Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Roman Soto v. Perk

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

June 28, 2017

RAMON E. ROMAN SOTO, Plaintiffs,
MATTHEW PERK, Defendants.


          STENGEL, J.

         This pro se civil rights lawsuit is based on an alleged civil conspiracy related to state court and arbitration proceedings in which the plaintiff was a litigant. The Honorable Nina Wright Padilla, a judge in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, filed a motion to dismiss the claims against her. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.


         Plaintiff Ramon Soto asserts civil rights claims in connection with a property dispute over a driveway and a gate he erected. (Compl. at 3.) According to the complaint, over the past ten years defendant Carlos Rodriguez broke the plaintiff's eight-foot gate, obstructed his “cut-curve entry, ” claimed a three-foot strip of the driveway, and caused him to expend funds for “constant repair damages.” (Id.)

         The plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his right to “reasonable action in the Court” in violation of the First Amendment as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 1.) The claims against Judge Padilla arise from an arbitration proceeding, to which she is alleged to have “falsely” given “authority and legal life” even though, according to the plaintiff, arbitration “did not apply to the self admitted knocking down of [his] drive-way Gate, nor did [he] agreed [sic] to proceedings of Arbitration.” (Id. at 2.)


         Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. Following these basic dictates, the Supreme Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), subsequently defined a two-pronged approach to a court's review of a motion to dismiss. “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Thus, although “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.

         Second, the Supreme Court emphasized that “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. A complaint does not show an entitlement to relief when the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id.; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that: (1) factual allegations of complaint must provide notice to defendant; (2) complaint must allege facts suggestive of the proscribed conduct; and (3) the complaint's “‘factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

         Notwithstanding these new dictates, the basic tenets of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review have remained static. Spence v. Brownsville Area Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.08-626, 2008 WL 2779079, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 15, 2008). The general rules of pleading still require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and need not contain detailed factual allegations. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233. Further, the court must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Pinkerton v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).


         In count three of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that Judge Padilla acted in concert with the other defendants “to deprive [him] of access to the Courts by falsely verifying and validating an ARBITRATION PROCEEDING which did not apply to [his] claims, nor did [he] consent to participate in arbitration proceedings; namely not being a contract related.” (Compl. at 4.) He further alleges that Judge Padilla willfully acted in concert with others to protect defendant Carlos Rodriguez, to the plaintiff's detriment and with a purpose to run the plaintiff out of his premises and take over the driveway. (Id.)

         Judge Padilla moves to dismiss the claims against her on immunity grounds and because the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action for conspiracy. Having considered the complaint and the parties' briefs, I find that Judge Padilla is immune from suit and that the conspiracy claim against her fails as a matter of law. I will therefore grant her motion to dismiss.

         A. Immunity

         “It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are generally ‘immune from a suit for money damages.'” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam)). “[A] judge's immunity from civil liability ‘is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.'” Id. (quoting Mi ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.