United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
GREGORY A. MILTON, Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants
before the Court is pro se Plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration (Doc. No. 69), of this Court's March
28, 2017 Order (Doc. No. 67), granting Defendants' motion
to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed a
brief in support of the motion (Doc. No. 70), and Defendants
have filed a brief in opposition to the same. (Doc. No. 71.)
Accordingly, the motion is ripe for disposition. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration (Doc. No. 69) will be denied.
se Plaintiff Gregory Milton, an inmate formerly confined
at the United States Penitentiary in Allenwood, Pennsylvania
(“USP-Allenwood”), initiated this civil action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff
claimed that he was denied due process relating to his
disciplinary proceedings while incarcerated at USP-Allenwood.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that with regard to a
January 2011 charge, he “was not allowed the
protections of his Wolff rights” (Doc. No. 1 at
4), when he was accused of using of a cell phone, which was
surreptitiously introduced into the prison, on eighteen (18)
occasions. (Doc. No. 40 ¶¶ 15-16, 19). Although
Plaintiff was sanctioned with sixty (60) days disciplinary
segregation, he was never placed in the Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”) and was released back to general
population. (Doc. No. 56 at 5.) Plaintiff was not sanctioned
with a loss of good time credits. (Doc. No. 40-1 at 71.)
as to a March 2011 charge in which Plaintiff was accused of
soliciting another inmate to call an individual and pass
information on Plaintiff's behalf to that individual,
Plaintiff received thirty days disciplinary segregation, six
months loss of telephone privileges, and six months loss of
email privileges. (Doc. No. 40 at 31; Doc. No. 56 at 7.)
Again, Plaintiff was not sanctioned with a loss of good time
credits. (Doc. No. 40-1 at 99.)
this Court found that as a matter of law, Plaintiff's due
process rights were not triggered by the disciplinary
segregation, loss of telephone privileges, and loss of email
privileges because those sanctions did not impose atypical
and significant hardship on Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 66 at 15.)
Consequently, Defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 67), was granted.
now asserts that he is entitled to reconsideration because
there is an obvious need to correct a clear error of law and
prevent a manifest injustice. (Doc. No. 70 at 5.) The Court
now addresses his claims for reconsideration.
scope of a motion for reconsideration “is extremely
limited.” Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415
(3d Cir. 2011). Its purpose is to correct manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.
Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d
Cir. 1985). Accordingly, a party seeking reconsideration must
demonstrate at least one of the following grounds prior to
the court altering, or amending, a standing judgment: (1) an
intervening change in the controlling law, (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court entered judgment, or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.
Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing North River Ins. Co. v.
CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir.
1995)). A motion for reconsideration is appropriate in
instances in which “the court has patently
misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the [c]ourt by the parties,
or has made an error not of reasoning but of
apprehension.” Rohrbach v. AT&T Nassau Metals
Corp., 902 F.Supp. 523, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1995), vacated
in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 915 F.Supp.
712 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel
Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.
1983)). Further, it may not be used as a means to reargue
unsuccessful theories, or argue new facts or issues that were
not presented to the court in the context of the matter
previously decided. Drysdale v. Woerth, 153
F.Supp.2d 678, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2001). “Because federal
courts have a strong interest in the finality of judgments,
motions for reconsideration should be granted
sparingly.” Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Diversified
Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
fails to satisfy the above standard in support of his motion
for reconsideration. Plaintiff invites the Court to make
“additional findings of fact and conclusions of law
concerning the evidence presented in support of [his]
claim” that he was denied due process during his
disciplinary hearing proceedings. (Doc. No. 70 at 5.)
However, Plaintiff previously presented his arguments to the
Court, and the Court thoroughly addressed Plaintiff's
arguments in its March 28, 2017 Memorandum (Doc. No. 66).
Specifically, the Court concluded:
As a matter of law, Plaintiff's due process rights were
not triggered by the disciplinary segregation, loss of
telephone privileges, and loss of email privileges Plaintiff
received for the January 2011 and March 2011 charges because
those sanctions do not impose atypical and significant
hardship on Plaintiff.
Id. Nevertheless, the Court provided a detailed
inquiry consistent with Wolff v. McDonnell,
concluded that Plaintiff was provided all due process rights
he was entitled. (See Doc. No. 66 at 14-16.)
instant motion for reconsideration neither advances an
intervening change in controlling law nor provides any
evidence that was not previously available to this Court.
Rather, Plaintiff merely seeks to reassert his same arguments
advanced previously. However, this simply “cannot
provide the basis for a successful motion for
reconsideration.” Blystone, 664 F.3d at 146.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion ...