United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
RICHARD A. MOTT, Petitioner,
TAMMY FERGUSON, et al., Respondents.
PARADISE BAXTER, United States Magistrate Judge.
before Court is the Respondents' motion to dismiss [ECF
No. 12] the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by
state prisoner, Richard A. Mott (the "Petitioner"),
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"). For the reasons set forth below, the
Respondents' motion is granted, the petition is dismissed
with prejudice, and a certificate of appealability is denied.
case, the Petitioner challenges the judgment of sentence
imposed upon him by the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford
County on February 2, 2009. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania summarized the relevant background of this case
On November 3, 2008, [the Petitioner] entered a guilty plea
to one count each of rape of a child and incest. [His]
conviction stems from his sexual abuse of his then
twelve-year-old daughter, who had been sexually assaulted
previously by three other men, including [the
Petitioner's] son. The plea bargain contained no
agreement as to sentencing. At the February 2, 2009
sentencing hearing, counsel for [the Petitioner] requested
that the court impose the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence
on the rape of a child count. The court declined, and imposed
a sentence of incarceration of not less than twenty nor more
forty years on this count, with a concurrent term of not less
than two nor more than ten years on the incest count. [The
Petitioner] filed a direct appeal challenging the
discretionary aspects of his sentence, and this Court
affirmed the judgment of sentence on February 5, 2010.
(See Commonwealth v. Mott, No. 313 WDA 2009,
unpublished memorandum at *1-3 (Pa.Super. filed Feb. 5,
2010)) ["Mott I"].
Commonwealth v. Mott, No. 1536 WDA 2015, 2016 WL
832525, *1 (Pa.Super.Ct. Mar. 2, 2016) ("Mott
II") (footnotes omitted).
Petitioner's judgment of sentence became final under both
state and federal law on or around March 8, 2010, when his
time to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. Id.; Pa.R.A.P.
903(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) ("a judgment
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.");
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-54 (2012)
(under relevant federal law a judgment becomes final at the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for
seeking such review).
6, 2015, the Petitioner filed a pro se motion for
relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act
("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.
The court appointed him counsel, who filed an amended PCRA
motion asserting a right to relief based on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne v. United
States, __ U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). "In
Alleyne, the Supreme Court overruled its prior
precedent, Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,
122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), and clarified that,
under the Sixth Amendment, any facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant
is exposed are elements of the crime and must be found beyond
a reasonable doubt." United States v. Reyes,
755 F.3d 210, 212 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations and internal
PCRA court dismissed the Petitioner's motion because it
determined that he filed it outside of the applicable
state-law statute of limitations. The PCRA's statute of
limitations is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) and it
provides, in relevant part:
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
and the petitioner proves that:
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
in this section and has been held by that court to apply
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph
(1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim ...