United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
MITCHELL S. GOLDBERG, J.
Zaiyair Ali Culbreth Guyton, who is representing himself
(proceeding pro se) brings this civil action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Curran-Fromhold
Correctional Facility (“CFCF”). Guyton seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis. For the following
reasons, the Court will grant Guyton leave to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Court understands Guyton to be bringing constitutional claims
based on the conditions at CFCF, where Guyton was
incarcerated from November 21, 2014 through March 24, 2016.
Guyton alleges that CFCF was overcrowded, so he “was
forced to live in inhumane conditions where 3 men were forced
to live in one cell for almost 4 months straight at one
point.” (Compl. at 7.) Guyton seeks monetary damages for
depression, paranoia, “small forms of P.T.S.D.”
and other “mental and emotional damages.”
(Id. at 8.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court grants Guyton leave to proceed in forma
pauperis because it appears that he is not capable of
paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly,
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires
the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a
claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard
applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).
The Court may also consider matters of public record.
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260
(3d Cir. 2006). Additionally, the Court may dismiss claims
based on an affirmative defense if the affirmative defense is
obvious from the face of the complaint. See Fogle v.
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); cf.
Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 459 (3d Cir. 2013),
abrogated on other grounds by, Coleman v.
Tollefson, 135 S.Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). As Guyton is
proceeding pro se, the Court construes his
allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655
F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
claims are time-barred. Pennsylvania's two-year
limitations period applies to Guyton's § 1983
claims. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524;
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The
limitations period began to run from the time Guyton
“knew or should have known of the injury upon which
[his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc.
v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
is bringing claims based on conditions in which he was held
from November 21, 2014 through March 24, 2016. However, he
did not file this lawsuit until August 6, 2019, more than two
years after his claims accrued. Guyton knew or should have
known of the conditions in which he was incarcerated at the
time he was held in those conditions. Accordingly,
Guyton's claims are time barred.
foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Guyton will
not be given leave to amend because amendment would be
futile. An appropriate Order follows.
 The Court adopts the pagination
assigned to the Complaint by the CM-ECF docketing