United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
B. BRODY, J.
Linda Sondesky brings suit against Defendants Cherry
Scaffolding, Inc. (“Cherry Scaffolding”) and
Stephen Ellis. Sondesky asserts claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Pennsylvania Wage
Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”) against all
Defendants. First Am. Compl. 4-5, ECF No. 12. In addition,
Sondesky asserts Dragonetti Act and common law abuse of
process claims against Cherry Scaffolding only. Id.
at 5. Cherry Scaffolding asserts counterclaims against
Sondesky for conversion and breach of fiduciary
duty. Defs.' Answer and Countercl. 12-16,
ECF No. 31.
have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim and have also moved for judgment
on the pleadings as to all counts of Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 15;
Defs.' Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 38. Plaintiff has moved
for judgment on the pleadings as to Cherry Scaffolding's
counterclaims. Pl.'s Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 34. I
will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Sondesky's
WPCL claim and her abuse of process claim. I will deny
Defendants' motion to dismiss Sondesky's FLSA and
Dragonetti Act claims. I will deny both parties' motions
for judgment on the pleadings.
was employed by Cherry Scaffolding as a bookkeeper from
October 22, 2015 until March 7, 2016. Sondesky's rate of
pay on her last day of work was $28.85 per hour. Sondesky
asserts that she was a non-management employee and that her
position was not exempt from any state or federal laws
governing overtime pay. At some point during her employment,
Sondesky had a telephone conversation with Ellis, who serves
as President and Treasurer of Cherry Scaffolding. Sondesky
informed Ellis that the office was in disarray and that she
would need to be paid in full for all hours that she worked
as the bookkeeper. Ellis confirmed that he understood
Sondesky's position. Sondesky subsequently submitted all
of her hours, including overtime, to payroll, and Cherry
Scaffolding's management approved her compensation.
early March of 2016, Cherry Scaffolding terminated Sondesky
without a specific reason. Following her termination, Cherry
Scaffolding filed a lawsuit against Sondesky in Pennsylvania
Magisterial District Court (the “State Court
Action”) seeking to recover overtime compensation from
Sondesky. On June 23, 2016, judgment in that suit was entered
in Sondesky's favor.
Answer and Counterclaim, Cherry Scaffolding asserts that
Sondesky had access to Cherry Scaffolding's bank accounts
and withdrew $2, 566.09 without justification. Sondesky
refused Cherry Scaffolding's demands to return the money.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court
must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter
the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay
trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Judgment will only be granted
where the moving party clearly establishes there are no
material issues of fact, and that he or she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” DiCarlo v. St. Mary
Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2008). There is
“no material difference in the applicable legal
standards” for a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Rule 12(c) and a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 n.2 (3d Cir.
survive dismissal, a complaint must allege facts sufficient
to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id.
a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to
dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.
However, an exception to the general rule is that a document
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be
considered . . . .” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)
(emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, a court may “consider matters of
public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and
items appearing in the record of the case.” Oshiver
v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380,
1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994). Further, “a court may consider
an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches
as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's
claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d
1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
move to dismiss and move for judgment on the pleadings on all
claims brought against them. I will deny both of
Defendants' motions as to the FLSA claim (Count I) and
the Dragonetti Act claim (Count III) because the facts
alleged in the Amended Complaint raise a plausible right to
relief. I will dismiss the WPCL claim (Count II)