United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
H. RAMBO United States District Judge
the court is Defendant Jerome King's motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 81) of this court's denial of his
amended motion to suppress evidence (Doc. 39). After careful
consideration, the court will deny Defendant's motion for
January 13, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to suppress
physical evidence and statements (Doc. 24), and later amended
that motion to add an additional basis for suppression,
(see Doc. 39). In his amended motion to suppress,
Defendant raised four arguments for suppression, including
that the police had no reasonable suspicion to detain him,
lacked a legal basis to enter his apartment and seize the
shotgun, and lacked probable cause to arrest him without a
warrant. (Doc. 39 at 2). He further contended that any
statements he made while in custody at the hospital were in
violation of Miranda, and any other contraband
seized from the apartment after the comprehensive police
search must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree due to
the prior unlawful police conduct. (Id.)
court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on April 11,
2017. Following the hearing, the parties filed supplemental
briefing on their respective positions. (See Docs.
61, 63, 73, 74). The court subsequently denied
Defendant's amended motion to suppress in its entirety.
(Docs. 75, 76).
23, 2017,  Defendant filed a pro se motion
for reconsideration. (Doc. 81). His motion focuses on one
particular ground for suppression: the warrantless entry into
his apartment and the associated warrantless seizure of the
shotgun. (Id. at 2-4).
argues that the court made a clear error of fact regarding
where Corporal Henry was located when he first saw the
shotgun. The thrust of his argument is that Corporal Henry
was standing inside the doorway of Defendant's apartment
unit, and not inside the doorway to the common area of the
second floor of the apartment building. (Id. at
3-4). Defendant asserts that Corporal Henry's
cross-examination testimony and other parts of the record
conclusively demonstrate that Corporal Henry was unlawfully
inside the apartment unit when he first saw the shotgun,
making the warrantless seizure of the shotgun a Fourth
Amendment violation and thus requiring suppression.
Government filed a one-page response to Defendant's
motion. (Doc. 82). It asserts that Defendant did not make the
requisite showing of “newly discovered evidence, an
intervening change in the law, or a legitimate need to
correct a manifest injustice” to permit reconsideration
of the denial of the suppression motion. (Id.
(citing Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d
Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (setting forth standard for motion
for reconsideration-under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e)-of final judgment of dismissal of complaint)).
Defendant's motion for reconsideration is now ripe for
asks the court to reconsider the denial of a motion to
suppress, which is an interlocutory order. See United
States v. Williams, 413 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131
(1962)). The standard of review for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order is different than the standard of review
for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order,
which courts generally interpret as a motion to alter or
amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or
for relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b),
requires the showing of “(1) an
intervening change in the controlling law, (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court [issued the underlying order]; or (3) the need to
correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice.” United States ex rel Schumann v.
Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848-49 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Max's Seafood Café ex rel.
Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
of an interlocutory order, on the other hand, is more
properly considered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), and is appropriate whenever justice so requires.
See State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. County of Camden,
824 F.3d 399, 406 & n.14 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir.
1973) (“[S]o long as the district court has
jurisdiction over the case, it possesses inherent power over
interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is
consonant with justice to do so.”)); United States
v. Rojas, No. 1:15-CR-00169, 2017 WL 105932, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Jan. 11, 2017) (Rambo, J.) (quoting Qazizadeh v.
Pinnacle Health Sys., 214 F.Supp.3d 292, 295-96 (M.D.
Pa. 2016)) (applying “when consonant with justice to do
so” standard to motion for reconsideration of
interlocutory order involving motion in limine in a
case, Defendant has provided no reason for the court to
believe that justice requires reconsideration of the
interlocutory denial of his suppression motion.
Defendant's argument, although somewhat difficult to
understand, appears to attempt to point to inconsistencies in
the testimony of Corporal Henry and Officer Roadcap that he
believes conclusively show that Corporal Henry was standing
in the apartment unit when he first perceived the shotgun.
For the following reasons, the court does not agree.
maintains that when Corporal Henry was cross-examined at the
suppression hearing, he testified that Officer Roadcap had
followed him up the fire escape and was standing behind him
either in the “threshold of the fire escape
doorway” to the apartment building, or “just
behind” him in the common area. (Doc. 81 at 3 (quoting
Doc. 67, Tr. of Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress [hereinafter
“Doc. 67”], at 26-27)). According to Defendant,
this testimony is inconsistent with Officer Roadcap's
testimony that when he followed Corporal Henry up the fire
escape, he observed Corporal Henry standing in or inside the
apartment building doorway while he waited outside the
building on the fire-escape landing. (Id. at 4;
see also Doc. 67 at 37). As Defendant argues,
“[i]t is clearly impossible for [O]fficer Roadcap to
have observed Corporal Henry in the ‘apartment building
doorway' when according to Corporal Henry['s]
testimony, [O]fficer Roadcap himself was in the
‘apartment building doorway.'” ...