United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
the Court is pro se Petitioner Caurice Sharmane
Rodgers (“Petitioner”)'s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking a
nunc pro tunc designation for the commencement of
his current federal sentence on the basis that his prior
sentence imposed by the State of Maryland involved conduct
relevant to his federal offense. (Doc. No. 1.) Following an
Order to Show Cause (Doc. No. 3), Respondent filed a response
stating that Petitioner is not entitled to the requested
nunc pro tunc designation and that the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) has properly computed his federal
sentence. (Doc. No. 5.) Petitioner has not filed a traverse,
despite receiving an extension of time to do so (Doc. Nos. 6,
7). Accordingly, the § 2241 petition is ripe for
disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
deny Petitioner's § 2241 petition.
December 1, 2008, Petitioner was arrested in Bergen County,
New Jersey, and charged with possession of marijuana. (Doc.
No. 5-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 6.) He was released that day, and the
charge was dismissed for failure to prosecute on August 8,
6, 2009, Petitioner was arrested on related state charges in
Maryland for possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
(Id. ¶ 7.) He was released on May 7, 2009.
(Id.) On June 1, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to a
five (5)-year term of imprisonment and committed to the
custody of the Maryland Department of Corrections.
(Id.; Doc. No. 5-1 at 10-11.)
August 16, 2010, the Maryland Department of Corrections
temporarily transferred custody of Petitioner to federal
authorities pursuant to a federal writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum. (Doc. No. 5-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 9.) On
March 11, 2011, Petitioner was indicted in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina and
charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 50 grams or
more of cocaine base (crack), and tampering with a witness.
(Id. ¶ 8.) On October 25, 2011, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina sentenced Petitioner to 180 months of incarceration
on those charges. (Id. ¶ 10.) The court noted
in the judgment and commitment order that “this
sentence is in addition to the state sentence the defendant
is currently serving.” (Id., Doc. No. 5-1 at
19.) On November 15, 2011, Petitioner was returned to the
custody of the Maryland Department of Corrections, and the
federal judgment and commitment order was lodged as a
detainer against him. (Ex. No. 5-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 11.)
March 15, 2013, the State of Maryland released Petitioner on
parole. (Id. ¶ 12.) On March 18, 2013, he was
turned over to exclusive federal custody pursuant to the
detainer. (Id.) On November 23, 2016, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina reduced Petitioner's sentence to 146 months'
incarceration. (Id. ¶ 13.) The court's
order explicitly noted that “[t]his sentence is to be
served consecutive to the defendant's Maryland state
sentence.” (Id., Doc. No. 5-1 at 27.)
prepared Petitioner's sentence computation based upon the
146-month term of imprisonment. (Doc. No. 5-1, Ex. 1 ¶
14.) Petitioner's sentence commenced on March 18, 2013,
his first day in exclusive federal custody. (Id.)
The BOP awarded Petitioner three (3) days of prior custody
credit for December 1, 2008 and for March 16-17, 2013.
(Id.) Petitioner's current projected release
date, with good conduct time considered, is November 25,
Attorney General is responsible for computing federal
sentences for all federal offenses committed after November
1, 1987. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585; United
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 331-32 (1992). The
Attorney General has delegated this authority to the Director
of the BOP. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.96. The process
of computing a federal sentence is governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585 and consists of two steps: (1) a determination of
the date on which the federal sentence commences, and (2)
consideration of any credit to which the inmate may be
entitled. See Chambers v. Holland, 920 F.Supp. 618,
621 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
3585(a) provides that a federal sentence commences “on
the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(a). A federal sentence does not begin to run when
an individual is taken into federal custody from state
custody pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum because the state remains the primary
custodian in such circumstances. See Ruggiano v.
Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
does not dispute that he was temporarily taken into custody
by federal authorities pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum on August 16, 2010. (See
Doc. No. 5-1, Ex. 1 ¶ 9.) Nor does he dispute that the
State of Maryland released him on parole on March 15, 2013,
and that he was turned over to exclusive federal custody on
March 18, 2013.
¶ 12.) Thus, pursuant to § 3585(a),
Petitioner's federal sentence commenced on March 18,
Petitioner is not challenging the BOP's calculation of
prior custody credit. Rather, Petitioner seeks a nunc pro
tunc designation of his federal sentence, arguing that
such a designation is warranted because his Maryland sentence
was based upon conduct relevant to his federal sentence.
(Doc. No. 1 at 2, 6-7.) As this Court has previously noted:
the defendant was in non-federal primary custody at the time
the federal sentence was imposed, and the federal sentencing
court was silent as to its intent to run the federal sentence
concurrently with the non-federal sentence, the prisoner may
ask the BOP to exercise its discretion pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
[§] 3621(b) to designate the state prison as the place
of imprisonment for the federal sentence, effectively making
the sentences concurrent. The BOP may implement such a
designation nunc pro tunc. McCarthy v.
Warden, No. 1:CV-12-0846, 2013 WL 3943551, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. July 29, 2013) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621; Setser
v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 234-36 (2012);
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir.
1990)); see also Prescod, Jr. v. Schuylkill, 630
Fed.Appx. 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that, pursuant to
BOP Program Statement 5160.05, federal and state sentences
“should run concurrently ‘only when it is
consistent with the intent of the sentencing [f]ederal court,
or with the goals of the criminal justice
system'”). When “determining the intent of
the sentencing court, the BOP considers the judgment ...