from the Judgment of Sentence October 18, 2017 in the Court
of Common Pleas of Butler County Criminal Division at No(s):
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, and STRASSBURGER, [*] JJ.
Andrew White (Appellant) appeals from the October 18, 2017
judgment of sentence imposed following a resentencing hearing
pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II), 163 A.3d 410 (Pa.
2017). We affirm.
31, 1998, Appellant, then 17 years old, shot and killed his
father and disposed of his body. Following a jury trial,
Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and abuse of a
corpse. On September 28, 1999, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for
first-degree murder, and two to four months' imprisonment
for abuse of a corpse. This Court affirmed Appellant's
judgment of sentence on September 26, 2000. Commonwealth
v. White, 79 WDA 2000 (Pa. Super. 2000) (unpublished
memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition for allowance
of appeal to our Supreme Court.
9, 2010, Appellant filed his first petition pursuant to the
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§
9541-9546. Counsel was appointed and filed three amended
petitions. In the second amended petition, Appellant relied
on Miller to establish an exception to the
PCRA's timeliness requirements. Second Amended PCRA
Petition, 7/5/2012, at ¶ 6. The PCRA court stayed the
proceedings pending our Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013),
wherein our Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the
holding in Miller did not apply retroactively to
cases on collateral appeal. Accordingly, the PCRA court
dismissed Appellant's petition as untimely filed.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court, and we
affirmed the PCRA court's order. Commonwealth v.
White, 125 A.3d 450 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished
the United States Supreme Court held that Miller
applied retroactively, essentially overruling
Cunningham. Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___
U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). Following that decision,
Appellant filed a second PCRA petition on March 7, 2016. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA
October 18, 2017, after a hearing, the PCRA court granted
Appellant's PCRA petition and resentenced Appellant to
35-years-to-life imprisonment. Appellant filed a
post-sentence motion on October 26, 2017, alleging that the
PCRA court did not state on the record how it weighed the
Miller factors. Further, Appellant contended the
PCRA court impermissibly imposed a mandatory sentence
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1, and, even if it did not
impose the mandatory sentence, Appellant's sentence was
excessive because "it does not give [Appellant], who has
demonstrated rehabilitation, an individualized sentence with
a meaningful opportunity for parole[.]" Appellant's
Post-Sentence Motion, 10/26/2017, at ¶¶ 4, 9-12.
The PCRA court denied Appellant's motion without a
hearing, and this timely-filed notice of appeal
appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our
A. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in not articulating its
analysis of the Miller factors when sentencing
B. Whether the [PCRA] court erred and abused its discretion
by failing to consider evidence that [Appellant] had been
rehabilitated while incarcerated, which resulted in an
excessive sentence for a juvenile being sentenced pursuant to
C. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in applying the sentencing
mandatory in 18 Pa.C.S. §[ ]1102.1 to [Appellant], in
violation of due process and the prohibition against ex
post facto laws[.]
D. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in imposing a sentence
that does not offer a meaningful chance of parole for
[Appellant], a juvenile offender [who] has not been found to
be incapable of rehabilitation, said "meaningful chance
of parole" being a requirement of Miller[.]
Brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested
answers omitted; reordered for ease of disposition).
Appellant's first two claims implicate the discretionary
aspects of his sentence.
well settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects
of sentencing, there is no automatic right to appeal.
Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a
four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal [was
timely-filed]; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3)
whether Appellant's brief includes a concise statement of
the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect
to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the
concise statement raises a substantial question that the
sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.... [I]f
the appeal satisfies each of these four requirements, we will
then proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.
Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 902 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
has satisfied the first two requirements: he timely filed a
notice of appeal and he sought reconsideration of his
sentence in a post-sentence motion. However, Appellant has
failed to comply with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f). Nonetheless, because the Commonwealth has
not objected, we will not find Appellant's
discretionary-aspects-of-sentencing claims waived. See
Commonwealth v. Brougher, 978 A.2d 373, ...