Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Commonwealth v. Mock

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 19, 2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
MICHAEL A. MOCK Appellant

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 1, 2017 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-44-CR-0000506-2016

          BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER [*] , J.

          OPINION

          LAZARUS, J.

         Michael A. Mock appeals from his judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County, after he was convicted, in a nonjury trial, of one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) - highest rate, as a second offense.[1] Upon careful review, we affirm.

         Mock was arrested on July 10, 2016, after Corporal Arthur Stanton of the Mifflin County Regional Police pulled him over for repeatedly crossing the fog line and double yellow lines of State Road 522. A criminal information was filed on October 12, 2016, charging Mock with DUI - general impairment (Count 1) and driving an unregistered vehicle (Count 3), in addition to the above charge of DUI - highest rate, as a second offense (Count 2).

         On October 25, 2016, Mock filed a motion to quash the information, asserting that his prior DUI offense, which occurred on June 3, 2006, and for which he was convicted on March 27, 2007, did not fall within the ten-year look-back period set forth in section 3806(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code and, as such, he was improperly charged as a second-time offender. The trial court denied the motion and Mock proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial, at which time the Commonwealth nolle prossed Counts 1 and 3 and the court entered a verdict of guilty as to Count 2. The court sentenced Mock to a term of 90 days' to 5 years' imprisonment, plus fines, costs and related penalties. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(c)(2).

         This timely appeal follows, in which Mock asserts that both the motion court and the trial court erred as a matter of law

by applying [section 3806(a)] to [section 3806(b), ] thus calculating [Mock's] current DUI as a second in ten M1 for grading and sentencing purposes instead of only using section 3806(b). Specifically[, ] the [c]ourt erred by calculating the grading and possible penalties under section 3806(a) even though they are specifically carved out to be calculated under section 3806(b).

Brief of Appellant, at 1-2.

         Mock's appellate issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is a pure question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Haag, 981 A.2d 902 (Pa. 2009).

         In matters of statutory interpretation, the General Assembly's intent is paramount. Commonwealth v. Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). The best indication of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute. In re D.M.W., 102 A.3d 492, 494 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Only when the words of the statute are ambiguous should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly through considerations of the various factors found in section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act. Id.

         Mock was convicted under section 3802(c) of the Act, DUI - highest rate. The penalties for offenses committed under that section are set forth in section 3804(b), which provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days' imprisonment in the case of a second DUI - highest rate of impairment offense. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804(c)(2)(i). Section 3806, in turn, provides the framework for determining what qualifies as a "prior offense" for purposes of grading and sentencing as follows:

         § 3806. Prior offenses

(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term "prior offense" as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been imposed . . . before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:
(1) an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
. . .
(b) Timing.--
(1) For purposes of sections . . . 3803 (relating to grading), 3804 (relating to penalties) . . ., the prior ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.