United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
J. PAPPERT, J.
Dalanas sued Uni-Kem Chemicals, Inc., alleging that Uni-Kem
violated his rights under the FLSA and the PMWA by failing to
pay him the minimum wage and not properly compensating him
for overtime hours. Uni-Kem moves to dismiss the Amended
Complaint on the grounds that a portion of the claimed
damages is time-barred by the FLSA's and PMWA's
statutes of limitations and that Dalanas has not sufficiently
pleaded that he was a Uni-Kem employee or that he suffered
any damages. The Court denies the Motion for the reasons that
began his employment with Uni-Kem as a technician on July 1,
2015. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 7.) He worked in
Uni-Kem's Tullytown, Pennsylvania office. (Id.
at ¶ 14.) Dalanas “perform[ed] manual labor,
” “pick[ed] up and drop[ped] off equipment,
” “travel[led] to different job locations”
and performed some clerical work. (Id. at ¶
26.) He had no managerial responsibilities. (Id. at
Amended Complaint alleges that Uni-Kem “regularly
supervised [Dalanas's] work, set [his] schedule, and
determined the hours” he worked. (Id. at
¶ 23.) Dalanas “used tools and/or equipment
provided by [Uni-Kem]” to perform his work.
(Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.) Uni-Kem
“promulgated work rules, policies, and procedures that
applied to [Dalanas] and [Uni-Kem] had the authority to
discipline [him] for any violation” of those rules.
(Id. at ¶ 21.) Uni-Kem kept records of
Dalanas's work in its Tullytown office. (Id. at
alleges that from July 1, 2015 to August 15, 2018, he
“routinely” worked eighty hours per week,
including “overnight jobs” approximately twice
per week. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.) He claims
Uni-Kem never paid him. (Id. at ¶¶ 25,
30.) Instead, Uni-Kem “expected [another Uni-Kem]
employee, Robert Albert . . . to pay [Dalanas].”
(Id. at ¶ 25.) Dalanas received $250 from
Albert each week. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Dalanas filed
this lawsuit on April 1, 2019. (Compl., ECF No.
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). A complaint
must provide “more than labels and conclusions”
or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Id. (citation omitted). While a
complaint need not include detailed facts, it must provide
“more than an unadorned,
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555).
and Iqbal require the Court to take three steps to
determine whether the complaint will survive defendants'
motion to dismiss. See Connelly v. Lane Const.
Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). First, it must
“take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 675). Next, it must identify the allegations that
are no more than legal conclusions and thus “not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Finally, where the
complaint includes well-pleaded factual allegations, the
Court “should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679). The Court should “construe truths in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable
inferences from them.” Id. at 791.
first argues that Dalanas's claims for damages that
allegedly accrued between July 1, 2015, and April 1, 2016 are
barred by the FLSA's and PMWA's statutes of
limitations. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)
(“[E]very [FLSA] action [for unpaid minimum wages or
overtime compensation] shall be forever barred unless
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued,
except that a cause of action arising out of a willful
violation may be commenced within three years . . .
.”); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 260.9a(g) (“No . .
. legal action shall be instituted under the [PMWA] for the
collection of unpaid wages . . . more than three years after
the day on which such wages were due and payable . . .
.”). Dalanas concedes that his claims for damages
before April 1, 2016 are outside of the applicable
limitations periods, but argues that the statutes of
limitations are equitably tolled because Uni-Kem failed to
post summaries of the FLSA and PMWA in its Tullytown office
as required by both statutes. See (Am. Compl.
¶¶ 48, 55, 63, 71); 29 C.F.R. § 516.4; 43 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 333.108.
cites Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d
187 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an employer's failure to post an ADEA
notice in the workplace tolls the ADEA's limitations
period for filing a claim with the Secretary of Labor.
District courts within the Third Circuit have applied
Bonham in the FLSA and PMWA contexts, holding that
an employer's failure to post summaries of the FLSA and
PMWA in the workplace tolls the applicable statutes of
limitations. See, e.g., Order, Albert v. Uni-Kem
Chems., Inc., No. 19-cv-1368 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2019),
ECF No. 16; Ying Yang v. Vill. Super Mkt., Inc.,
2019 WL 1275059 at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2019),
reconsideration denied, 2019 WL 2135908 (D.N.J. May
14, 2019); Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Servs., Inc.,
833 F.Supp. 470, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Kamens v. Summit
Stainless, Inc., 586 F.Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
as true Dalanas's allegations that Uni-Kem failed to post
FLSA and PMWA summaries in its Tullytown office, the Amended
Complaint's allegations are sufficient to toll the FLSA
and PMWA's statutes of limitations at this stage of the