from the Order Entered October 7, 2016 In the Court of Common
Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at No(s):
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the October 7, 2016
order granting Appellee Brian Wayne Carper's suppression
motion and granting, in part, his habeas corpus
motion. In this case, we conclude that Appellee preserved his
state constitutional claim in his post-suppression hearing
brief. We hold that blood draw evidence collected prior to
June 23, 2016 is not admissible under Davis v. United
States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) and Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987),  as no good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule exists under Article I, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. Finally, we hold that blood
draw evidence is necessary to make a prima facie
showing that a defendant violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3802(d)(1). Accordingly, we affirm.
factual background and procedural history of this case are as
follows. On October 13, 2014, a Pennsylvania State Police
trooper pulled Appellee over for an expired inspection
sticker. During the ensuing interaction, the trooper found
evidence that Appellee was driving under the influence of a
controlled substance. Appellee was transported to a local
hospital and informed, by a reading of the DL-26 form, that,
if he did not consent to a blood draw, he would face
increased criminal penalties. Appellee then agreed to the
blood draw, which showed the presence of a controlled
February 12, 2016, the Commonwealth charged Appellee via
criminal information with two counts of driving under the
influence ("DUI")-controlled substance,
manufacturing a designer drug,  possession of drug paraphernalia,
three summary offenses. On September 1, 2016, Appellee moved
to suppress the blood draw evidence. He argued that the
evidence was collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Appellee also moved for a
writ of habeas corpus with respect to the
DUI-controlled substance charges because, he argued, without
the blood draw evidence the Commonwealth failed to make a
prima facie case.
the trial court held a suppression hearing which encompassed
this case and six other cases which raised similar legal
issues. Pursuant to the trial court's order, Appellee
filed a post-suppression hearing brief. In that brief,
Appellee, for the first time, argued that Article I, Section
8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution barred admission of the
blood draw evidence. On October 7, 2016, the trial court
granted the suppression motion. The trial court also granted
the habeas corpus motion with respect to count two
of the criminal information, which charged Appellee with
DUI-controlled substance in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3802(d)(1), and denied the habeas corpus motion in
all other respects. The Commonwealth filed this timely
interlocutory appeal as of right. See Pa.R.A.P.
Commonwealth presents three issues for our review:
1. Whether the [trial court] erred by ruling that
[Davis and Krull] were inapplicable under
Article [I, ] Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when
[Appellee] had only made a claim under the Fourth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution and had implicitly waived all
claims under Article [I, ] Section 8[?]
2. Whether the [trial] court erred by suppressing evidence
that was seized based upon the officer's good faith
reliance on appellate precedent[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred by granting the motion for
writ of habeas corpus and holding that the
Commonwealth required a blood test to meet its burden when
there is no such language in the [statute?]
Commonwealth's Brief at 6.
Commonwealth's first two claims challenge the trial
court's order suppressing the results of the blood draw.
"Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it
is the Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the challenged evidence was not
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights."
Commonwealth v. Evans, 153 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super.
2016) (citation omitted). Our standard of review in
addressing a challenge to a trial court's order granting
a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. See Commonwealth v.
Champney, 161 A.3d 265, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en
banc) (citation omitted). "[O]ur scope of review is
limited to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
[trial] court." In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080
(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). "When the Commonwealth
appeals from a suppression order, we . . . consider only the
evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of
the entire record, remains uncontradicted."
Commonwealth v. Young, 162 A.3d 524, 527 (Pa. Super.
2017) (citation omitted). "Where the [trial] court's
factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by
these findings and may reverse only if the [trial]
court's legal conclusions are erroneous."
Commonwealth v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
order to understand the issues presented in this case, it is
necessary to review the change in the law which prompted
Appellee to file his suppression motion. When Appellee was
arrested and gave consent to the blood draw, the warnings
regarding increased criminal penalties for refusing a blood
draw (included in form DL-26) were legally correct. While
Appellee's case was pending, however, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). In Birchfield,
the Supreme Court ...