The Court again declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction and there appears to be no basis
for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. To the extent
that Charles seeks to raise a claim against the Social
Security Administration for the denial of benefits, since he
does not assert that he ever actually applied for benefits,
the claim is not plausible and will be dismissed without
prejudice to Charles reasserting the claim in a new
lawsuit.[4]
Having
afforded Charles the opportunity to cure the jurisdictional
defects the Court previously identified in his Complaint, and
it now appearing that any further attempt at amendment would
be futile, the ACs in each of these cases will be dismissed
without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
other than the claim against the Social Security
Administration, which ...