United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
RICHARD P. CONABOY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Lonardo filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while confined at the
Allenwood Low Federal Correctional Institution, White Deer,
Pennsylvania (LFCI-Allenwood). Service of the petition was
pending action does not challenge the legality of his
underlying federal criminal conviction and sentence which was
imposed by the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York. Rather, Petitioner claims entitlement
to federal habeas corpus relief on the basis that the
LFCI-Allenwood staff and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
acted improperly and abused their discretion by only
recommending him for a sixty (60) day pre-release placement
in a Residential Reentry Center (“RRC” or
“halfway house”). See Doc. 1, ¶ 6.
maintains that pursuant to the Second Chance Act, he is
entitled to halfway house placement. However, he assets that the
recommended sixty (60) day period is less than 10% of his
sentence and other similarly situated prisoners have been
recommended for a longer halfway house placement Lonardo adds
that being afforded longer placement would provide him with
opportunity to obtain treatment for a medical condition and
allow him adequate opportunity to secure housing upon his
13, 2017, Respondent filed a “Notice of Suggestion of
Mootness” stating that Lonardo has been released from
federal custody into an RRC. Doc. 8, p. 1. Consequently,
Respondent seeks dismissal of the petition since the only
habeas corpus issue raised by Lonardo is moot.
corpus review under § 2241 “allows a federal
prisoner to challenge the ‘execution' of his
sentence.” Woodall v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).
habeas corpus petition may be brought by a prisoner who seeks
to challenge either the fact or duration of his confinement
in prison. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973), Telford v. Hepting, 980 F.2d 745, 748 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 920 (1993).
Federal habeas relief is available only “where the
deprivation of rights is such that it necessarily impacts the
fact or length of detention.” Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002). Since
Lonardo's claim of denial of sufficient halfway house
placement conceivably impacted the length of his
imprisonment, this matter was properly raised under §
2241. See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243-44 (claims
regarding denial of halfway house placement properly sound in
case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of
the United States Constitution subsists through all stages of
federal judicial proceedings. Parties must continue to have a
“‘personal stake in the outcome' of the
lawsuit." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
U.S. 395, 401 (1975). In other words, throughout the course
of the action, the aggrieved party must suffer or be
threatened with actual injury caused by the defendant.
Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.
adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon "the
continuing existence of a live and acute
controversy." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 459 (1974) (emphasis in original). "The rule in
federal cases is that an actual controversy must be extant at
all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is
filed." Id. at n.10 (citations omitted).
"Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to
sustain a present case or controversy ... if unaccompanied by
continuing, present adverse effects." Rosenberg v.
Meese, 622 F.Supp. 1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1974)); see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil
No.3:CV-02-465, slip op. at p. 2 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2002)
explained in Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147
(3d Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). in the context of a habeas corpus
challenge to the execution of a sentence under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, “[i]ncarceration satisfies the case or
controversy requirement; it is a concrete injury.”
Id. However, once the petitioner has been released,
“some continuing injury, also referred to as a
collateral consequence, must exist for the action to
continue.” Id. See also United States v.
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2008).
sole claim asserts that he was improperly denied a sufficient
period of halfway house placement. Respondent has notified
the Court that Petitioner has been released from prison to an
RRC. A review of the BOP's inmate locator computerized
database shows that Petitioner is presently residing in a RRC
located in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area and will be
released from facility on August 29, 2017.
Supreme Court in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7
(1998), held that release of a petitioner from custody on a
parole violator term deprived federal courts of the power to
act. Significantly, the Court found that there were no
“collateral consequences” remaining after
expiration of the parole violator term sufficient to animate
the matter with a case or controversy capable of concrete
redress, explaining that federal courts “are not in the
business of pronouncing that past actions which have no
demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.”
Id. at 18. See also United States v.
Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2002) (a
petitioner unconditionally released from probation cannot
maintain challenge to sentence received for violating the
terms of probation); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624,
632-34 (1982); Hagwood v. ...