United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
E.K. PRATTER, JUDGE
Raymond Lee, who is proceeding pro se, filed a
Complaint naming as Defendants Christian Thomas, Lola Thomas,
Andrea McGoldrick, “Third Auto Salse [sic] Company,
” Judge Harris J. Shirdan, “Shriff Keanean and
Department, ” Lt. Lee, Shirley May Lee, Charles Lee,
Nahaniel Lee, and “District Att. Turner and
Office.” He seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will
grant Mr. Lee leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
dismiss his Complaint for failure to state a claim and for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
alleges that Christian Thomas “attacked” him,
causing him to sustain a fractured skull and broken neck.
(Compl. ECF No. 2 at 6.) He also alleges that his “mother
and her two sons were helping Christian and his mother get
away with it and also police were helping them [too] it was a
big conspiracy.” (Id.) Mr. Lee seeks monetary
damages in the amount of four billion dollars “because
of what [he] could have done in [his] life and because of the
length of time all of the conspiracy was [taking]
place.” (Id. at 7.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Court will grant Mr. Lee leave to proceed in forma
pauperis because it appears that he is not capable of
paying the fees to commence this civil action. Because Mr.
Lee is proceeding in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies. This action requires the
Court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable
to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,
240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine
whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). Moreover,
“if the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
is proceeding pro se, so this Court will construe
his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y Gen.,
655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
has not explained in his Complaint what most of the
Defendants allegedly did or did not do to support any kind of
claim against them. Although Mr. Lee alleges that Christian
Thomas attacked him and caused him injuries, he does not
clearly make any allegations pertaining to any of the other
Defendants. Mr. Lee identifies his mother, her two sons,
Christian Thomas's mother, and “police” as
being involved in a “big conspiracy, ” but it is
not clear how those allegations match any of the Defendants
or what exactly any of those Defendants did to participate in
the alleged conspiracy or to otherwise injure him.
Accordingly, Mr. Lee has not stated a claim against them.
only claim that this Court can discern form a liberal reading
of the complaint is a tort claim against Christian Thomas
pursuant to Pennsylvania law. The only independent basis for
the Court's jurisdiction over state law claims is found
in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a federal district
court jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . .
citizens of different States.” Diversity jurisdiction
requires “complete diversity, ” which, in turn,
requires that “no plaintiff be a citizen of the same
state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg.
Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, Mr.
Lee provided Philadelphia addresses for both himself and for
Christian Thomas, so it appears on the face of the complaint
that complete diversity of citizenship is lacking.
Accordingly, the Complaint does not establish that this Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
foregoing reasons, the Court must dismiss Mr. Lee's
Complaint. Mr. Lee will be given leave to file an amended
complaint if he can cure the aforementioned pleading defects
and if he endeavors to do so within (30) days of the
Court's ruling. An appropriate Order follows, which shall
be docketed separately.