United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
JOHN E. JONES III
se defendant Roger Sedlak (“Defendant”) has filed
a motion (Doc. 522) to amend the sentencing order so that it
will show that he is not required to comply with
Pennsylvania's sex offender registration law. Defendant
also requests that the Court order the United States
Probation Department to amend his presentence report (PSR) so
that it too shows that he does not have to comply with that
to a written plea agreement executed in June 2010, Defendant
pled guilty to four counts of a superseding indictment,
Counts 1, 3, 5, and 18. Count 1 charged a conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 371 to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2421,
interstate transportation with the intent to engage in
prostitution, and to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a),
persuading, inducing, coercing and enticing interstate travel
to engage in prostitution. Count 3 charged a substantive
violation of section 2422(a). Count 5 charged a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), aggravated identity theft.
Count 18 charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1)(B)(i), money laundering.
plea agreement originally contained a paragraph which would
have expressed Defendant's “understand[ing], in
part, that the Court “as a condition of supervised
release . . . must order the defendant to comply with all sex
offender registration requirements under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act . . .” (Doc. 207,
plea agreement ¶ 4). The government agreed to strike this
provision from the agreement.
7, 2011, Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 145
months' imprisonment and to ten years of supervised
release. The sentencing order described the offense in Count
3 simply as 18 U.S.C. 2422. (Doc. 285, judgment in a criminal
case, at 2). The sentencing order also required Defendant,
among other conditions of supervised release, to
“comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act . . . as directed by the
probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex
offender registration agency which he or she resides, works,
is a student, or was convicted of a qualifying
offense.” (Id. at 4).
convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
United States v. Sedlak, 529 Fed.Appx. 253 (3d Cir.
2013)(nonprecedential). As pertinent here, Defendant
challenged on direct appeal the Court's imposition of the
condition requiring him to comply with SORNA. That challenge
was rejected. The Third Circuit stated: “The District
Court did not commit any reversible error by requiring him to
comply with the requirements of the sex offender registration
agency in any state where he resides or works because whether
or not he actually has to register as a sex offender is a
matter of state law.” Id. at 255.
March 10, 2015, the Court denied a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 to vacate the convictions and sentence.
United States v. Sedlak, 2015 WL 1033981 (M.D. Pa.).
On February 8, 2016, the Third Circuit denied Defendant's
application for a certificate of appealability in regard to
the 2255 motion and then on September 11, 2017, denied his
petition for a rehearing. United States v. Sedlak,
C.A. No. 15-2446 (3d Cir.).
has filed numerous other motions seeking various forms of
relief. As relevant here, on June 9, 2014, he filed a motion
(Doc. 385) under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 to correct a clerical
error in the sentencing order so that it would show Count 3
was a conviction for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a),
not simply for in violation of section 2422. On July 17, 2014,
the Court granted that motion. (Doc. 405).
21, 2014, the amended sentencing order (Doc. 407) was filed.
It clarified that Count 3 was a violation of section 2422(a).
(Id. at 2). But it also imposed a requirement
concerning sex offender registration in language slightly
different from the original sentencing order. The amended
order provided that “[t]he defendant shall register
with the state sex offender registration agency in the state
where the defendant resides, works, or is a student, as
directed by the probation officer.” (Id. at
4). As noted, Defendant only moved to clarify that Count 3
was an offense under section 2422(a). He did not move to
modify the SORNA language, nor did the Court order any such
instant motion to amend the sentencing order, Defendant
contends he does not have to register as a sex offender
because he did not commit a sex offense as defined in SORNA.
34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. SORNA imposes
registration requirements, id. § 20913, on
those who have committed a “sex offense, ” as
defined in the Act. Id. § 20911. Defendant says
he did not commit a sex offense as defined in SORNA because
section 20911(5)(C) excepts from the definition of a sex
offense, in pertinent part, an “offense involving
consensual sexual conduct . . . if the victim was an adult
unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the
offender at the time of the offense . . . .” Defendant
also relies on Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189,
1193, 1224 (Pa. 2017), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that Pennsylvania's SORNA violated
Pennsylvania's ex post facto clause in regard to the
appellant there (with a minority on the court also holding it
violated the federal ex post facto clause as well).
relief, Defendant requests that the Court amend the
sentencing order: (1) to show that he is not subject to sex
offender registration in Pennsylvania in light of what he
says is the intervening change in Pennsylvania law under
Muniz; (2) to clearly show in light of federal
SORNA's definition of a sex offense that he does not have
to register as a sex offender; and (3) in light of
Muniz, to correct the sentencing order to show,
based on the plea agreement, that he would not be subject to
registration as a sex offender under Pennsylvania law.
requests that the Court order the United States Probation
Department to amend Defendant's PSR to clearly reflect
that Defendant's relevant offense was under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2422(a), that his offense thus falls within the
exception to the definition of a sex offense under federal
SORNA, and that he need not register under Pennsylvania law
in light of Muniz.