United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
D. WOLSON, J.
Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for
Certification of Interlocutory Appeal, Plaintiff Joseph
Cathcart argues that the Court’s Memorandum and Order
dated August 28, 2019 (ECF Nos. 20, 21) contain clear error
of law that require correction. Plaintiff’s Motion does
not satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating that
reconsideration or an interlocutory appeal is appropriate
here. The Court will therefore deny the Motion.
scope of a motion for reconsideration . . . is extremely
limited,” Blystone v. Horn, 664, F.3d 397, 415
(3d Cir. 2011), and its purpose “is to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d
906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Motions for reconsideration
“may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise
arguments or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5 (2008); see also
Blystone, 664 F.3d at 415 (“Such motions are not
to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case.”).
Indeed, it is “improper on a motion for reconsideration
to ask the Court to rethink what [it] had already thought
through-rightly or wrongly.” Glendon Energy Co. v.
Borough of Glendon, 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D.Pa.
1993) (citations and internal quotes omitted).
although Cathcart argues that the Court committed a clear
error of law, he makes no such showing. Instead, his Motion
merely regurgitates the same arguments that he made in
response to the original motion. That is, Cathcart’s
Motion reflects his continued disagreement with the
Court’s interpretation of the law. While Cathcart
characterizes the law as “well-settled,” the fact
is that the Court reviewed the cases that Cathcart cited
originally and that he cites again. The Court has concluded
that Cathcart’s interpretation of those cases is
incorrect, and Cathcart has done nothing to demonstrate that
the Court’s conclusion is wrong. Reconsideration is
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a court may certify an order for
interlocutory appeal when (1) the order involves a
controlling question of law, (2) as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (3) an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation. “Congress
intended that section 1292(b) should be sparingly
applied.” Milbert v. Bison Labs., Inc., 260
F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958). Cathcart has not satisfied his
burden as to any of the statutory factors.
question that “appears to be a controlling question of
law” but nevertheless presents a question “about
a court’s application of the facts of the case to the
established legal standards are not controlling questions of
law for purposes of section 1292(b).” Kao v.
CardConnect Corp., Civ. A. No. 16-5707, 2019 WL 2615720,
at * 4 (E.D.Pa. June 26, 2019) (quote omitted). Here, as
Cathcart’s Motion makes clear, his disagreement is with
the Court’s application of various legal precedents to
the facts that he has alleged. That is not the type of pure
question of law that interlocutory appeals are intended to
addition, there is a “substantial ground for difference
of opinion” when the matter involves “one or more
difficult and pivotal questions of law not settled by
controlling authority.” Id. (quoting
McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st
Cir. 1984). A court “should not certify question of
relatively clear law merely because the losing party
disagrees with [its] analysis.” Id. (quote
omitted, alteration in original). Here, as discussed above,
Cathcart makes plain that he disagrees with the Court’s
analysis, but he has not demonstrated any substantial ground
for his disagreement. He just wishes for a different outcome.
Cathcart has not demonstrated that an interlocutory appeal
would materially advance the litigation. The claims that the
Court has dismissed against USI Insurance Services LLC
(“USI”) are discreet from the remaining claim in
the case, both factually and legally. The overlap between the
claims against USI and the remaining assault claim against
the remaining defendant is minimal. Thus, Cathcart’s
arguments in his Motion about judicial efficiency do not
satisfy his burden.
Motion does not demonstrate a need for the extraordinary
relief that he seeks. The Court has analyzed his claims, and
it sees no substantial basis for Cathcart’s arguments.
Cathcart disagrees. At the end of the case, ...