from the Judgment of Sentence May 1, 2017 In the Court of
Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at No(s):
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER [*] , J.
A. Mock appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County, after he was
convicted, in a nonjury trial, of one count of driving under
the influence of alcohol (DUI) - highest rate, as a second
offense. Upon careful review, we affirm.
was arrested on July 10, 2016, after Corporal Arthur Stanton
of the Mifflin County Regional Police pulled him over for
repeatedly crossing the fog line and double yellow lines of
State Road 522. A criminal information was filed on October
12, 2016, charging Mock with DUI - general impairment (Count
1) and driving an unregistered vehicle (Count 3), in addition
to the above charge of DUI - highest rate, as a second
offense (Count 2).
October 25, 2016, Mock filed a motion to quash the
information, asserting that his prior DUI offense, which
occurred on June 3, 2006, and for which he was convicted on
March 27, 2007, did not fall within the ten-year look-back
period set forth in section 3806(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code
and, as such, he was improperly charged as a second-time
offender. The trial court denied the motion and Mock
proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial, at which time the
Commonwealth nolle prossed Counts 1 and 3 and the
court entered a verdict of guilty as to Count 2. The court
sentenced Mock to a term of 90 days' to 5 years'
imprisonment, plus fines, costs and related penalties. 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(c)(2).
timely appeal follows, in which Mock asserts that both the
motion court and the trial court erred as a matter of law
by applying [section 3806(a)] to [section 3806(b), ] thus
calculating [Mock's] current DUI as a second in ten M1
for grading and sentencing purposes instead of only using
section 3806(b). Specifically[, ] the [c]ourt erred by
calculating the grading and possible penalties under section
3806(a) even though they are specifically carved out to be
calculated under section 3806(b).
Brief of Appellant, at 1-2.
appellate issue presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which is a pure question of law. Accordingly,
our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Haag, 981 A.2d
902 (Pa. 2009).
matters of statutory interpretation, the General
Assembly's intent is paramount. Commonwealth v.
Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(a). The best indication of the legislature's
intent is the plain language of the statute. In re
D.M.W., 102 A.3d 492, 494 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Only when the words of the
statute are ambiguous should a reviewing court seek to
ascertain the intent of the General Assembly through
considerations of the various factors found in section
1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act. Id.
was convicted under section 3802(c) of the Act, DUI - highest
rate. The penalties for offenses committed under that section
are set forth in section 3804(b), which provides for a
mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days' imprisonment in
the case of a second DUI - highest rate of impairment
offense. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(c)(2)(i).
Section 3806, in turn, provides the framework for determining
what qualifies as a "prior offense" for purposes of
grading and sentencing as follows:
3806. Prior offenses
(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the
term "prior offense" as used in this chapter shall
mean any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been
imposed . . . before the sentencing on the present violation
for any of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under
influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
. . .
(1) For purposes of sections . . . 3803 (relating to
grading), 3804 (relating to penalties) . . ., the prior