United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs Beverly Miller and Roger Plate filed this action
against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., their former
employer. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant
failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime pay for hours worked over
forty hours within a seven day work week, as required by the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et seq.; the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage
Act of 1968, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 333.101,
et seq.; and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and
Collection Law, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 260.1,
et seq. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs also claim that
Defendant required them to work overtime and failed to
compensate them for “off-the-clock” work.
(Id. at 2.)
the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Claim of Plaintiff Roger Plate. (Doc. No. 51.) Defendant
moves for summary judgment on the only claim made by
Plaintiff Plate-the claim for overtime pay under the
FLSA-arguing that Plate failed to meet his evidentiary burden
to show that he performed unpaid overtime work. (Id.
Roger Plate (“Plate”) is a former hourly-paid
employee of Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells
Fargo”) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 47-3 at
¶¶ 1, 2.) From 2010 until December 2012, Plate was
employed as a private banker, earning approximately $21.63
per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 7.) As a private
banker, he assisted customers with various banking services
and products, such as checking and savings accounts, online
banking access, loans, and lines of credit. (Doc. No. 63 at
was often required to work over forty hours per work week.
(Id. at 5.) He generally arrived at least fifteen
minutes prior to the branch's opening and often would
stay until after closing in order to meet sales goals.
(Id.) He observed that personal bankers at the King
of Prussia location would be required to stay after closing
on Wednesday evenings to call prospective clients and to work
on Saturdays to meet sales goals. (Doc. No. 47-3 ¶ 8.)
According to Plate, Wells Fargo management was aware that he
and other private bankers were working in excess of forty
hours per week. (Doc. No. 63 at 5.) Nonetheless, management
explicitly instructed Plate not to report all hours worked in
excess of forty hours per work week. (Id.) If he
tried to report more than forty hours, he was told by his
manager to adjust his timesheet so that it did not reflect an
excess beyond forty hours worked per work week.
claims that discrepancies existed between the hours he
reported on his time sheet and the hours he was actually
compensated for. (Id. ¶ 18.) Because Plate had
a practice of keeping a personal record of the hours he
worked, he noticed that he was not being paid for all the
hours he worked. (Doc. No. 63 at 5.) He became concerned
about any negative repercussions of reporting the excess
hours and for this reason only reported forty hours, as did
other private bankers. (Id.) As Plate stated in a
written Declaration, taken under penalty of perjury:
I could not meet management's expectations in performing
my job duties if I did not work additional hours. I was
concerned about negative repercussions to my job if I did not
work the additional hours. Nevertheless, I was generally
instructed by management to report only forty hours of work
per work week. On some occasions, when I attempted to report
more hours than forty in a given work week, I was instructed
by my direct supervisor to adjust the timesheet. In other
instances, if I would report more than forty hours, the hours
would be adjusted by the district manager after they had been
(Doc. No. 47-3 ¶¶ 10-11.)
Plate alleges that (1) Wells Fargo required him to work
overtime hours but prohibited him from reporting hours worked
in excess of forty hours per work week; and (2) that Wells
Fargo failed to compensate him for any overtime hours worked
in excess of forty hours per work week, in violation of the
FLSA and related Pennsylvania state wage laws.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy. Summary judgment
is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). In reaching this decision, the court must determine
“whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the
moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d
266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). A disputed issue is
“genuine” only if there is a sufficient
evidentiary basis on which a reasonable factfinder could find
for the non-moving party. Kaucher v. County of
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). A factual dispute is “material” only if
it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Gray v. York Papers, Inc., 957 F.2d
1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Court's task is not to
resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether
there exist any factual issues to be tried.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 271; Bouriez v. Carnegie
Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009). Whenever
a factual issue arises which cannot be resolved without a
credibility determination, at this stage the Court must
credit the non-moving party's evidence over that
presented by the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255. If there is no factual issue and if only one reasonable
conclusion could ...