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Wojciechowski v. Saul

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

July 30, 2019

STEPHEN JOSEPH WOJCIECHOWSKI, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, [1] Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          LINDA K. CARACAPPA, UNITED STATES CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         Plaintiff Stephen Joseph Wojciechowski brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, and Local Rule 72.1, consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge has been established.

         Presently before this court are plaintiff's request for review, the Commissioner's response, and plaintiff's reply. The Commissioner moved to stay the litigation pending the outcome of two cases presently before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the Commissioner's Motion for Stay be DENIED and that plaintiff's request for review be GRANTED. Plaintiff's case is remanded to a different, constitutionally appointed ALJ. Since the ALJ's decision was a nullity based on Lucia, we do not address the merits of petitioner's additional claims because a new ALJ must conduct a de novo review on remand.

         I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff is a fifty-seven-year old male born on July 17, 1962. (Tr. 28). Plaintiff has least a high school education and past relevant work as a laborer and facilities maintenance. (Tr. 28, 146-151).

         On February 12, 2015, plaintiff filed an application for DIB. (Tr. 102-103). Plaintiff's alleged disability onset date was June 14, 2013. (Tr. 128). Plaintiff's application for DIB was denied at the state level on February 14, 2014. (Tr. 12). Plaintiff's application for SSI was denied at the state level on April 8, 2015. (Tr. 50-55). Plaintiff subsequently requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

         On March 23, 2017, ALJ Stephen Bosch held a hearing. (Tr. 25-49). The ALJ issued an opinion on August 24, 2017, finding plaintiff not disabled under the Act from October 31, 2007 through the date of the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 9-24). Plaintiff filed a request for review and on July 11, 2018 the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff appealed that decision to this court.

         On September 10, 2018, plaintiff initiated the present action. Plaintiff argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's decision and, for the first time, plaintiff contends the presiding ALJ was improperly appointed and therefore lacked legal authority to decide plaintiff's case. Pl. Br. at 13-16. (citing Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S.Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (holding that ALJs employed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) were inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause of the United State Constitution and that a party who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of the officer who adjudicates his or her case is entitled to relief). Plaintiff concedes that he failed to present this Appointments Clause claim before the ALJ and the Appeals Council. Id. at 14. The Commissioner responds that plaintiff's Appointments Clause claim should be dismissed because it was not timely raised by plaintiff during the Administrative Process. Def. Resp. at 15-24.

         Since plaintiff initiated the present action, district court judges in this district have remanded identical Appointments Clause claims, while other district court judges in this district have declined to remand. Appointments Clause claims have also been raised in other districts. The Middle District of Pennsylvania issued two decisions on March 4, 2019, finding that the plaintiffs had not waived their Appointment Clause claims by failing to raise the claim during the administrative process. See Bizarre v. Berryhill, 364 F.Supp.3d 418 (M.D. Pa. 2019); Cirko v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-680, 2019 WL 1014195 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2019). On April 5, 2019, the Commissioner appealed the Middle District decisions in Bizarre and Cirko to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 21, 2019, the Commissioner moved to stay all further proceedings in this case pending the Third Circuit's ruling.

         For the reasons discussed below, we find that the ALJ was not appointed in accordance with constitutional requirements and petitioner was not required to preserve his Lucia objection at the initial administrative level of review. Additionally, it would have been futile for petitioner to raise his Appointments Clause objection before the ALJ. We also find that the Commissioner's motion for a stay is denied.

         II. STAY AND ABEYANCE

         As a threshold matter, this court must resolve the Commissioner's motion to stay before proceeding. Plaintiff argues that he would be harmed if a stay were granted because the stay would be indefinite and at a minimum add years to his case. See Pl. Resp. to Motion to Stay, Doc. 14. The Commissioner argues that a stay is appropriate because the very same Appointments Clause claim is currently pending before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, consequently granting a stay in this matter will promote judicial efficiency and consistency. Def. Motion to Stay, Doc. 21, at 2. The Commissioner also contends that this court cannot avoid plaintiff's Appointment Clause claim, even if this court were to remand on other grounds, because the resolution of the Appointment Clause claim will dictate whether plaintiff's case will be heard before the same ALJ or need to be heard before a different ALJ. Id. at 2-3. For the following reasons we find that the Commissioner's Motion for Stay is denied.

         The district court's power to stay a proceeding “is incidental to the power inherent in every court to dispose of cases so as to promote their fair and efficient adjudication.” U.S. v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 893 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1077 (3d Cir.1983)). This power to stay proceedings “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Cheyney State College Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)).

         The legal principles that guide this court have been distilled into four factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). Thus, under the district court's power to stay a proceeding, the court must weigh the competing interests of the parties. The party seeking the stay must demonstrate “a clear case of hardship or inequity, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay would work damage on another party.” Gold, 723 F.2d at 1075- 76.

         In the present case, plaintiff has demonstrated a clear case of hardship. Not only is plaintiff undeniably ill, but plaintiff has also faced significant wait times for a final decision regarding benefits, which he is potentially entitled to. Before even proceeding to this court, plaintiff waited a significant amount of time for his appeal to be heard before an ALJ, and if plaintiff's case is remanded, plaintiff will again face significant wait time until his case is reheard by a properly appointed ALJ. Plaintiff also faced additional wait time before this court. Thus, to make plaintiff wait again, when the Third Circuit may not render a final decision for several months if not more, presents a clear case of hardship. On the other hand, the Commissioner will not face a significant hardship if this case moves forward because the Commissioner has already submitted the required briefing in this matter. We believe, the resources the Commissioner will be required to expend in order to litigate this case on remand are minimal and do not constitute a hardship.

         The interests of judicial economy are also not furthered sufficiently to outweigh plaintiff's hardship. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n the exercise of its sound discretion, a court may hold one lawsuit in abeyance to abide the outcome of another which may substantially affect it or be dispositive of the issues.” Stokes v. RealPage, Inc., CV 15-1520, 2016 WL 9711699, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2016) (citing Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937)). However, “[o]nly in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). Here, although plaintiffs are already facing inconsistent results among judges, two factors weight strongly against a stay. First, the strong merits of plaintiff's claim, which are discussed in the following section. Second, the hardship plaintiff will face if a stay is granted and plaintiff is forced to continue waiting for the final disposition ...


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