United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
ARTIS C. CARROLL, JR.
citizen sentenced by a Pennsylvania state judge to prison
followed by parole with conditions must timely complete the
conditions. Pennsylvania police authorities may otherwise
obtain a bench warrant and arrest him for violating parole
followed by a parole violation hearing within a reasonable
time following his loss of liberty. The Commonwealth requires
its courts rule on the parole violation within a reasonable
time of the conduct. When a parole officer issues the
violation notice within a day of the violation and the parole
revocation hearing occurs within five weeks of a bench
warrant issued by a state court judge leading to the
parolee's arrest, the parolee cannot claim his parole
officer violated his right to due process by delaying his
revocation hearing. He also cannot claim a parole revocation
hearing held by a state court judge allows him to sue his
parole officer for violating his double jeopardy protections.
We grant the parole officer's motion to dismiss the
former inmate's pro se claims with prejudice.
Pro se allegations and the public
officials released Artis C. Carroll, Jr. from prison in
October 2016 "after [he] serv[ed] some 'back
time' due to a violation." He remained on parole with
his term "set to expire at the end of the day on
November 30[, ] 2016." The state court's parole
conditions included fifty hours of community
service. Janelle Madara served as Mr. Carroll's
parole officer. Notwithstanding "the short period of
time to find and complete [fifty] hours of community
service[, ] [Officer Madara] still made him do
it." As the condition required fifty hours
served by November 30, 2016, he could not violate the
condition until after November 30, 2016. Filing a violation
notice before the parole term expired (or at least before the
last two days of parole) is not possible.
Carroll alleges Officer Madara "knew [of] the violation
and the violator well in advance, but she waited until after
his term of parole expired to file the
violation." Officer Madara "filed the violation
approximately 12 hours after his term of parole
expired." This technical parole violation did not
require immediate detention due to a safety concern for Mr.
Carroll or the community.
unplead reasons, the Commonwealth did not promptly move
forward on arresting Mr. Carroll on the parole violation. Mr.
Carroll alleges he "wanted to know" the date of his
parole violation hearing but Officer Madara
"wouldn't tell him." Mr. Carroll alleges a bench
warrant issued in April or May 2017 "issued by [Officer]
Madara." The public record corrects Mr.
Carroll's pro se recollection confirming a state
court judge signed the bench warrant on May 17,
2017. The state court held a hearing on June
22, 2017 resulting in the state court judge finding he
violated parole. The Commonwealth did not release him
"until on or about June 29, 2017 when he maxed out or
his sentence was terminated."
Carroll blames Officer Madara, who, he claims, "denied
him a speedy hearing" because she "didn't
schedule the hearing as speedily as possible, as [d]ue
process requires and [she] should've filed the violation
before the parole expired or not file it at
all." Mr. Carroll sues Officer Madara in her
individual capacity. He alleges Officer Madara (1) violated
his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (2) violated his rights under the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Madara moves to dismiss Mr. Carroll's
claims. Mr. Carroll has not opposed the motion.
Mr. Carroll has not stated a claim. We grant Officer
Mr. Carroll cannot plead Officer Madara denied him
Madara argues we must dismiss Mr. Carroll's due process
claim because he "has not pled facts to support that his
due process rights were violated because of an unreasonable
delay in his parole revocation hearing for which Officer
Madara] was responsible." Officer Madara argues Mr.
Carroll did not endure an unreasonable delay in violation of
his due process rights. She also emphasizes her lack of
personal involvement in delaying the scheduling of hearings,
which Mr. Carroll argues caused the alleged injury.
"[A]ll orders relating to scheduling the hearings
related to [Mr. Carroll's] defiant trespass charge and
subsequent parole violation hearings were entered ... by
Court of Common Pleas Judges," she argues.
Madara timely issued the violation.
Carroll does not demonstrate how Officer Madara's
"wait[ing] until after his term of parole expired to
file the violation" deprived him due
process. In Schepp v. Fremont Cty.,
Wyoming, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found "[m]any states provide that
revocation proceedings may commence within a reasonable time
after the probation period terminates," and
"[t]hese schemes have not been held to violate
probationers' constitutional due process
rights." The court of appeals found the
"[f]ailure to commence revocation proceedings before the
end of formal probation does not, in itself, create a
significant likelihood that probationers' constitutional
rights will be violated."
law permits "a sentence for a violation of the terms of
probation [to] be imposed after the expiration of the
probationary period if the revocation is based on a violation
which occurred within the probationary period," so long
as the probation is revoked and the sentence is "imposed
within a reasonable time after the expiration of the
Commonwealth charged Mr. Carroll for failing to meet the
terms of his parole requiring fifty hours of community
service. He admittedly did not serve fifty hours of community
service. His present reasons for failing to do so are not
before us. Officer Madara issued the violation on the first
possible day. This notice is timely.
weeks between warrant and hearing does
not violate due process.
Carroll challenges the delay between Officer Madara's
violation notice on December 1, 2016 and his June 22, 2017
revocation hearing. He claims this delay violates his right
to due process even though the Commonwealth did not arrest
him until approximately five weeks before his revocation
hearing. He misunderstands the nature of due process which
focuses on the time after the parole violator is placed in
"[Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute
liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of
special parole restrictions." Notwithstanding a
parolee's highly conditional liberty, our Supreme Court
in Morrissey v. Brewer held the parolee's
"liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court in
Morrissey held due process requires a parolee
receive "an effective but informal hearing" at
"two important stages in the typical process of parole
first important stage is an initial "inquiry ... in the
nature of a 'preliminary hearing' to determine
whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to
believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts that
would constitute a violation of parole
conditions." The second important stage, the
"[Revocation [h]earing," "must lead to a final
evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration
of whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation." The parolee must have an opportunity at
the revocation hearing "to be heard and to show, if he
can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did,
that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation
does not warrant revocation. The revocation hearing must be
tendered within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken
Morrissey, the Supreme Court in Moody v.
Daggett held "the loss of liberty as a parole
violator does not occur until the parolee is taken into
custody under the warrant." A parolee "has been
deprived of no constitutionally protected rights simply by
issuance of a parole violator warrant. The Commission
therefore has no constitutional duty to provide petitioner an
adversary parole hearing until he is taken into custody as a
parole violator by execution of the
warrant." Our Court of Appeals reaffirmed this
principle last year writing, "the duty to provide a
hearing arises only when the parolee 'is taken into
custody as a parole violator by execution of the
warrant,' because ...