United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
ORDER
Alan
N. Bloch United States District Judge
AND
NOW, this 23rd day of September, 2019, upon
consideration of the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment, the Court, upon review of the Acting Commissioner
of Social Security's final decision, denying
Plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income
benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., finds that the Acting
Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995);
Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied sub nom., 507 U.S. 924 (1993);
Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988);
see also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.Supp. 942, 944
(W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the
Commissioner's decision must be affirmed, as a federal
court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely
because it would have decided the claim differently)
(citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir.
1981)).[1]
Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED.
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Notes:
[1]Plaintiff argues that the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by: (1) failing to find
at Step Two of the sequential analysis that Plaintiff's
vestibular disorder and weight loss were “severe”
impairments; (2) failing to give proper weight in his
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) analysis to
the medical opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician;
(3) failing to consider properly Plaintiff's testimony
regarding her symptoms; and (4) failing to assign Plaintiff
to the next higher age category in applying the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 2 (“the Grids”). The Court disagrees and
finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's
findings as well as his ultimate determination, based on all
the evidence presented, of Plaintiff's
non-disability.
With regard to Plaintiff's first argument, the
Court notes at the outset that the Step Two determination as
to whether a claimant is suffering from a severe impairment
is a threshold analysis requiring the showing of only one
severe impairment. See Bradley v. Barnhart, 175
Fed.Appx. 87, 90 (7th Cir. 2006). In other words,
as long as a claim is not denied at Step Two, it is not
generally necessary for the ALJ specifically to have found
any additional alleged impairment to be severe. See
Salles v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed.Appx. 140,
145 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007); Lee v. Astrue, 2007 WL
1101281, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2007); Lyons v.
Barnhart, 2006 WL 1073076, at *3 (W.D. Pa. March 27,
2006). Since Plaintiff's claim was not denied at Step
Two, it is irrelevant whether the ALJ correctly found any of
Plaintiff's other alleged impairments to be non-severe as
long as, as discussed, infra, he properly accounted
for all impairments later in his analysis.
Moreover, the Court finds here that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's findings, which do not
include vestibular disorder and weight loss among
Plaintiff's severe impairments. (R. 18). A claimant has
the burden of demonstrating, at Step Two of the disability
determination process, that he or she has a
“severe” impairment or combination of
impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.912(a),
416.920(c); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41
(1987). An impairment is “not severe” if the
medical evidence establishes that the condition has no more
than a minimal effect on the claimant's ability to
perform basic work activities. See SSR 85-28, 1985
WL 56856, at *3 (1985); Newell v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing SSR
85-28). The severity step of the sequential evaluation
process thus functions as “a de minimis
screening device to dispose of groundless claims.”
Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; see also McCrea v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir.
2004) (holding that the “burden placed on an applicant
at step two is not an exacting one”).
The Court notes that the ALJ engaged in extensive
discussion of Plaintiff's allegations related to her
vestibular issues. (R. 19-22). The ALJ reviewed in great
detail Plaintiff's various visits to physicians, but
explained that, although Plaintiff had seen multiple
specialists, there was no etiology for her subjective
symptoms and no definitive treatment recommended other than
attempts to address her symptoms. (R. 21). The ALJ also noted
that physical examinations of Plaintiff showed only
intermittent and inconsistent abnormalities, her testing was
nearly all normal, and none of her treatment providers placed
any safety limitations on her. (R. 21). Further, the ALJ
stated that, in addition to the lack of documented and
consistent objective testing, Plaintiff's reports (and
those of her sister) were not consistent with the record. (R.
21). Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in
concluding that Plaintiff's “vestibular complaints
and their various descriptions in the record are not
medically determinable impairments as none of the
claimant's treating specialists found an objective cause
for her subjective symptoms, physical examination showed only
intermittent abnormalities, testing was generally normal, and
the only basis for her treatment has been her subjective
complaints.” (R. 22).
Regarding Plaintiff's allegations of weight loss,
the Court notes that the record shows that Plaintiff's
treatment providers noted her weight in their records and
found her to be well nourished, well developed, appearing to
be healthy, and in no apparent distress. The Court thus finds
that the evidence of record fails to support Plaintiff's
argument that the ALJ should have found her weight loss to be
a severe impairment.
Upon consideration of the evidence presented in this
case, the Court therefore finds that the ALJ's decision,
which included ample discussion of the evidence of record but
did not include her vestibular issues or weight loss as
severe impairments, is indeed supported by substantial
evidence. Moreover, as the ALJ explained in his decision,
even if he “were to conclude the conditions were
medically determinable impairments, the exertional and
postural limitations, as well as limitations to hazards in
the [RFC] would account for the attendant symptoms.”
(R. 22). Thus, as noted, supra, even if the Court
were to find that the ALJ erred in failing to find
Plaintiff's vestibular disorder and weight loss to be
severe impairments, such failure would constitute harmless
error as the ALJ accounted for all of Plaintiff's
work-related limitations, regardless of the diagnostic label
under which they might fall, later on in his
analysis.
Second, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's
contention that the ALJ failed to give proper weight in his
RFC analysis to the medical opinion evidence of
Plaintiff's treating psychologist, Faisal Roberts, Psy.D.
The Court notes that a claimant's RFC is the most that a
claimant can do despite his or her limitations, and the
determination of a claimant's RFC is solely within the
province of the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. §§
416.927(d)(2), 416.945(a), 416.946(c). In formulating a
claimant's RFC, the ALJ must weigh the evidence as a
whole, including medical records, medical source opinions, a
claimant's subjective complaints, and descriptions of his
or her own limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§
416.927, 416.929, 416.945. Moreover, it is well-established
that “[t]he ALJ-not treating or examining physicians or
State agency consultants- must make the ultimate disability
and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 404.1546(c)). “The
law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating physician
does not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional
capacity.” Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197
n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). A treating physician's opinion is
only entitled to controlling weight if it is
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case
record.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
43 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).
“If, however, the treating physician's opinion
conflicts with other medical evidence, then the ALJ is free
to give that opinion less than controlling weight or even
reject it, so long as the ALJ clearly explains [his or] her
reasons and makes a clear record.” Salles v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed.Appx. 140, 148 (3d Cir.
2007). A treating physician's opinion on the ultimate
issue of disability is not entitled to any “special
significance, ” and an ALJ is not required to accept it
since the determination of whether an individual is disabled
“is an ultimate issue reserved to the
Commissioner.” Smith v. Comm'r of Social
Sec., 178 Fed.Appx. 106, 112 (3d Cir. 2006).
The Court finds that the ALJ did not fail to provide
sufficient reasons for discounting the opinion of Dr.
Roberts, nor did he substitute his own lay analysis for the
judgment of Dr. Roberts in formulating Plaintiff's RFC.
Rather, the ALJ fulfilled his duty as fact-finder to evaluate
Dr. Roberts' opinion, considering a number of factors,
and in light of all the evidence presented in the record.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927. In fact, the ALJ
specified that he was giving Dr. Roberts' opinion
“little weight” only after engaging in an
extensive discussion of Plaintiff's treatment records
with the doctor and the doctor's medical opinion. (R.
27-28, 31-32). Specifically, the ALJ noted that, in a medical
impairment questionnaire from October of 2017, Dr. Roberts
assessed Plaintiff with a GAF score of 55, indicative of
moderate symptoms, but she opined that Plaintiff had many
extreme, marked, and moderate limitations. (R. 31-32,
729-34). The ALJ also explained that Dr. Roberts stated that
Plaintiff had had 3 or more episodes of decompensation
lasting at least two weeks within a 12-month period, and she
predicted that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than
4 days per month. (R. 32, 733-34). Upon reviewing the record,
the ALJ noted that the treatment notes from Dr. Roberts and
Kreinbrook Psychological services contain unremarkable
findings. (R. 32). The ALJ also remarked that Plaintiff's
treatment records note some improvement with treatment, and
that none of her other treating providers documented findings
that would support extreme or marked limitations. (R. 32).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in
ultimately deciding to give Dr. Roberts' opinion little
weight in his analysis. (R 32).
Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing
to consider properly Plaintiff's testimony regarding her
symptoms. In support of this contention, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ should have found that the severity of her
symptoms was supported generally by the objective medical
evidence, and more specifically, that it was supported by the
medical opinion evidence. The Court finds, however, that the
ALJ did in fact properly address the medical ...