United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
C. MITCHELL MAGISTRATE JUDGE
pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 9), with brief in support (ECF No. 10),
filed by defendant, Alysia Home Health Agency (Alysia). For
the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Alysia's
and Procedural History
26, 2017, Plaintiff Latoya Griffin (Griffin) was terminated
from her employment with Alysia on the basis that she was
“stealing money” by working as both a caregiver
and a consumer monitor. (ECF No. 8, ¶ 15). Griffin filed
her original complaint on December 5, 2017. (ECF No. 1). On
February 26, 2018, Alysia filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No.
3), and a brief in support thereof. (ECF No. 4). In response,
Griffin filed an amended complaint (ECF No. 8). In light of
this filing, the Court terminated Alysia's motion. On
March 29, 2018, Alysia filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint (ECF No. 9), along with a brief in support (ECF No.
10). Griffin has filed a brief in opposition (ECF No. 12).
amended complaint, Griffin contends that Alysia failed to pay
her wages and overtime compensation in violation of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et
seq.; the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (PMWA), 43
P.S. § 333.101, et seq.; and the Pennsylvania
Wage Payment & Collection Law (WPCL), 43 P.S. §
260.1, et seq.
March 29, 2018, Alysia filed its motion to dismiss
Griffin's amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Alysia contends that
Griffin's complaint is insufficient to prove that she is
engaged in interstate commerce as defined by the FLSA; thus,
Count I of her complaint should be dismissed. (ECF No. 9, pg.
4-7). Alysia then asks this Court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law clams.
(Id. at 7-9).
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
parties have consented to proceed before the undersigned
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (ECF No. 7, 13).
defendant moving to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) bears
the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to state
a claim for relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also,
e.g., Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744,
750 (3d Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court opinions
in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) and, more recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), have shifted pleading standards from
simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading,
requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of
relief to survive a motion to dismiss. With the Supreme Court
instruction in mind, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has outlined a two-part analysis that courts should
utilize when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. First, the factual and legal elements of a
claim should be separated. In other words, while courts must
accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
they may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, courts then
decide whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1950. That is, a complaint must do more than allege
the entitlement to relief; its facts must show such an
entitlement. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210-211 (3d Cir. 2009).
FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and
overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by
contract.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013). The statute
requires that an employer must pay any employee “who in
any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
a specified minimum hourly wage for work performed. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(a). For hours worked beyond forty, an employer
must pay “not less than one and one-half times the
regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. §
state a claim that an employer violated the FLSA's
overtime compensation requirement, the plaintiff must
establish that she is an employee covered by the FLSA's
overtime wage provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Individual
coverage can be established if an employee is
“engage[d] in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce.” Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc.,
13 F.3d 685, 694 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The FLSA
also extends coverage to employees if the employer is an
“enterprise engaged in commerce.” Id.
Once coverage is established “a plaintiff must
sufficiently allege [forty] hours of work in a given workweek
as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the [forty]
hours.” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765
F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation
argument centers on Griffin's alleged inability to
establish individual coverage. Specifically, Alysia argues
that Griffin's FLSA claim fails because, during her
employment with Alysia, Griffin was not “engaged in
commerce” within the meaning of the Act. (ECF No. 10,
“Commerce” is defined by the Act as “trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication
among the several States or between any State and any place
outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). ...