United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
D MARIANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Peter Hoskins, an inmate confined at the Allenwood Low
Federal Correctional Institution, White Deer, Pennsylvania,
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Federal Bureau of
Prisons' ("BOP") decision precluding him from
early release under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
3621(e)(2)(B), which would have made him eligible to receive
up to a one-year earlier release if he completed the
Residential Drug Abuse Program. (Doc. 1-1). On September 5,
2017, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing the
habeas petition as premature based on Hoskins' failure to
fully exhaust his available BOP administrative remedies.
(Docs. 4, 5).
pending before the Court is Hoskins' motion to alter,
amend, or reconsider the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. 7). For the reasons set forth
below, the motion will be denied.
Motion for Reconsideration Standard of
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party may move
"to alter or amend a judgment." FED. R. Civ. P.
59(e). A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited
utility. It may be used only to seek remediation for manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence
which, if discovered previously, might have affected the
court's decision. Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779
F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1171
(1986). Typically, "[a] proper Rule 59(e) motion ...
must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change
in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or
(3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice." Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591
F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).
motion for reconsideration is appropriate in instances where
the court has"... misunderstood a party, or has made a
decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the
Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning
but of apprehension." Rohrbach v. AT & T Nassau
Metals Corp., 902 F.Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995),
vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration
915 F.Supp. 712 (M.D. Pa. 1996), quoting Above the Belt,
Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101
(E.D. Va. 1983). "A motion for reconsideration is not to
be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and
disposed of." Waye v. First Citizen's Nat'l
Bank, 846 F.Supp. 310, 314 (M.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 31 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. &
Publ'g Corp., 825 F.Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.N.J.
1993) (citations omitted) ("A party seeking
reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the
Court's decision, and 'recapitulation of the cases
and arguments considered by the court before rendering its
original decision fails to carry the moving party's
burden.'"). Moreover, "[b]ecause federal courts
have a strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions
for reconsideration should be granted sparingly."
Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus. Inc.,
884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
seeks reconsideration of the Court's decision dismissing
his undeniably premature federal habeas corpus petition, and
again argues that he is entitled to early release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). (Doc. 7). Hoskins fails to
demonstrate a need to "correct manifest errors of law or
fact, " Harsco Corp., 779 F.2d at 909,
regarding the prior dismissal of his habeas petition. The
Court thus finds that Hoskins has not made out a valid case
for reconsidering the Order dismissing his habeas petition as
time Hoskins filed his habeas petition, he acknowledged that
he did not complete the administrative remedy process with
respect to the claims in the habeas petition, and stated that
he was "still awaiting the final decision in the
BOP's administrative remedy process." (Doc. 1-1, p.
5). In the Court's previous Memorandum, it was noted that
Hoskins filed an appeal to the Regional Director, and was
unsuccessful at the Regional Level. (Doc. 4, p. 6). The Court
also noted that Hoskins then filed an appeal with the Office
of General Counsel. (Id.). At the time the federal
habeas petition was filed, Hoskins' appeal with the
Office of General Counsel was pending. (Id.). The
Court therefore found that Hoskins' petition was clearly
premature under the standards set forth in Moscato v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir.
instant motion for reconsideration, Hoskins states that,
subsequent to the filing of the habeas petition and
subsequent to the Court's Order dismissing the action as
premature, he received a response from the Office of General
Counsel. (Doc. 7). Thus, Hoskins contends that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id.).
However, it is well-settled that "[a] federal prisoner
ordinarily may not seek habeas corpus relief until he has
exhausted all available administrative remedies."
Bradshaw v. Carlson,682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir.
1981). It is clear that Hoskins did not exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to bringing this federal cause
of action. The Court finds that Hoskins does not provide
grounds for a motion to reconsider this Court's prior
Order dismissing the premature habeas corpus petition. He
fails to present any newly found evidence, to advance an
intervening change in controlling law, or to establish that a
clear error of law or fact exists. Nor does he establish that