United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
N. Bloch, United States District Judge.
NOW, this 19th day of September, 2017, upon consideration of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 11)
filed in the above-captioned matter on October 17, 2016, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED.
further, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 9) filed in the above-captioned
matter on September 9, 2016, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said
Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically,
Plaintiff's Motion is granted to the extent that it seeks
a remand to the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) for further evaluation as set
forth below, and denied in all other respects. Accordingly,
this matter is hereby remanded to the Commissioner for
further evaluation under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) in light of this Order.
Henry Edward McCullum, filed a claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, on
February 24, 2014, and protectively filed a claim for
Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f, effective January 21, 2014,
claiming that he became disabled on April 1, 2013, due to
bipolar disorder, lower back problems, hearing loss in the
left ear, high cholesterol, and borderline
diabetes. (R. 20, 101, 113, 198-210, 228). After
being denied initially on July 10, 2014, Plaintiff sought,
and obtained, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on August 31, 2015. (R. 20, 38-79,
101-26). In a decision dated November 10, 2015, the ALJ
denied Plaintiff's request for benefits. (R. 20-31). The
Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision on
April 4, 2016. (R. 1-5). Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with
this Court, and the parties have filed cross-motions for
Standard of Review
review of a social security case is based upon the pleadings
and the transcript of the record. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The scope of review is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards
and whether the record, as a whole, contains substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner's findings of fact.
See Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir.
2001) (noting that “‘[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive'”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))); Schaudeck v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d
Cir. 1999) (stating that the court has plenary review of all
legal issues, and reviews the ALJ's findings of fact to
determine whether they are supported by substantial
evidence” is defined as “‘more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate'” to support a
conclusion. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900,
901 (3d Cir. 1995)). However, a “‘single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the
[Commissioner] ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict
created by countervailing evidence.'” Morales
v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir.
1983)). “‘Nor is evidence substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence- particularly certain types of
evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians)-or if it
really constitutes not evidence but mere
disability is established when the claimant can demonstrate
some medically determinable basis for an impairment that
prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful
activity for a statutory twelve-month period. See
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38-39 (3d Cir.
2001). “A claimant is considered unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity ‘only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy . . . .'” Id. at 39
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).
Social Security Administration has promulgated regulations
incorporating a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is under a disability as
defined by the Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. In Step One, the Commissioner must
determine whether the claimant is currently engaging in
substantial gainful activity. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If so, the
disability claim will be denied. See Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987). If not, the second
step of the process is to determine whether the claimant is
suffering from a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). “An
impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it
does not significantly limit [the claimant's] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1522, 416.922. If the claimant fails to show
that his or her impairments are “severe, " he or
she is ineligible for disability benefits. If the claimant
does have a severe impairment, however, the Commissioner must
proceed to Step Three and determine whether the
claimant's impairment meets or equals the criteria for a
listed impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If a claimant meets
a listing, a finding of disability is automatically directed.
If the claimant does not meet a listing, the analysis
proceeds to Steps Four and Five.
Four requires the ALJ to consider whether the claimant
retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to perform his or her past relevant work, see 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv),
and the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an
inability to return to this past relevant work, see
Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). If the
claimant is unable to resume his or her former occupation,
the evaluation then moves to the fifth and final step.
stage, the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner,
who must demonstrate that the claimant is capable of
performing other available work in the national economy in
order to deny a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making
this determination, the ALJ should consider the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience.
See id. The ALJ must further analyze the cumulative
effect of all the claimant's impairments in determining
whether he or she is capable of performing work and is not
disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523,
The ALJ's Decision
November 10, 2015 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met
the insured requirements of the Social Security Act through
September 30, 2015. (R. 22). Accordingly, to be eligible for
DIB benefits, Plaintiff had to establish that he was disabled
on or before that date. See 42 U.S.C. ...