United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
I. QUINONES ALEJANDRO, U.S.D.C. J.
States of America (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of its
agency the Rural Housing Service (“RHS”), United
States Department of Agriculture, filed the instant mortgage
foreclosure action against Defendant Anna Dawson
(“Defendant”) alleging that she defaulted on a
loan provided by RHS. Presently before this Court is
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with supporting
documents. [ECF 9, 10, 11]. Defendant has not filed a
response though the time to do so has long passed. The motion
for summary judgment has been fully briefed and is ripe for
disposition. For the reasons stated herein, the motion for
summary judgment is granted.
January 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint and averred
therein that pursuant to Title V of the Housing Act of 1949,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1471, et seq.,
Defendant applied for and received a loan in the amount of
$190, 650.00 from RHS secured by a mortgage on real estate
located in Pennsylvania. [ECF 1]. Defendant subsequently
defaulted on the loan, and Plaintiff seeks to foreclose on
the mortgage. (Id.). On March 6, 2017, Defendant,
proceeding pro se, filed an answer in which she
admitted to the underlying secured indebtedness but denied
that she had defaulted on the loan and disputed the amount
owed. [ECF 3]. On July 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant
motion for summary judgment. [ECF 9]. The deadline to file a
response to the motion for summary judgment was August 14,
2017. As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion, Defendant
has yet to file a response.
considering the motion for summary judgment, this Court has
considered all the relevant facts in this matter in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e.,
Defendant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986). These relevant facts, as gleaned from
the affidavit attached to the motion for summary judgment,
are summarized as follows:
On June 25, 2010, Defendant obtained a mortgage on a property
located at 82 Hannah Court, Royersford, Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania (the “Property”) from RHS. [ECF 11
¶ 3, Ex. A]. The mortgage secured the payment of a
promissory note in the amount of $190, 650.00. (Id.
¶ 4, Ex. B). The mortgage and promissory note were
continuously held by Plaintiff and were never assigned or
transferred. (Id. ¶ 6).
Defendant failed to pay the principal and interest payment
due on December 25, 2013, and every monthly payment
thereafter, despite Plaintiff's willingness to accept
payment. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8). As such, Defendant
defaulted on the mortgage. (Id. ¶ 7). On
January 20, 2015, the loan was accelerated and Plaintiff was
sent a “Notice of Acceleration of Your Mortgage
Loan(s); Demand for Payment of that Debt; Notice of Right to
Cure Your Delinquency; Notice of Intent to Foreclose and
Notice of Your Opportunity to Have a Hearing Concerning this
Action.” (Id. ¶¶ 7-10, Ex. D). By
July 31, 2017, the amount due was calculated at $245, 832.51,
which broke down as follows: (1) principal balance of $183,
524.17; (2) $25, 247.19 in interest from November 25, 2013 to
September 20, 2016 at 4.875% ($24.5118 per diem); (3) $16,
999.83 of interest recapture; (4) $262.34 in late charges;
(5) escrow/impound of $4, 313.51; (6) $1, 034.19 for fees
required with payoff funds; and (7) $14, 451.28 in currently
accessed fees. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14, Ex.
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 governs
summary judgment motion practice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Specifically, this rule provides that summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or
non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation, and
a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Galena v.
Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2011).
with Rule 56(c), the movant bears the initial burden of
informing the court of the basis for the motion and
identifying those portions of the record which the movant
“believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden can be met by showing that
the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case.” Id. at 322.
the moving party has met the initial burden, summary judgment
is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to rebut the
moving party's claim by “citing to particular parts
of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . ., admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials” that show a genuine issue
of material fact or by “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A-B).
The nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party may
not rely on “bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions, ” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark v.
DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982), nor rest on
the allegations in the pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the
pleadings” and either by affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,
“designate ‘specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.'” Id.
averred in the complaint, Defendant obtained a loan from RHS
secured by a mortgage on the Property and, subsequently,
failed to make the required mortgage payments and defaulted.
Plaintiff seeks to ...