from the Order Entered August 2, 2017 In the Court of Common
Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 3140 CIVIL
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
BENDER, P.J.E. JUDGE
Jean A. Fonte, appeals from the August 2, 2017 order granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellee, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm"). After
careful review, we affirm.
trial court summarized the following undisputed facts and
procedural background of this case in its August 2, 2017
Prior to the evening of May 15, 2014, Erin C. Dooner
[("Ms. Dooner")] and [Appellant]  were
involved in a romantic relationship. While traveling in
[Ms.] Dooner's vehicle, the couple was involved in a
one[-]car accident. [Ms.] Dooner had a motor vehicle
insurance policy number 173-0212-A08 through [State
Farm's] company. Because of this accident, [Ms.]
Dooner was arrested and taken to the Monroe County DUI
Center. [Appellant] then retrieved her own vehicle, a
2004 Dodge Stratus, in order to pick up [Ms.] Dooner from
the DUI Center sometime after midnight on May 16, 2014.
[Appellant's] vehicle was insured by an automobile
policy through Progressive Advanced Insurance [Company]
(hereinafter "[Progressive]"). As [Appellant]
was driving the couple home, they began to fight.
[Appellant] claims [Ms.] Dooner struck her in the face.
As the fight continued, [Ms.] Dooner grabbed the bottom
of the steering wheel and jerked it. This caused the
Dodge Stratus to swerve into oncoming traffic and collide
head-on with a police cruiser. The police cruiser was
operated by Jeffrey J. Kowalski (hereinafter
"[Officer] Kowalski"). Gary J. Fedorczyk
(hereinafter "[Officer] Fedorczyk") was a front
seat passenger in the police vehicle at the time of the
[Appellant] and [Officer] Kowalski, along with his wife, have
filed lawsuits in this [c]ourt against [Ms.] Dooner relating
to the accident. These suits are respectively filed at 3416
CV 2014 and 1859 CV 2016. On April 27, 2016, [State Farm]
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment stating that it
has no duty to defend, indemnify, or otherwise provide
liability coverage to [Ms.] Dooner under [its] insurance
policy. On May 30, 2017, [State Farm] filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. There is also a Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by  Progressive currently pending before the [c]ourt
in 3140 CV 2016. Oral argument was not held in this matter
and a decision [was] rendered based upon the submissions of
Trial Court Opinion ("TCO"), 8/2/17, at 1-2.
August 2, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting
State Farm's motion for summary judgment and finding that
State Farm does not owe a duty of coverage in this case.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 25, 2017,
followed by a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein,
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and commit error by
granting [s]ummary [j]udgment on behalf of [State Farm],
improperly determining that State Farm did not owe a duty of
coverage to [its] insured[, ] [Ms.] Dooner, and all parties
who suffered injuries through [Ms.] Dooner's negligence,
thus misapplying case law and relevant precedent?
Appellant's Brief at 5.
standard of review with respect to a trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is as
A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court
only where it is established that the court committed an
error of law or abused its discretion. As with all questions
of law, our review is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter summary
judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law,
summary judgment may be entered. Where the non-moving party
bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely
on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary
judgment. Failure of a nonmoving party to adduce sufficient
evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which it
bears the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the
moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Lastly, we will
view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Byoung Suk An v. Victoria Fire & Cas. Co., 113
A.3d 1283, 1287-88 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
Additionally, we note that the interpretation of an insurance
policy is a question of law that we will review de
novo. See Rourke v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co., 116 A.3d 87, 91 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Appellant avers that Ms. Dooner's policy with State Farm
"provides coverage for a 'non-owned car' if the
car is in lawful possession of you or any
resident relative." Appellant's Brief at 12
(emphasis in original). Appellant further notes that the
policy is silent with respect to the definition of the terms
"possession" and "lawful." Thus, she
concludes that the policy is ambiguous and must, therefore,
be construed in her favor. Id. (citing Madison
Construction Company v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance
Company, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999) (stating that
where a provision of an insurance policy is ambiguous, the
policy provision is to be construed in favor of the insured
and against the insurer)). After careful review of the
record, we deem Appellant's claim to be wholly without
begin our analysis by setting forth well-established rules of
insurance contract interpretation. "The task of
interpreting [an insurance] contract is generally performed
by a court rather than by a jury." Madison
Construction, 735 A.2d at 106 (Pa. 1999).
The goal in construing and applying the language of an
insurance contract is to effectuate the intent of the parties
as manifested by the language of the specific policy. When
the language of an insurance policy is plain and unambiguous,
a court is bound by that language. Alternatively, if an
insurance policy contains an ambiguous term, the policy is to
be construed in favor of the insured to further the
contract's prime purpose of indemnification and against
the insurer, as the insurer drafts the policy, and controls
coverage. Contract language is ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible to more than one construction and meaning.
Finally, the language of the policy must be construed in its
plain and ordinary sense, and the policy must be read in its
Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. St. John,
106 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). See also Wagner v. Erie Ins. Co.,
801 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2002) (adding that when
construing a policy, we may inform our understanding of words
of common usage by considering their dictionary definitions).
Moreover, a court "will not find a particular provision
ambiguous simply because the parties disagree on the proper
construction; if possible, it will read the provision ...