United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
THERESA LIGATO, DONNA BUSILLO, individually and as members of D & T Transport Services, LLC, and D&T TRANSPORT SERVICES, LLC
RYDER USED VEHICLE SALES, INC.
R. Padova, J.
Plaintiffs Theresa Ligato, Donna Busillo, and D&T
Transport Services, LLC bring this action asserting breaches
of express and implied warranties and violations of the
Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. §
1951 et seq., violations of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301 et seq. (“MMWA”), and violations of
the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1 et seq.
(“UTPCPL”). Defendant Ryder Vehicle Sales, LLC
(misidentified in the Complaint as “Ryder Used Vehicle
Sales, Inc.”) has moved to dismiss some of
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we grant the
Motion in its entirety.
Complaint alleges that Theresa Ligato, Donna Busillo, and
D&T Transport Services, LLC purchased a certified used
2011 Freightliner Cascadia 125 truck from Defendant Ryder
Used Vehicle Sales on July 23, 2018. (Compl. ¶ 5, Ex.
A.) Plaintiffs bought the truck for “business and
general transportation purposes, ” and Plaintiffs
Ligato and Busillo personally signed and guaranteed payments
for the truck. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 23.) Defendant
issued several warranties in connection with the truck,
including an automatic 30-day limited powertrain warranty and
an express 12-month/100, 000 mile warranty. (Id.
¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiffs discovered defects in the truck
on August 8, 2018-16 days after buying the truck-and took the
truck to be repaired the following day. (Id.
¶¶ 12-13.) Over the next four months, Plaintiffs
sought repairs under the vehicle warranty a total of seven
times, causing Plaintiffs to lose clients and business
revenue. (Id. ¶¶ 14-21.) The truck
continues to break down regularly and to exhibit defects and
nonconformities that substantially impair its use, value, and
safety. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)
Complaint asserts five claims: 1) breach of implied warranty,
2) breach of express warranties, 3) violation of the
Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law,  4) violation of MMWA, and 5)
violation of the UTPCPL. Defendant asks us to dismiss Counts
III,  IV, and V for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we
consider “only the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, [and] matters of public record, as well as
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's
claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). We
“‘accept all factual allegations [of the
complaint] as true [and] construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.'” DelRio-Mocci
v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir.
2012) (second alteration in original) (quoting Warren
Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.
2011)). A plaintiff's pleading obligation is to set forth
“‘a short and plain statement of the claim,
'” which gives “‘the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)). The complaint must contain
“‘sufficient factual matter to show that the
claim is facially plausible,' thus enabling ‘the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for [the] misconduct alleged.'” Warren
Gen. Hosp., 643 F.3d at 84 (quoting Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)).
Count IV: MMWA
IV asserts that Defendant violated the MMWA by failing to
comply with the express written warranties that it provided
Plaintiffs. (See Compl. ¶¶ 53-59.)
Defendant moves to dismiss this Count on the ground that
Plaintiffs are not “consumers” as defined by the
MMWA and thus cannot assert a claim under the Act. Defendant
also maintains that the truck is not a “consumer
product” and is therefore not covered by the MMWA.
MMWA provides that “a consumer who is damaged by the
failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to
comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a
written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may
bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable
relief” in either state or federal court. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(d)(1). The Act defines a consumer to be:
a buyer . . . of any consumer product, any person to whom
such product is transferred during the duration of an implied
or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the
product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of
such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State
law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor)
the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).
15 U.S.C. § 2301(3). A consumer product is defined as
“any tangible personal property which is distributed in
commerce and which is normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. §
2301(1) (emphasis added). “[H]ow a particular buyer
uses the goods is irrelevant as long as the goods are
‘normally used' for consumer purposes.”
Triad Charters, Inc. v. Viking Yacht Co., Civ. A.
No. 88-4977, 1989 WL 21763, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 1989)
(citations omitted); see also Mendelson v. Country Coach,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 06-572, 2007 WL 4812279, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 9, 2007) (“The broad policy of the Mag-Moss
Act and its regulations indicates that a ‘type' or
‘class' analysis of a product is the appropriate
test in resolving the issue of coverage. An individual's
deviation from the normal use of a particular type product
will not affect its classification for purposes of the
Act.” (citations omitted)).
truck at issue is a 2011 Freightliner Cascadia 125, which is
classified by the purchase contract as a “heavy
truck.” (Compl. ¶ 5; Ex. A at 8.) Other courts
have found similar vehicles not to be consumer products under
the MMVA. See Kwiatkowski v. Volvo Trucks N. Am.,
Inc., 500 F.Supp.2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(“The court agrees . . . that a commercial
tractor-trailer is not ordinarily used for personal, family,
or household use. The normal and ordinary purpose for such
trucks is to haul trailers in transport of goods and products
over long distances for commercial benefit. Such a vehicle is
not a “consumer ...