United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
case, Plaintiff William Matthews alleges that Defendant
BioTelemetry, Inc. violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act
(“PMWA”) when it failed to pay Plaintiff and
other similarly situated workers a premium hourly rate for
hours worked in excess of forty per week. Plaintiff seeks to
represent a putative class of “all persons presently or
formerly employed by Defendant at any point during the past
three (3) years in the position of Remote Holter Technician
who were paid on a piece rate basis and denied overtime
compensation.” (Complaint. ¶ 21). Presently before
the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Count Two of the Complaint
for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted,
filed by Defendant. For the reasons discussed below,
Defendant's motion is granted without prejudice.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff's allegations as true, the factual background
is as follows. Plaintiff William Matthews is a Virginia
resident who began working for Defendant BioTelemetry, Inc.
in 2011. (Complaint. ¶¶ 9, 30). BioTelemetry, Inc.
is a private Delaware corporation with its headquarters and
principal place of business in Malvern, Pennsylvania.
(Id. ¶¶ 10-11). Defendant operates
multiple healthcare monitoring, research, and product
manufacturing locations throughout the United States.
(Id. ¶ 11).
was hired as a Cardiac Specialist and reported to
Defendant's office in Norfolk, Virginia. (Id.
¶ 30). In or around January 2012, Plaintiff was promoted
to the position of Holter Department Supervisor.
(Id. ¶ 31) From 2012 until January 2017,
Plaintiff supervised Holter Technicians physically located in
the Defendant's Norfolk office (“In-Person
Techs”), as well as those who worked from home, known
as Remote Holter Technicians (“Remote Techs”).
(Id. ¶ 33). The Remote Tech role was not
offered by Defendant until 2014. (Id. ¶ 38).
Plaintiff transitioned to this role of Remote Tech in
February of 2017. (Id. ¶ 36). In this role,
Plaintiff generally worked from 10:00 am to 7:30 pm for a
total of 47.5 hours per week, and often worked until 12:00 am
and occasionally on weekends (Id. ¶¶
classified In-Person Techs as non-exempt employees.
(Id. ¶ 34). In-Person Techs were paid on an
hourly basis and entitled to overtime compensation for hours
worked in excess of forty. (Id.). Defendant
classified Remote Techs as independent contractors.
(Id. ¶ 35). Remote Techs were paid on a
piece-rate system, and not eligible to receive overtime pay.
(Id.). Apart from the location where the work was
performed, the role of Remote Tech and In-Person Tech were
virtually identical, and were marketed to employees as such.
(Id. ¶¶ 37-38). All Techs were also
supervised by and reported remotely to Defendant's
headquarters in Malvern, Pennsylvania. (Id.
employee who wished to transition from the role of In-Person
Tech to the role of Remote Tech was required to execute a
“Professional Services Agreement” and a
“Business Associate Agreement.” (Id.
¶¶ 8, 39). These agreements specified that the
individual would be classified as a 1099-independent
contractor and be paid on a piece rate basis. (Id.).
These agreements also identified Pennsylvania law as
governing, and identified the state and federal courts for
Chester County, Pennsylvania, as the venue for actions
arising out of disputes related to the agreement.
(Id. ¶ 8).
February 9, 2018 Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint states
two claims on behalf of Plaintiff and the putative class:
1. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 for unlawfully failing to pay overtime
2. Violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, 43 P.S.
§333.100, et seq for unlawfully failing to pay
April 23, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss only
Count II of the Complaint (ECF No. 10). Count II is
Plaintiff's PMWA claim. On May 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
(ECF No. 11), and Defendant replied to Plaintiff's
opposition motion on May 18, 2018 (ECF No. 14).
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec.,
Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
Court in Iqbal explained that, although a court must
accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a
complaint, that requirement does not apply to legal
conclusions; therefore, pleadings must include factual
allegations to support the legal claims asserted.
Id. at 678, 684. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“We caution that without some factual
allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the
requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair
notice,' but also the ‘grounds' on which the
claim rests.”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556 n.3). Accordingly, to survive a motion to ...