United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
RAYMOND M. KRUSHIN AND, ULYSSES HOFFMAN, Plaintiff,
SCI-WAYMART, ET AL., Defendants.
MATTHEW W. BRANN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
M. Krushin and Ulysses Hoffman (Plaintiffs), initiated this
pro se civil rights action regarding their prior
confinement at the State Correctional Institution, Waymart,
Pennsylvania (SCI-Waymart). Named as Defendants are
SCI-Waymart and various members of the prison staff.
responded to the complaint by filing respective dispositive
motions. Presently pending is Plaintiffs' motion seeking
preliminary injunctive relief. See Doc. 4. The
opposed motion is ripe for consideration.
motion similarly asserts that in the nine months preceding
the initiation of this action Plaintiffs were denied adequate
medical treatment for “parasitic conditions”
which caused them to suffer non-stop itching, a rash, and
relief, they seek outside medical consultations.
injunctive relief is extraordinary in nature, and is
discretionary with the trial judge. Orson, Inc. v.
Miramax Film Corp., 836 F.Supp. 309, 311 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(citing Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State
College, 353 F.Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1973)). In
determining whether to grant a motion seeking preliminary
injunctive relief, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has instructed that courts should consider the
following four factors: (1) the likelihood that the applicant
will prevail on the merits; (2) the extent to which the
movant is being irreparably harmed by the challenged conduct;
(3) the extent to which the non-moving party will suffer
irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and
(4) whether granting preliminary injunctive relief will be in
the public interest. S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube
Int'l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1992)
(citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &
Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990)); Instant
Air Freight v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 800
(3d Cir. 1989); Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental
Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 852 (3d Cir. 1986). It is the
moving party who bears the burden of demonstrating these
factors. See Dorfman v. Moorhous, No. Civ. A.
93-6120, 1993 WL 483166, at *1 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 24, 1993).
the most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is a demonstration that, if it is not
granted, the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm
before a decision on the merits can be rendered.
Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614
F.2d 351, 356 (3d Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit has defined
irreparable injury as “potential harm which cannot be
redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following a
trial.” Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801.
A court may not grant preliminary injunctive relief unless
“[t]he preliminary injunction [is] the only way of
protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Id.
relevant inquiry is whether the party moving for the
injunctive relief is in danger of suffering the irreparable
harm at the time the preliminary injunction is to be issued.
SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244,
1264 (3d Cir. 1985). Speculative injury does not constitute a
showing of irreparable harm. Continental, 614 F.2d
at 359; see also Public Serv. Co. v. West Newbury,
835 F.2d 380, 383 (1st Cir. 1987). The possibility that
adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be
available at a later date, in the ordinary course of
litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable
harm.” Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 801
(quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1964)).
adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon “the
continuing existence of a live and acute
controversy.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 459 (1974) (emphasis in original). “The rule in
federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at
all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is
filed.” Id. at n.10 (citations omitted).
“Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to
sustain a present case or controversy regarding injunctive
relief if unaccompanied by continuing, present adverse
effects.” Rosenberg v. Meese, 622 F.Supp.
1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974); see also
Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil No. 3:CV-02-465, slip op. at
p. 2 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2002) (Vanaskie, C.J.). Furthermore,
an inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief
fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has
been transferred. Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169,
1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Carter
v. Thompson, 808 F.Supp. 1548, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
after the filing of this action, Plaintiff Krushin notified
this Court that he had been released and was residing at a
substance abuse treatment center. See Doc. 12.
Thereafter, Krushin informed the Court that he had violated
his parole and was currently housed at the State Correctional
Institution, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. See Doc. 34.
There is no indication that Krushin will be returned to
SCI-Waymart in the near future.
light of Plaintiff Krushin's departure from SCI-Waymart,
he is no longer subject to the alleged lack of adequate
medical care at that prison. Therefore, Krushin's request
for preliminary injunctive relief is subject to dismissal on