United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Susan Everett, brings suit against her former employer,
Maternal Child Consortium, LLC (“MCC”), alleging
that Defendant discriminated against her in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et
seq., and that Defendant violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201,
et seq., as well as the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage
Act of 1968 (“PMWA”), 43 P.S. § 33, et
seq. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the claims
against it. For the reasons below, Defendant's motion
will be granted and denied in part.
about September 2004, the Maternal Child Care Consortium
hired Everett as a scheduler. Between 2004 and October 13,
2016, Everett alleges that she consistently worked 41.5 hours
per week. Everett estimates that on three occasions per week,
her meal breaks were interrupted and lasted fewer than the
twenty minutes required by law. Nevertheless, MCC deducted
thirty minutes of time from Plaintiff's time records.
According to the Complaint, MCC failed to pay Everett 1.5
times her regular rate of pay for each hour that she worked
in excess of 40 hours per week. In addition, Everett alleges
that she performed compensable on-call work. On the basis of
these allegations, Everett asserts claims for violations of
the FLSA and the PMWA.
also asserts claims under the FMLA and ADA. Specifically,
during the summer of 2016, after she was diagnosed with
Lofgren Syndrome, Everett requested a leave of absence
pursuant to the FMLA, which MCC granted. In early October,
2016 Everett notified Defendant that she anticipated that her
rheumatologist would soon release her to return to work.
However, MCC notified Everett that it required a work
authorization from her podiatrist instead. Everett was unable
to obtain an appointment with her podiatrist until October
17, 2016. On October 13, 2016, MCC terminated her employment
on the grounds that she had not obtained a timely letter from
February 3, 2017, Everett filed a Charge of Discrimination
against “Associates Home Care, Inc.” with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Plaintiff subsequently received a
Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. The Notice states that
Plaintiff has the right to sue “Associates Home Care,
Inc, ” the respondent in the EEOC matter. Defendant,
MCC, moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“Threadbare” recitations of the elements of a
claim supported only by “conclusory statements”
will not suffice. Id. at 683. Rather, a plaintiff
must allege some facts to raise the allegation above the
level of mere speculation. Great Western Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176 (3d
Cir. 2010) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
analyzing a motion to dismiss legal conclusions are
disregarded, well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as
true, and a determination is made whether those facts state a
“plausible claim for relief.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally that determination is made upon a review of the
allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached
appropriately to the complaint and matters of public record.
See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc. 998 F.2d 1192, 1996 (3d Cir. 1993). A court may
also consider a document “integral to or explicitly
relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.
1997). In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint explicitly
relies upon the Notice of the Right to Sue from the EEOC.
Therefore, the EEOC Notice may be considered as well.
a plaintiff is precluded from bringing an action under the
ADA against a defendant other than the one named in his or
her original charge before the EEOC. See Glus v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977). An
exception exists, however, “when the unnamed party
received notice and when there is a shared commonality of
interest with the named party.” Schafer v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 903 F.2d 243,
252 (3d Cir. 1990). In Glus, the Third Circuit
identified four factors relevant to determine whether a party
not named in an administrative charge can nevertheless be
named as a defendant in a subsequent civil action:
(1) whether the role of the unnamed party could through
reasonable effort by the complainant be ascertained at the
time of the filing of the EEOC complaint; whether, under the
circumstances, the interests of a named [party] are so
similar as the unnamed party's that for the purpose of
obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance, it would be
unnecessary to include the unnamed party in the EEOC
proceedings; (3) whether its absence from the EEOC
proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interests of
the unnamed party; and (4) whether the unnamed party has in
some way represented to the complainant that its relationship
with the complainant is to be through the named party.
Glus, 562 F.2d at 888. Plaintiff's Complaint is
bereft of any information concerning the relationship between
Associates Home Care, Inc. and MCC. Absent additional
details, the Court is unable to determine whether the
Glus factors weigh in favor or against allowing this
case to proceed. Thus, ...