United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
MALACHY E. MANNION UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42U.S.C.
§1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), by
plaintiff, Carrie Ann Gula ("Gula"), in which she
alleges violations of her constitutional rights arising out
of her employment with the Pennsylvania State Police
("PSP") and, an alleged assault incident between
Gula and her boyfriend on August 1, 2012.
pending is the partial motion for summary judgment of
defendants PSP Trooper Lisa Brogan ("Brogan") and
Lieutenant Richard Krawetz ("Krawetz")and
Lieutenant Anthony O'Hara ("O'Hara"),
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56, regarding Counts
IV, VI and VIII of the plaintiff's amended complaint,
i.e., her claims under the PHRA for sex discrimination,
hostile work environment based on sex, and retaliation, to
the extent Gula seeks to hold the three stated defendants
individually liable. (Doc. 31). The court will also discuss
Gula's PHRA claims against the PSP.
upon the following discussion, the partial motion for summary
judgment of Brogan, Krawetz and O'Hara regarding Counts
IV, VI and VIII of the amended complaint will be
GRANTED since Gula's claims against
these defendants individually under the PHRA cannot proceed.
The court will also DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
Gula's PHRA claims against the PSP since they are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.
the court stated the factual background of this case in its
November 8, 2017 Memorandum, (Doc. **), it will not be
currently proceeding on her amended complaint under
§1983, Title VII and, the PHRA which was filed on August
29, 2016. (Doc. 19). The plaintiffs amended complaint is
comprised of eight counts, to wit: (1) First Amendment
retaliation claim and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim based on her sex against the individual
defendants in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2)
malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and §1983 against Krawetz, and Brogan; (3) sex
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., against PSP; (4) sex
discrimination claims against all defendants under the PHRA,
43 Pa. Stat. §951, et seq, ; (5) hostile work
environment claim based on sex under Title VII against PSP;
(6) hostile work environment claim based on sex against all
defendants under the PHRA; (7) retaliation claim under Title
VII against PSP; and (8) retaliation claim against all
defendants under the PHRA.
March 22, 2017, Brogan, Krawetz and O'Hara filed their
partial motion for summary judgment of regarding plaintiffs
stated PHRA claims seeking to hold them individually liable
in Counts IV, VI and VIII of her amended complaint. (Doc.
31)- They simultaneously filed their statement of facts with
exhibits and a brief in support. (Doc. 32, Doc. 33, Docs.
37-63). The plaintiff filed her brief in
opposition to Brogan, Krawetz and O'Hara's
motion and her response to their statement of facts on May
10, 2017. (Doc. 85, Doc. 87). Plaintiff filed exhibits in
support of her brief. (Docs. 76-83). Brogan, Krawetz and
O'Hara filed a reply brief on June 7, 2017. (Doc. 92).
Their motion is now ripe for disposition by the court.
court has jurisdiction over Gula's federal claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1331 and §1343 as well as 42
U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(3). The court can exercise pendent
jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C.
§1337. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C.
court incorporates by reference the material facts of this
case from its November 8, 2017 Memorandum, (Doc.
On December 13, 2012, Krawetz filed a criminal complaint
against Gula and signed the affidavit of probable cause in
support of the charges. Krawetz arrested Gula and took her
into custody at PSP Hazleton. Gula was charged with the
following crimes: Unlawful Use of Computer; Computer
Trespass; Criminal Use of Communication Facility; False
Report-Falsely Incriminate Another; False Reports-Reported
Offense Did Not Occur; Unsworn Falsification to Authorities.
(Doc. 81.-7, Doc. 55-1). Additionally, on December 13, 2012,
Gula was suspended without pay by Hoke. (Doc. 60 at 50).
criminal trial commenced on March 17, 2014. (Doc. 81-12).
Prior to jury selection, the ADA withdrew Count 1, Unlawful
Use of Computer and Count 3, Computer Trespass. (Doc. 81-13).
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Gula not
guilty of all charges.
March 21, 2014, Gula was placed on restricted duty by
Lieutenant Daniel J. Gentile, Jr. pending the outcome of the
internal affairs investigation into her alleged false
reports. Lt. Col. George Bivens approved Gula's court
martial on September 30, 2014, and she was again suspended
Gula successfully pursued a claim against the PSP through
arbitration and, she was restored to her position as a
trooper with the PSP.
following facts are also material regarding Gula's PHRA
claims against Brogan, Krawetz and O'Hara. Brogan has
never had supervisory authority over Gula. (Doc. 37-1, Brogan
Deck, ¶3). Additionally, neither Krawetz nor O'Hara
have ever held supervisory authority over Gula. (Doc. 37-2,
Krawetz Decl., ¶3, Doc. 37-3, O'Hara Decl. ¶3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c): see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335. 340 (3d Cir. 1990).
A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find
for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect
the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Ericksen,
903 F.Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment
stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Marino v.
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a
court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations). Rather, the court must consider all evidence
and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. Andreoii v. Gates, 482 F.3d
641. 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must
affirmatively identify those portions of the record which
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party can
discharge the burden by showing that "on all the
essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden
of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the
non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d
229. 238 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325. If the moving party meets this initial burden, the
non-moving party "must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts, "
but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict
in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d
386. 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Bee. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574. 586 (1986)). However,
if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant]
will bear the burden of proof at trial, " Rule 56
mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure
"necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v.
Hoffman La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770. 777 (3d Cir.
motion for summary judgment requires Plaintiff to present
evidence that there does exist a genuine issue of material
fact, and Plaintiff may not rely solely on the
pleadings." Isajewicz v. Bucks County Dept Of
Communications, 851 F.Supp. 161. 165 (E.D.Pa. 1994)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
Brogan, Krawetz and O'Hara move for partial summary judgment
with respect to Counts IV, VI and VIII of Gula's amended
complaint, namely, her PHRA claims against the stated
defendants individually. They argue that they are entitfed to
summary judgment on Gula's PHRA claims because they did
not have supervisory authority over her.
argues that she has made out aiding and abetting claims
against the defendants under the PHRA. She contends that it
is disputed whether the defendants had supervisory authority
over her and, that disputed material facts exist as to
whether the ...