United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
John
E. Jones III United States District Judge.
Presently
pending before the Court are two motions for judgment on the
pleadings filed by Defendants the Milton Hershey School and
the Hershey Trust Company (“the Motions”). (Docs.
240, 242). Both matters have been fully briefed, (Docs. 241,
242, 251, 252, 261, 262), and are ripe for disposition. For
the reasons that follow, the Motions shall be granted in part
and denied in part.
I.
BACKGROUND
The
underlying facts of this case have been discussed at length
in several previous Memoranda and Orders issued by this
Court. (Docs. 62, 216, 230, 258). To reiterate, Defendants
the Milton Hershey School and the Hershey Trust Company, as
Trustee for the Milton Hershey School Trust (collectively,
“Defendants” or “the School”),
operate a cost-free, not-for-profit, residential academy.
Plaintiffs Julie Wartluft (“Wartluft”) and
Frederick Bartels, Jr. (“Bartels”) are the
parents of Abrielle Kira Bartels (“Abrielle”), a
former student.
In
their amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that, despite
knowing that Abrielle suffered from depression and suicidal
ideations, Defendants discharged her from their care under a
“shadow policy” which mandated that students be
expelled from the School after two mental health
hospitalizations, even if those hospitalizations were
recommended by school staff. (Doc. 29 at ¶ 108).
Abrielle committed suicide shortly after her discharge.
Wartluft and Bartels, in their individual capacities and in
their capacities as administrators of the Estate of Abrielle
Kira Bartels (“the Estate”), sought
damages.[1]
Following
several rulings from this Court, [2] the following counts alleged
in Plaintiffs' amended complaint remain viable. In Count
I, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated several
provisions of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) by
dismissing Abrielle from the School and by barring her from
entering what had been her home for several years and from
participating in various school functions on the basis of her
mental disability. In Count III, Plaintiffs aver that
Defendants were negligent in dismissing Abrielle from their
care thereby forcing her into an unstable environment
resulting in her death. In Count V, Plaintiffs Wartluft and
Bartels in their individual capacities (collectively,
“Individual Plaintiffs”) allege a wrongful death
action, and in Count VI, the Estate, represented by the
Individual Plaintiffs in their capacities as administrators
of the Estate, alleges a survival action. In Counts IX and X,
Plaintiffs allege intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. In Count XI, Plaintiffs allege a civil
conspiracy amongst the Defendants to endanger children under
Pennsylvania law. In Count XII, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants breached their fiduciary duty of care and of good
faith. In Count XIII, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants were
negligent per se predicated upon asserted violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
and the FHA.
On
April 18, 2019, Defendants filed two motions for judgment on
the pleadings. The first sought judgment on the pleadings as
to Wartluft and Bartels in their individual capacities. (Doc.
240). The second sought judgment on the pleadings as to the
Estate. (Doc. 242). Both matters have been fully briefed,
(Docs. 241, 242, 251, 252, 261, 262), and are ripe for
disposition. As aforestated, and for the reasons that follow,
the Motions shall be granted in part and denied in part.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides “[a]fter the
pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). When, as here, the basis of the moving
party's Rule 12(c) motion is that the plaintiff has
allegedly failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the motion is properly analyzed under the same
standard of review applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss. See Revell v. Port Authority, 598 F.3d 128,
134 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A motion for judgment on the
pleadings based on the defense that the plaintiff has failed
to state a claim is analyzed under the same standards that
apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
In
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether,
under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374
n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In resolving a motion pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), a court generally should consider only the
allegations in the complaint, as well as “documents
that are attached or submitted with the complaint, . . . and
any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the
claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public
record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the
case.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452
F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
A Rule
12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint
against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2)
requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
“in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need
not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff
must allege facts that “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level . . . .” Victaulic Co. v.
TIeman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Accordingly, to satisfy
the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that
defendant's liability is more than a “sheer
possibility.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.'”
Id.
III.
DISCUSSION
Because
the instant Motions overlap as to several lines of inquiry,
for purposes of at least a modicum of brevity, we group
relevant argument together and identify divergent issues
where appropriate. We address Defendants' arguments as to
each count in Plaintiffs' amended complaint
seriatim.
a.
Count I - Fair Housing Act
Defendants
first argue that Count I should be dismissed as to both the
Individual Defendants and the Estate. We first address
Defendants' arguments as to the Individual Plaintiffs and
then address Defendants' arguments as to the Estate.
1.
Individual Plaintiffs' Claims under the Fair Housing
Act
In
their first issue, Defendants argue that the Individual
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have Article
III standing to pursue their claim under the FHA and that
Count I must be dismissed to the extent it seeks a remedy on
their behalf. Specifically, Defendants contend, although
Plaintiffs' amended complaint outlines the harms that
Abrielle allegedly suffered as a result of her dismissal from
the School, Plaintiffs have failed to plead that Wartluft or
Bartels suffered any injury sufficient to confer upon them
Article III standing. (Doc. 241 at 11 (citing Fair Hous.
Council v. Main Line Times, 141 F.3d 439, 441 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that a plaintiff must allege a “distinct
and palpable' injury sufficient to satisfy Article III
standing requirements under the Fair Housing Act”);
O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir.
1973) (“[O]ne cannot sue for the deprivation of
another's civil rights.”)).
In
response, the Individual Plaintiffs do not address Article
III standing specifically. Rather, the Individual Plaintiffs
contend that they are “aggrieved persons” under
the Fair Housing Act who “have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice.” (Doc. 252 at 16
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)) (“An aggrieved person
may commence a civil action in an appropriate United States
district court or State court not later than 2 years after
the occurrence or the termination of an alleged
discriminatory housing practice.”); 42 U.S.C. §
3602(i)(1) (“‘Aggrieved person' includes any
person who-(1) claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such
person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice
that is about to occur.”)). The Individual Plaintiffs
further argue that “[t]he Supreme Court has held that
the definition of ‘aggrieved person' reflects a
congressional intent to expand standing under the FHA to the
full extent permitted by the Constitution's Article III,
” (Doc. 252 at 16 (citing Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176 (2011)),
and that the Fair Housing Act was intended to be
“liberally construed.” (Id. (citing
San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d
470, 475 (9th Cir. 1998)). In this case, Individual
Plaintiffs conclude, Wartluft and Bartels were
“aggrieved persons” because they suffered the
loss of Abrielle's companionship and services as a result
of the School's discriminatory conduct and, therefore,
they have Article III standing to pursue their claims under
the FHA. (Doc. 252 at 16-17 (citing Doc. 29 at ¶¶
200-202)).
In
their Reply, Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' contention
that simply being an “aggrieved person” under the
FHA confers Article III standing. Moreover, Defendants
explain, the sparse factual assertions related to
Plaintiffs' alleged loss-of-services injury is discussed
under their wrongful death claim, not their FHA claim. Thus,
because “‘a plaintiff must demonstrate standing
for each claim he seeks to press,' and here, the Amended
Complaint does not contain a single allegation regarding
injury directly suffered by [the Individual] Plaintiffs that
is ‘fairly traceable to a ‘discriminatory housing
practice, '” the Individual Plaintiffs' FHA
claim fails as a matter of law. (Doc. 262 at 14 (citing
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335
(2006)). We agree with Defendants' conclusion but base
our decision upon a different rationale.
“Absent
Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff's claims, and
they must be dismissed.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp.
Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). “The
sole requirement for standing to sue under the Fair Housing
Act is the [Article] III minima of injury in fact: that the
plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant's
actions he has suffered ‘a distinct and palpable
injury.'” Fair Hous. Council of Suburban
Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 75
(3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982)). “[S]o long as
this requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has
granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear
implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of
the legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may
invoke the general public interest in support of their
claim.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975).
In
2011, in the context of Title VII, our Supreme Court narrowed
the scope of who is entitled to seek relief considered an
“aggrieved person” in Thompson v. North
American Stainless, LP. In short, the High Court held
that, in order to constitute an “aggrieved
person” under Title VII, a claimant must allege an
injury in fact that falls “within the ‘zone of
interests' sought to be protected by the statutory
provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his [or
her] complaint.” Thompson, 562 U.S. at 177. In
other words, a claimant is only considered an
“aggrieved person” with Article III standing if
they assert the violation of an interest “arguably
[sought] to be protected by the statute” at issue.
Id. at 178.
In so
holding, the Court expressed disapproval with the Third
Circuit's discussion in Hackett v. McGuire
Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971) which referenced
in dicta that Congress' use of the term
“aggrieved person” in the context of the Fair
Housing Act “showed ‘a congressional intention to
define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of
the Constitution.'” Hackett, 445 F.2d at
446. The Supreme Court reasoned in Thompson that the
Third Circuit's reading of Congress' intent
“was too expansive” and the Court signaled that
future decisions should utilize the “zone of
interests” analysis discussed therein.
Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176.
Recently,
in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, Fla., ___
U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1296 (2017), the Supreme Court applied
the “zone of interests” analysis outlined in
Thompson to address standing under the FHA.
Id. at 1305. In Bank of America, the Court
held that the City of Miami had standing to pursue claims
against Bank of America under the FHA because the City's
claims “arguably fall within the FHA's zone of
interests.” Id. at 1304-1305 (citing
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) (allowing suit by white tenants claiming that they
were deprived benefits when discriminatory rental practices
kept minorities out of their apartment complex);
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979) (allowing suit by a village that alleged that it had
lost tax revenue and had the racial balance of its community
undermined by racial-steering practices); Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (allowing suit by
a nonprofit organization that spent money to combat housing
discrimination)). Specifically, the Court reasoned, Bank of
America “intentionally targeted predatory practices at
African-American and Latino neighborhoods and residents,
” which “led to a ‘concentration' of
‘foreclosures and vacancies' in those
neighborhoods, ” which, in turn, “caused
‘stagnation and decline in African-American and Latino
neighborhoods, '” “hindered the City's
efforts to create integrated, stable neighborhoods, ”
and “reduced property values, diminishing the
City's property-tax revenue and increasing demand for
municipal services.” Id. Finding that these
injuries were within the zone of interests contemplated by
the FHA, the Supreme Court held that the City of Miami had
Article III standing to pursue its claims as an
“aggrieved person” under the statute.
In a
dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Justice Thomas
disagreed, arguing that the City of Miami's injuries fell
outside the FHA's zone of interests because those
injuries were only “marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes” of the FHA, which, in
the Dissent's view, was not “concerned about
decreased property values, foreclosures, and urban blight,
much less about strains on municipal budgets that might
follow.” Id. at 1308-1310. Thus, according to
the Dissent, the City of Miami was not similarly situated to
the plaintiffs in Trafficante, Gladstone,
or Havens, and the City's injuries fell outside
the FHA's zone of interests.
In
light of Bank of America, it is clear that a
plaintiff has standing to pursue claims under the FHA
provided he or she can demonstrate that he or she suffered an
injury in fact that falls within the zone of interests
contemplated by the FHA. That is, “that as a result of
the defendant's actions [he or she has] suffered ‘a
distinct and palpable injury, '” Fair Hous.
Council of Suburban Philadelphia, 141 F.3d at 75
(quoting Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 372), and
that said injury falls within the zone of interests
implicated by the FHA. Bank of America Corp., ___
U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. at 1305.
In
their amended complaint and as noted in their briefs before
this Court, the Individual Plaintiffs aver that they suffered
“loss of support, loss of aid, loss of services, loss
of companionship, loss of consortium and comfort, loss of
counseling and loss of guidance” as a result of
Defendants' actions. (Doc. 29 at ¶ 200). While we
acknowledge that Plaintiffs did not technically incorporate
this provision by reference into Count I's FHA claim
because these loss-of-services allegations were discussed in
Count V under Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim, we find
that Plaintiffs' allegations as to Count V can be imputed
to Count I for purposes of establishing standing. In our
view, Plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to place
the Defendants on notice of all of the factual predicates
upon which Plaintiffs' thirteen counts were based,
whether those factual predicates were outlined in Count I or
Count V. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)
(finding that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, “in order to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.”).
Even
were we inclined to favor form over substance and find fatal
Plaintiffs' failure to include their allegations
concerning loss of services within Count I, we note that the
ordinary remedy in such a case would be an amended filing.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e); Wagner v. First Horizon
Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“[W]e disagree that dismissal was the appropriate
course of action for the district court to take at this
juncture in the litigation. As the district court concluded,
‘the problem was not that Plaintiffs did not allege
enough facts, or failed to recite magic words; the problem
lay in the fact that while Plaintiffs introduced a great deal
of factual allegations, the amended complaint did not clearly
link any of those facts to its causes of action.' We
disagree with the dismissal of this case because these
observations sound more clearly in Rule 12(e)'s remedy of
ordering repleading for a more definite statement of the
claim, rather than in Rule 12(b)(6)'s remedy of dismissal
for failure to state a claim.”); Cates v. Int'l
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 756 F.2d 1161, 1180 (5th Cir.
1985) (finding that pleadings that are “extremely
conclusory, confused, and unclear” are normally subject
to amendment rather than dismissal); Belizaire v.
Whitecap Inv. Corp., No. CV 2013-66, 2014 WL 4961599, at
*3 (D.V.I. Oct. 3, 2014). Because this case has been pending
since 2016 and because the instant case comes before us on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings which necessitates a
deferential standard of review, rather than demanding
repleader, we simply find that Plaintiffs have stated
sufficient facts in their amended complaint to demonstrate
that they have suffered an injury in fact.
However,
we also find that the Individual Plaintiffs have failed to
plead that their injuries fall within the zone of interests
contemplated by the FHA and we are thus constrained to
conclude that they lack standing to pursue those claims.
As
noted by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Bank of
America:
The FHA permits “[a]n aggrieved person” to sue,
§ 3613(a)(1)(A), if he “claims to have been
injured by a discriminatory housing practice “ or
believes that he “will be injured by a discriminatory
housing practice that is about to occur.” §§
3602(i)(1), (2) (emphasis added). Specifically, the FHA makes
it unlawful to do any of the following on the basis of
“race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
or national origin”: “refuse to sell or rent . .
. a dwelling, ” § 3604(a); discriminate in the
“terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of
a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, ” § 3604(b); “make,
print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination, ” § 3604(c); “represent to
any person . . . that any dwelling is not available for
inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available, ” § 3604(d); “induce any person
to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the
entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person
or persons of” certain characteristics, § 3604(e);
or discriminate in the provision of real estate or brokerage
services, §§ 3605, 3606. The quintessential
“aggrieved person” in cases involving violations
of the FHA is a prospective home buyer or lessee
discriminated against during the home-buying or leasing
process. Our cases have also suggested that the interests of
a person who lives in a neighborhood or apartment complex
that remains segregated (or that risks becoming segregated)
as a result of a discriminatory housing practice may be
arguably within the outer limit of the interests the FHA
protects.
Bank of America, 137 S.Ct. at 1308-1309 (internal
citations omitted).
In this
case, the Individual Plaintiffs have failed entirely to
explain how “loss of support, loss of aid, loss of
services, loss of companionship, loss of consortium and
comfort, loss of counseling and loss of guidance, ”
(Doc. 29 at ¶ 200), is in any way within the zone of
interests contemplated by the FHA-a statute designed to
combat discrimination in the sale or rental of housing. At
bottom, the Individual Plaintiffs' claims sound in tort
and are entirely untethered to the FHA specifically or
Abrielle's housing situation generally. Although we
understand Plaintiffs' argument that, but for
Abrielle's dismissal from the School (and her housing
therein) she would not have been forced to return home and
thereby would not have died and, in turn, the Individual
Plaintiffs' would not have suffered their loss of
services, the relationship between Abrielle's housing
claim and the Individual ...