United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
H. RAMBO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court for disposition is Defendants' motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 61), and Plaintiff's motion
for default judgment (Doc. No. 72). For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants' motion will be granted and
Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
December 1, 2016, pro se Plaintiff Cedric Tyrone
Walker, an inmate formerly incarcerated in the Special
Management Unit (“SMU”) at the United States
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania
(“USP-Lewisburg”), filed the instant Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotic, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff subsequently
filed an amended complaint on January 30, 2017 (Doc. No. 10),
and this Court ordered service of the same on February 7,
2017 (Doc. No. 15).
2, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 21),
which this Court granted on September 18, 2017 (Doc. Nos. 40,
41). The Court directed Plaintiff to file a second amended
complaint. (Id.) On October 31, 2017, Plaintiff
filed a second amended complaint against the following
employees of USP-Lewisburg: Ferdinand Alama, Dallas Beachel,
David J. Ebbert, Francis Fasciana, Adam Good, Derrick Heim,
Matthew Hess, Christopher Hughes, Brandon Mottern, Dr. Kevin
Pigos, and Brian White. (Doc. No. 45.) Plaintiff alleges that
his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was placed
in restraints on May 1, 2015 through May 10, 2015.
(Id.) He alleges that the restraints were so tight
that they cut off his circulation and caused wounds on his
wrists, for which he was denied medical care. (Id.)
February 5, 2018, Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 61), and on February 20, 2018, filed their
statement of facts (Doc. No. 62), and brief in support (Doc.
No. 63). On June 4, 2018, upon observing that Defendants
raised the issue as to whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant
action, the Court issued an Order advising the parties that
it would consider the exhaustion issue in the context of
summary judgment, and by doing so, would consider matters
outside the pleadings in its role as factfinder. (Doc. No.
69.) The Court directed Defendants to file any additional
supplemental materials relevant the exhaustion issue to the
extent that they had not already done so, and further
directed Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition to
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Id.)
The Court further advised Plaintiff to file a statement of
material facts specifically responding to the numbered
paragraphs in Defendants' statements pursuant to Local
Rule 56.1, and to submit materials and documents relevant the
exhaustion of administrative remedies issue. (Id.)
28, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment,
requesting that the Court enter a default judgment against
Defendants for their purported failure to comply with this
Court's July 4, 2018 Order. (Doc. No. 72.) On July 30,
2018, the Court received and docketed Plaintiff's brief
in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
(Doc. No. 73.) However, Plaintiff failed to file a statement
of material facts specifically responding to Defendants',
despite the clear directive set forth in this Court's
July 4, 2018 Order. (Doc. No. 69.)
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to render
summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). “[T]his standard provides that the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is
“material” if proof of its existence or
nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under
applicable substantive law. Id. at 248; Gray v.
York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir.
1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters
and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir.
determining whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact, the court must view the facts and all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v.
Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992);
White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59
(3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment, however,
the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated
allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party seeking
summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56 of
identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party is
required by Rule 56 to go beyond his pleadings with
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or the
like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which
give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The party opposing
the motion “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56 shifts the burden of
production to the nonmoving party, that party must produce
evidence to show the existence of every element essential to
its case which it bears the burden of proving at trial, for
“a complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846,
851 (3d Cir. 1992).
opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local
Rule 56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party
to submit a “statement of the material facts,
responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the
statement required [to be filed by the movant], as to which
it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be
tried”; if the nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll
material facts set forth in the statement required to be
served by the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted.” L.R. 56.1. A party cannot evade these
litigation responsibilities in this regard simply by citing
the fact that he is a pro se litigant. These rules
apply with equal force to all parties. See Sanders v.
Beard, No. 09-cv-1384, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, *15 (M.D.
Pa. July 20, 2010) (pro se parties “are not
excused from complying with court orders and the local rules
of court”); Thomas v. Norris, No. 02-cv-01854,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64347, *11 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2006)
(pro se parties must follow the Federal Rules of
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL
formerly incarcerated in the SMU at USP-Lewisburg, is
presently incarcerated at USP-Coleman, Florida. (Doc. No. 62,
¶¶ 1-2.) The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”),
has established an administrative remedy procedure through
which an inmate may submit complaints relating to any aspect
of his confinement. (Id. ¶ 3.) Inmates must
first present their complaints to staff in an attempt to
informally resolve the matter. (Id. ¶ 4.) If
unsuccessful at informal resolution, the inmate may then
present the issue to the warden within twenty calendar days
of the event giving rise to the complaint. (Id.
¶ 5.) If an inmate is dissatisfied with the warden's
response, he may then appeal to the BOP Regional Director
within twenty calendar days. (Id. ¶ 6.) If
dissatisfied with the Regional Director's response, the
inmate may then appeal to the BOP's Central Office within
thirty calendar days, constituting the final level of
administrative review. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) No
administrative remedy appeal is considered to have been fully
exhausted until it is decided on its merits by the Central
Office. (Id. ¶ 9.)
has filed fifty-five (55) administrative remedies since
incarcerated with the BOP. (Id. ¶ 10.) On June
29, 2017, Plaintiff filed Administrative Remedy No. 907484-F1
at the institutional level concerning his alleged placement
in restraints for ten days. (Id. ¶ 11.) This
claim was denied on August 7, 2017 and Plaintiff appealed to
the Regional Office on September 6, 2017 via Remedy
907484-R1. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) The Regional
Office denied the appeal on September 21, 2017 and Plaintiff
appealed to the Central Office on October 17, 2017 via Remedy
907484-A1. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) The Central
Office rejected the filing on ...