Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

DeRigo v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

April 9, 2019

HARRIET DERIGO, On Behalf of Albert Anthony DeRigo, Jr. (deceased) Plaintiff

          MARIANI, D.J.


          William I. Arbuckle, U.S. Magistrate Judge.


         Plaintiff Harriet DeRigo (“Plaintiff”), seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her deceased son, Claimant Albert Anthony DeRigo, Jr.'s (“Claimant”) application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

         This matter has been referred to me to prepare a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the Commissioner's final decision, and the relevant portions of the certified administrative transcript, I find the Commissioner's final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I recommend that the Commissioner's final decision be VACATED and this case be REMANDED to the Commissioner to conduct a new administrative hearing pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).


         On February 11, 2014, Claimant protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 10-2, p. 18). In this application, Claimant alleged he became disabled as of September 1, 2009, when he was forty-five (45) years old, due to the following conditions: cirrhosis of the liver, and chronic lower back pain. (Admin. Tr. 132; Doc. 10-6, p. 6). Claimant alleged that the combination of these conditions affected his ability to stand on his feet for more than ten to fifteen minutes, and that he was unable to do any heavy lifting. (Admin. Tr. 142; Doc. 10-6, p. 16). Additionally, Claimant alleged that these conditions affected his ability to walk, kneel, climb stairs, squat, bend, or reach. (Admin. Tr. 147; Doc. 10-6, p. 21). Claimant had at least a high school education and was able to communicate in English. (Admin. Tr. 27; Doc. 10-2, p. 28). Before the onset of his impairments, Claimant worked as a barber. (Admin. Tr. 26; Doc. 10-2, p. 27).

         On April 16, 2014, Claimant's application was denied at the initial level of administrative review. (Admin. Tr. 64; Doc. 10-4, p. 4). On April 22, 2014, Claimant requested an administrative hearing. (Admin. Tr. 68; Doc. 10-4, p. 8).

         On April 19, 2015, Claimant died, with the immediate cause of death identified as complications of alcoholism and morbid obesity. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 10-2, p. 18). On November 18, 2015, a Notice Regarding Substitution of a Party upon the Death of a Claimant was received, filed by Plaintiff, Claimant's mother. (Admin. Tr. 77; Doc. 10-4, p. 17).

         On January 12, 2016, Plaintiff, assisted by her counsel, appeared and testified during a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Theodore Burock (the “ALJ”). (Admin. Tr. 32; Doc. 10-2, p. 33). On April 4, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits. (Admin. Tr. 17; Doc. 10-2, p. 18). On May 27, 2016, Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review (“Appeals Council”). (Admin. Tr. 115; Doc. 10-4, p. 55).

         On July 13, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Admin. Tr. 1; Doc. 10-2, p. 2).

         On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint. (Doc. 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Id. Plaintiff requests that the Court grant such relief as may be proper. Id.

         On November 3, 2017, the Commissioner filed an Answer. (Doc. 9). In the Answer, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ's decision holding that Plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits was made in accordance with the law and regulations and is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 9, p. 2). Along with her Answer, the Commissioner filed a certified transcript of the administrative record. (Doc. 10 et seq.).

         Plaintiff's Brief (Doc. 11), and the Commissioner's Brief (Doc. 16), have been filed. Plaintiff chose not to file a reply. (Doc. 17). This matter is now ripe for decision.


         A. Substantial Evidence Review - the Role of This Court

         When reviewing the Commissioner's final decision denying a claimant's application for benefits, this Court's review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

         “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether Claimant is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that Claimant is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary's determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F.Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .”).

         B. Standards Governing the ALJ's Application of The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

         To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).[1] To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a).

         In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

         Between steps three and four, the ALJ must also assess a claimant's RFC. RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2).

         At steps one through four, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512; Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.