United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
EDVIS E. HENDERSON, Plaintiff
AMY FLATT MANNING, et al., Defendants
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, CHIEF JUDGE.
Edvis Henderson (“Henderson”), an inmate who was
housed at all relevant times at the State Correctional
Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, (“SCI-Camp
Hill”), initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 1). The matter is proceeding via an
amended complaint. (Doc. 10). Named as defendants are Timothy
Rutherford, Theodoor Voorstad, Hans Reisinger (hereinafter
referred to as the “corrections defendants”), Sri
Burger, M.D. (“Dr. Burger”), Amy Flatt Manning,
and Mariya Kadier. Before the court are two Rule 12(b)
motions (Docs. 22, 24) to dismiss filed by the corrections
defendants and Dr. Burger, respectively.Henderson failed
to respond to defendants' motions and the time for
responding has now passed. Therefore, the motions are deemed
unopposed and ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth
below, the court will grant each pending motion. The court
will also dismiss the action against defendants Manning and
Kadier pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).
Allegations of the Amended Complaint
alleges that he injured his knee after a slip and fall at
SCI-Camp Hill. (Doc. 1). After the fall, Henderson underwent
an x-ray. (Doc. 10 at 1, 3).
6, 2018, defendant Voorstad treated Henderson and observed
his walk. (Id. at 4). Henderson avers that defendant
Voorstad did not provide an adequate examination of his knee
and did not order an MRI. (Id.)
alleges that defendant Rutherford did not provide adequate
medical care and gave him crutches instead of a wheelchair.
(Id. at p. 5). Henderson similarly alleges that Dr.
Burger did not provide any medical care and that a wheelchair
was not issued to him for three days. (Id. at 5). As
a result, Henderson had to walk with crutches, which caused
he was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at
Rockview (“SCI-Rockview”), defendant Reisinger
treated Henderson in the medical department, but “did
not have the necessary things to take fluid off knee or give
[him] a shot.” (Id. at 4). While housed at
SCI-Rockview, another x-ray was ordered. (Id.).
summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims
that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any
material fact” and for which a jury trial would be an
empty and unnecessary formality. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The
burden of proof tasks the non-moving party to come forth with
“affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the
pleadings, ” in support of its right to relief.
Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315
(M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014). This evidence must be adequate, as a
matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the
non-moving party on the claims. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587-89 (1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of
action proceed. See Pappas, 331 F.Supp.2d at 315.
Failure to Exhaust
defendants argue that Henderson failed to properly exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant
action. (Doc. 23 at 3-8; Doc. 25 at 3-6). The Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (the “PLRA”)
requires a prisoner to pursue all avenues of relief available
within the prison's grievance system before bringing a
federal civil rights action concerning prison conditions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v.
Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2000). Section
1997e(a) establishes the requirement of administrative
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA “exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
532 (2002). It has been made clear that the exhaustion
requirement is mandatory. See Williams v. Beard, 482
F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance
procedures “regardless of the relief offered through
administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v. Reno,
204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). “[I]t is beyond
the power of [any] ...