United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM
Gene
E.K. Pratter United States District Judge
“The
very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce
the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether
there is a genuine need for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56
advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment. The Court
can think of few cases that present a clearer need for
summary judgment than the present one. The plaintiff, Terri
Brunson, claims that the United States Postal Service
carelessly failed to maintain a mat in the vestibule at the
entrance of its post office, which caused her to fall and
break her leg. Ms. Brunson makes these allegations despite
never seeing a negligently maintained mat, not knowing how
she fell, and admitting to her doctors that she tripped on
her own accord. Given these facts, no reasonable jury could
find that the Postal Service was negligent, and summary
judgment is granted in favor of the defendants.
Background
In
April 2016, Ms. Brunson was at a post office in Philadelphia.
As she left the post office, she tripped and fell, fracturing
her left fibula. After her fall, she filed this action under
the Federal Tort Claims Act against the Government, the
building owner, and the maintenance companies, alleging that
an upturned mat in the building vestibule caused her fall.
The
United States filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss
Ms. Brunson's action, claiming that she cannot establish
that there was an uneven mat or that (if one existed) it
caused her fall and injuries.[1] The Government argues that the
evidence shows that Ms. Brunson actually fell because she
caught her foot in the door-not due to any carelessness by
the defendants.
Standard
of Review
A court
shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue is
“genuine” if there is a sufficient evidentiary
basis on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the non-moving party. Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455
F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual
dispute is “material” if it might affect the
outcome of the case under governing law. Id. (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Under Rule 56, the Court
must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “[u]nsupported
assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions are
insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev.
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010).
The
movant bears the initial responsibility for informing the
Court of the basis for the motion for summary judgment and
identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the
non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular
issue, the moving party's initial burden can be met
simply by “pointing out to the district court that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case.” Id. at 325. After the
moving party has met the initial burden, the non-moving party
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuinely disputed factual issue for trial by “citing
to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by
“showing that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c).
Summary
judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to
rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322.
Discussion
The
United States is liable “for injury . . . caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government . . . in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(1). Because Ms. Brunson's injury happened in
Pennsylvania, the Court applies Pennsylvania law.
In
Pennsylvania, “[t]he four elements necessary to
establish a cause of action in negligence are: a duty or
obligation recognized by law; breach of that duty by the
defendant; causal connection between the defendant's
breach of that duty and the resulting injury; and actual loss
or damage suffered by the complainant.” Reilly v.
Tiergarten Inc., 633 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. 1993).
The
elements of damage and duty are not in dispute here. Instead,
the dispute centers on breach of duty and causation. First,
the parties dispute whether the post office breached its duty
by failing to maintain the mat in its vestibule; and second,
whether the mat was the cause of Ms. Brunson's fall and
injuries. The Court finds that there is no evidence on the
record to establish breach of duty, and therefore no evidence
to show causation.
I.
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