United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DEJUAN B. THORNTON-BEY, Petitioner
L.J. ODDO, Respondent
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge United States District
before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1), filed by
petitioner DeJuan B. Thornton-Bey ("Thornton-Bey"),
a federal inmate confined at the United States Penitentiary,
Allenwood, Pennsylvania. Preliminary review of the petition
has been undertaken, see R. GOVERNING § 2254
CASES R.4 (directing prompt examination of the petition and
dismissal if it plainly appears that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief), and, for the reasons set forth below, the
petition will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
a jury trial in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Thornton-Bey was found guilty
of possession of a firearm by a felon, possession with intent
to distribute a schedule I controlled substance in a public
housing authority facility, and using and carrying a firearm
in relation to a drug trafficking crime. (Doc. 1, at 14,
19-20). He was sentenced to a total of 387 months'
imprisonment, and ordered to pay a special assessment of
$300.00 and a fine of $3, 000.00, due immediately.
(Id. at 17-20).
habeas petition, Thornton-Bey challenges the legality of the
judgment and commitment order issued by the Northern District
of Illinois. (Doc. 1, at 6). Specifically, he contends that
the judgment and commitment order is invalid because it was
not signed by a judge on the date of the imposition of
sentence, was not entered on the docket, and does not bear
the court's seal. (Id. at 8-9). As a result of
this alleged fraudulent judgment and commitment order,
Thornton-Bey claims that he is unlawfully detained and
requests that the court order respondent to "send [him]
back" to the Northern District of Illinois. (Doc. 1-1,
to the legality of federal convictions or sentences that are
allegedly in violation of the Constitution may generally be
brought only in the district of sentencing pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Okereke v. United States, 307
F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Davis v. United
States 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974)); see In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). Once relief is
sought via section 2255, an individual is prohibited
from filing a second or subsequent 2255 petition unless the
request for relief is based on "newly discovered
evidence" or a "new rule of constitutional
law." 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
such claims may not be raised in a § 2241 petition
except in unusual situations where the remedy by motion under
§ 2255 would be inadequate or ineffective. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255; see Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at
251-52. The burden is on the habeas petitioner to allege or
demonstrate inadequacy or ineffectiveness. See
Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir.
1971). Importantly, § 2255 is not "inadequate or
ineffective" merely because the sentencing court has
previously denied relief. See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
at 251. Nor do legislative limitations, such as statutes of
limitation or gatekeeping provisions, placed on § 2255
proceedings render the remedy inadequate or ineffective so as
to authorize pursuit of a habeas corpus petition in this
court. Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 539
(3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d
643, 647 (3d Cir. 2000); Dorsainvil 119 F.3d at 251.
If a petitioner improperly challenges a federal conviction or
sentence under § 2241, the petition must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Application of Galante,
437 F.2d at 1165.
present claims fall within the purview of § 2255.
Indeed, he is currently pursuing a § 2255 motion in the
Northern District of Illinois and has raised the same claim
regarding the alleged fraudulent judgment and commitment
order. See United States v. Thornton-Bey, Civil No.
1:16-cv-5532 (N.D. 111. 2016) at (Docs. 28, 45). Thornton-Bey
offers no explanation or reasoning as to why his pending
§ 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective. In fact,
nothing in the petition speaks to a claim of inadequacy or
ineffectiveness, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The
remedy afforded under § 2241 is not an additional,
alternative, or supplemental remedy to that prescribed under
§ 2255. Thornton-Bey's recourse lies with a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court.
Consequently, the instant petition will be dismissed for lack
separate order shall issue.
 These rules are applicable to
petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the discretion of
the court. See R. GOVERNING ...