Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Moon v. Breathless Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

August 17, 2017

ALISSA MOON; YASMEEN DAVIS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
v.
BREATHLESS INC, a/k/a Vision Food & Spirits, d/b/a Breathless Men's Club Alissa Moon, Appellant

          Argued January 18, 2017

         On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-06297) District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton

          Jeremy E. Abay, Esq. [ARGUED] John K. Weston, Esq. Sacks Weston Diamond, LLC Counsel for Appellant

          Marc J. Gross, Esq. [ARGUED] Justin P. Kobenschlag, Esq. Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP Counsel for Appellee

          Before: FISHER, [*] HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges

          OPINION

          GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

         In this appeal, we must determine whether an arbitration clause in a signed contract covers Appellant's statutory claims. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey answered this question in the affirmative. We disagree. We shall reverse and remand.

         I. Background

         In 2013, Alissa Moon ("Moon") began performing at the Breathless Men's Club ("Club") in Rahway, New Jersey. In January of 2015, Moon agreed to rent performance space in the Club and signed an Independent Dancer Rental Agreement ("Contract"). The Contract contains an employment provision and an arbitration clause.

The employment provision provides:
Dancer understands and agrees that he/she is an independent contractor and not an employee of club. Dancer is renting the performance space for an agreed upon fee previously agreed to by Dancer and Club.

App. 41.

The arbitration clause reads:

In a dispute between Dancer and Club under this Agreement, either may request to resolve the dispute by binding arbitration. THIS MEANS THAT NEITHER PARTY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE SUCH CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE A JURY TRIAL - DISCOVERY AND APPEAL RIGHTS ARE LIMITED IN ARBITRATION. ARBITRATION MUST BE ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. THIS MEANS NEITHER YOU NOR WE MAY JOIN OR CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION, OR LITIGATE IN COURT OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIMS AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A CLASS.

App. 42.

         In August of 2015, Moon[1] sued the Club pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., the New Jersey Wage Payment Law ("NJWPL"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.1, et seq., and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law ("NJWHL"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a, et seq. App. 10-37. In September, the Club moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the Contract's arbitration clause foreclosed Moon from seeking relief in the District Court. In November, the District Court denied the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the parties to engage in limited discovery on the arbitration issue. After discovery, the Club filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of arbitration and the District Court held a hearing. On July 29, 2016, the District Court granted the Club's Motion for Summary Judgment concluding that, "[T]here [wa]s no genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff's claims fall within the scope of the arbitration provision." Moon v. Breathless, Inc., No.CV1506297SDWLDW, 2016 WL 4072331, at *4 (D.N.J. July 29, 2016). On August 10, 2016, Moon filed a timely Notice of Appeal. On appeal, Moon asks us to determine anew whether her claims fall within the scope of the Contract's arbitration provision.

         II. Jurisdiction

         For her federal claims, Moon invoked the District Court's jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For her state claims, Moon drew upon the District Court's power of supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

         III. Standard of Review

         On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, our review is "plenary" and we "apply the same test the district court should have utilized initially." Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Summary judgment should be granted only when the record shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "[A]ll justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmovant's] favor, " but the "mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmovant is insufficient to deny a motion for summary judgment; enough evidence must exist to enable a jury to reasonably find for the nonmovant on the issue." Giles, 571 F.3d at 322 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

         IV.Analy ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.