United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
D. MARIANI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Caiby ("Caiby"), an inmate who, at all relevant
times, was housed at the Monroe County Correctional Facility,
in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action
on June 4, 2018. (Doc. 1). Named as Defendants are Warden
Gary Haidle, Deputy Warden Joseph McCoy, and Jane/ John Doe.
(Id. at p. 6). Caiby seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Doc. 3). For the reasons that follow, the
motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted
solely for the purpose of the filing of the action,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), and the complaint will
be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Allegations of the Complaint
allegations of the complaint stem from Caiby's
incarceration at the Monroe County Correctional Facility from
February 2013 through September 2016. (Doc. 1, pp. 15-27).
Caiby sets forth various claims regarding the alleged
violations of his constitutional rights at the Monroe County
Correctional Facility. [Id.). Caiby avers that he
engaged in several physical altercations with fellow inmates,
he was subjected to excessive force by correctional officers,
and suffered injuries as a result of the altercations.
(Id.). Caiby alleges that prison staff hired private
investigators to reveal his past criminal information, and
correctional officers informed fellow inmates that he was a
snitch, rapist, and pedophile. (Id.). Caiby further
alleges that he was poisoned by iodine placed in his food.
response to questions concerning the exhaustion of
administrative remedies, Caiby indicates that he filed an
initial grievance concerning "some" of his
allegations, but he did not fully exhaust his administrative
remedies. (Doc. 1, p. 2). He plainly indicates that the
grievance process has not been completed. (Id.).
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (the
"PLRA"), a prisoner is required to pursue all
avenues of relief available within the prison's grievance
system before bringing a federal civil rights action
concerning prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 291 (3d
Cir. 2000). It has been made clear that the exhaustion
requirement is mandatory. See Williams v. Beard, 482
F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Booth v.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance
procedures "regardless of the relief offered through
administrative procedures"); Nyhuis v. Reno,
204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). This "exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is generally an
affirmative defense to be pleaded by the defendant, it has
been recognized that a district court has the inherent power
to dismiss sua sponte a complaint such as this one
which facially violates a bar to suit. See Ray v.
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing
Booth, 206 F.3d at 293 n. 2) (noting that
"Booth concedes that he did not avail himself of either
the intermediate or final review process"); and
Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 66 (stating that plaintiff
"argues that he did not avail himself of the
administrative process because it could not provide him with
two of the three forms of relief that he seeks in the present
stated, under the PLRA, "exhaustion is a precondition
for bringing suit under § 1983." Small v.
Camden County, 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013). It is a
"'threshold issue that courts must address to
determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right
forum at the right time."' Id. at 270
(emphasis in original) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers,
596 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 2010)). Recently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rendered a
decision in Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d
Cir. 2018), requiring that district courts place parties on
notice of their intent to consider whether a plaintiff has
exhausted his administrative remedies in accordance with the
PLRA, in its role as factfinder under Small v. Camden
Cty., 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013). Paladino,
885 F.3d at 211. However, in the case at bar, there are no
factual disputes regarding exhaustion. Caiby readily admits
that he did not exhaust the available administrative
remedies. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Caiby states that he was
transferred from the Monroe County Correctional Facility to a
different facility before he completed the grievance
procedure. (Id.). The Third Circuit has found that
the transfer to another facility does not excuse the
PLRA's exhaustion requirement. See Williamson v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 131 Fed.Appx. 888, 890 (3d
Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment for failure
to exhaust against plaintiff where plaintiff was transferred
to a different prison after filing administrative claim,
which plaintiff did not appeal); In re Bayside Prison
Litigation, 2008 WL 2387324, *4 (D. N.J. May 19, 2008).
See also Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky., 636 F.3d 218,
223 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[generally, '[t]he transfer of
a prisoner from one facility to another does not render the
grievance procedures at the transferor facility
'unavailable' for the purposes of
exhaustion'") (citations omitted).
acknowledges that there is an administrative grievance
procedure available, but that he has not completed the
process. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201 (3d
Cir. 2002) (exhaustion requires completion of the entire
administrative remedy process prior to filing suit)
(emphasis added). Because it is apparent from the face of the
complaint that Caiby is barred from pursuing federal relief,
the complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
separate Order will issue.
 As a general proposition, sua
sponte dismissal is inappropriate unless the basis is
apparent from the face of the complaint. See, e.g.,
Rycoline Prods., Inc. v.C&W Unlimited,109 ...