from the Order Entered, July 30, 2018, in the Court of Common
Pleas of Monroe County, Civil Division at No(s): 580 DR 2016
and 5626 CV 2018.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI [*] , J.
(Husband) appeals from an order issued pursuant to the
Protection From Abuse (PFA) Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
6101-6122. The PFA order provided C.H.L. (Wife), inter
alia, exclusive possession of the marital residence and
awarded her temporary sole custody of the parties'
four-year-old daughter; the child was not named as a
protected party in the order. After careful review, we
meticulous, 42-page Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court
detailed the "very calculated, complex, web of domestic
violence, control and intimidation by Husband against
Wife." See T.C.O., 11/16/18, at 1. Those facts,
crucial to our understanding the court's decision, are
ultimately not essential to the disposition of Husband's
appeal. Briefly, the overture is this:
parties wed after just three weeks of dating when Husband was
46 and Wife was 20. Their five-year marriage produced a
four-year-old daughter and extensive litigation, replete with
protective orders, contempt violations and criminal charges.
Not until the instant PFA hearing, however, did the court
recognize Husband's "manipulation of all facets of
the criminal justice and court system in order to achieve
power and control over Wife." See id. at 30.
The court stated that Husband "was playing the system
like a Stradivarius." See N.T., 7/30/18, at 42.
Although Husband tried to persuade the court that Wife
suffered from various mental illnesses, the court ultimately
concluded that Wife's erratic behavior was attributable
to years of domestic violence.
PFA hearing, Wife testified to Husband's extensive abuse
and produced photographic evidence of the same. The court
further determined that Husband used custody of the
parties' child as a "weapon against Wife."
See T.C.O. at 41. The court issued a two-year PFA
order, which included provisions awarding Wife exclusive
possession of the marital residence and temporary sole
custody of the child pending a custody conference scheduled
for seven weeks later.
filed this timely appeal and presents five issues for our
1. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in
granting Wife's protection from abuse petition when the
award was against the weight of the evidence presented and
against the credibility of Wife based on evidence during the
2. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in not
allowing Husband to present certain evidence which would have
shown that Husband was not abusive toward Wife and would have
shown the nature of the parties' relationship, such as
text messages and letters?
3. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in not
allowing Husband to present evidence which showed he had the
right to occupy the subject property pursuant to a divorce
settlement agreement, and where Husband had not welcomed Wife
to the subject property and asked Wife to leave the subject
4. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in
evicting Wife from the subject property when the parties had
executed a divorce settlement agreement, which stated
appellant would have exclusive possession of the subject
5. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in
awarding temporary primary custody to Wife when Wife
testified Husband had not physically harmed the child nor
threatened the child, and Wife testified that Husband was a
good father, and was precluded from presenting the current
custody order where he had sole physical custody?
See Husband's Brief at 9-10.
standard of review for PFA orders is well-settled. In the
context of a PFA order, we review the trial court's legal
conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.
Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citations omitted).
first claim seemingly challenges the weight of the evidence
presented at the PFA hearing. Throughout his brief, however,
Husband conflates the weight of evidence with the sufficiency
of evidence. See Husband's Brief at 42. The
combination of Husband's departure from the actual issue
presented, and the fact that he cites no relevant authority
makes it difficult to discern the substantive nature of his
its foundation, we conclude Husband's first issue is
waived. It is well-established that the failure to develop an
argument with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent
authority results in waiver of that issue on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); Eichman v. McKenon,
824 A.2d 305, 3019 (Pa. Super. 2003). Here, Husband cites no
relevant legal authority to discuss either the weight or the
sufficiency of the evidence; one cited case addresses a
court's appearance of impropriety and the other is a
decades-old precedent concerning the absence of due process
at a zoning hearing. See Husband's Brief at 30.
Husband merely attempts to re-litigate the facts and the PFA
court's credibility findings. See Husband's
Brief at 30-42.
end, we observe that the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be accorded to their testimony is within the
exclusive province of the trial court as the fact finder.
See Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Pa.
Super. 2008). In reviewing the validity of a PFA order, this
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
petitioner and granting her the benefit of all reasonable
inferences. See S.W. v. S.F., 196 A.3d 224, 228 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citation omitted). And we must defer to the
lower court's determination of the credibility of
witnesses at the hearing. Id. Thus, even if Husband
had preserved his first issue, we would still find his claim
to be meritless.
to his second claim, Husband argues that the PFA court
erroneously prevented him from presenting relevant evidence,
such as text messages and letters. Again, our review is
hindered by deficiencies in Husband's brief.
portion of Husband's argument section is a mere 200
words. See Husband's Brief at 43-44.
Although he cites legal precedent, a rule of evidence, and
the transcript, he does not actually identify the evidence he
sought to introduce, nor the court's alleged exclusion of
the evidence, nor his objection to the court's ruling.
Id. An exchange during his direct examination is the
only identified portion of the record where Husband claims
the court erroneously limited the admission of his evidence:
ATTORNEY: So [Wife] is [at the marital residence] as of now?
HUSBAND: She is not. She left on the 21st of this
month after being requested to, after about two months'
worth of requests --
THE COURT: Alright, I'm going to stop you there,
[Husband], so you're just going to answer the question
and not editorialize, otherwise we're never going to get
7/30/18, at 3-4.
neither Husband nor his attorney took issue with the ...