United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
William I. Arbuckle III Judge
E. Jones III United States District Judge
NOW, upon consideration of the Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 82) of United States Magistrate Judge
William I. Arbuckle III recommending that the amended
complaint (Doc. 28) in this matter be dismissed, and noting that
neither party has filed objections to the report and that there
is no clear error on the record, see Nara v. Frank,
488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that
“failing to timely object to [a report and
recommendation] in a civil proceeding may result in
forfeiture of de novo review at the district court
level”) and the court finding Judge Arbuckle's
analysis to be thorough, well-reasoned, and fully supported
by the record IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
Report and Recommendation (Doc. 82) of Magistrate Judge
Arbuckle is ADOPTED in its entirety.
Officer Miller's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34) is
Commonwealth Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 59) is
County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 64) is
amended complaint (Doc. 28) is DISMISSED WITH
Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. 4), the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 21), the Motion to Stay
Discovery (Doc. 37), the Motion to Stay (Doc. 69), the Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 74), and the additional
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 79) are DISMISSED AS
Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE the
file on this case.
The claims set forth in Plaintiff's
amended complaint largely arise out of events surrounding his
arrest and later incarceration until trial on charges brought
against him in York County, and are subject to dismissal for
a variety of reasons. First, pursuant to Heck v.
Humphrey, which disallows certain civil rights and torts
claims unless and until the underlying criminal case is
resolved in a fashion favorable to the plaintiff,
Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because he has not
alleged that the underlying criminal charges against him were
overturned. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). Second, the false imprisonment and malicious
prosecution claims fail because both claims require a lack of
probable cause as an element, which, in this case, can be
assumed by the validity of Plaintiff's conviction.
See Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595,
602 (3d Cir. 2005). Third, the abuse of process claim is
time-barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations.
Martucci v. Milford Borough, No. 3:17-1671, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20907 at *22-28 (M.D. Pa. 2018); see
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 (3d Cir. 1989).
Fourth, the claims against the Commonwealth Defendants fail
because Plaintiff fails to allege their involvement in the
alleged wrongdoing. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
(3d Cir. 2005). Additionally, state employees, acting in
their official capacity, are protected under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Finally, the claims
against the County Defendants must also fail due to
Plaintiff's failure to allege their personal
involvement. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
60 (2011); see also Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't
of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).
 When parties fail to file timely
objections to a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, the Federal Magistrates Act does not require
a district court to review the report before accepting it.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). As a matter
of good practice, however, the Third Circuit expects courts
to “afford some level of review to dispositive legal
issues raised by the report.” Henderson v.
Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987). The advisory
committee notes to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure indicate that “[w]hen no timely objection is
filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), advisory committee
notes; see also Henderson, 812 F.2d at 878-79
(stating that “the failure of a party to object to a
magistrate's legal conclusions may result in the loss of
the right to de novo review in the district court”);
Tice v. Wilson, 425 F.Supp.2d 676, 680 (W.D. Pa.
2006) (holding that the court's review is conducted under
the “plain error” standard); Cruz v.
Chater,990 F.Supp. 375-78 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that
the court's review is limited to ascertaining whether
there is “clear error ...