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Colon v. Conchetta, Inc.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

June 14, 2017

JULIEANN COLON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,
v.
CONCHETTA, INC. d/b/a CLUB RISQUE; RT, 413, INC. d/b/a CLUB RISQUE; TACONY 2008 INC. d/b/a CLUB RISQUE; CONNIE INNEZZELLI; DEAN M. PAGANO; RONALD CRUDELE; THEODORE PAGANO JR; and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM

          ROBERT F. KELLY, Sr. J.

         Presently before the Court is the Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Proceedings, and Stay Discovery filed by Defendants Conchetta Inc. d/b/a Club Risque, RT 413, Inc. d/b/a Club Risque, Tacony 2008 Inc. d/b/a Club Risque, Connie Innezzelli (“Innezzelli”), Dean M. Pagano, Ronald Crudele (“Crudele”), Theodore Pagano Jr., and Doe Defendants 1-10 (collectively “Defendants”), Plaintiff Julieann Colon's (“Colon”) Response in Opposition, Defendants' Reply Brief, and Colon's Notice of Supplemental Authority. For the reasons noted below, we grant Defendants' Motion.

         I. BACKGROUND

         On March 2, 2017, Colon filed the present class action before this Court alleging federal and Pennsylvania state wage violations. Specifically, Colon claims she was an exotic dancer at various entities doing business as “Club Risque.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) The essence of her Complaint is that she and others are entitled to damages because Defendants improperly classify exotic dancers as “independent contractors.” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 33.) Thus, Colon claims that the Defendants have, inter alia, violated federal and Pennsylvania state law relating to the failure to pay the applicable minimum wage; failure to pay overtime compensation in excess of forty hours; improper collection of a portion of tips the dancers receive from the public; and improper subsidization of the businesses by requiring a portion of tips to be forfeited to management and employees who do not regularly receive tips. (Id. ¶ 3.)

         On April 11, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Proceedings, and to Stay Discovery Pending Determination of the Motion, which relies upon an arbitration provision contained in a “Performer License and Temporary Space Lease Agreement” (the “Agreement”). (Defs' Brief; Ex. A § 16.) Colon filed a Response in Opposition, Defendants filed a Reply Brief, and Colon filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         In order to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, we must initially decide whether that determination is made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or 56, and thus, what materials may be considered. See Sanford v. Bracewell & Guiliani, LLP, 618 F. App'x 114, 117 (3d Cir. 2015). “Motions to compel arbitration are reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘[w]here the affirmative defense of arbitrability of claims is apparent on the face of a complaint (or . . . documents relied upon in the complaint).'” Id. (quoting Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773-74 (3d Cir. 2013)). “If the motion to compel arbitration is not based on a complaint ‘with the requisite clarity' to establish arbitrability or ‘the opposing party has come forth with reliable evidence that is more than a naked assertion that it did not intend to be bound by the arbitration agreement, even though on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did, ' resort to discovery and Rule 56 is proper.” Id. (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 774).

         Colon does not mention the Agreement in her Complaint, although it is clearly integral to her claims. See Hewitt v. Rose Grp., No. 15-5992, 2016 WL 2893350, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2016) (“It would frustrate the purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act if plaintiffs could avoid having their claims quickly compelled to arbitration simply by failing to mention the existence of clearly applicable arbitration agreements in their complaints.”). Defendants attached the Agreement to their Brief, and Colon does not contest its authenticity. Indeed, Colon admits to signing the Agreement on February 18, 2015. (Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n at 11.) Because there is no question that the Agreement is integral to Colon's claims and no dispute of its authenticity, we will consider it.

         Finding that arbitrability is facially established, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard applies. See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776 (stating under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, “[w]e consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents”) (citation omitted); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that even if a “[c]omplaint does not explicitly refer to or cite [a document] . . . the critical [issue] is whether the claims in the complaint are ‘based' on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic document was explicitly cited”); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document. Otherwise, a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied.”). Thus, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept as true the facts plead in the Complaint construing them in the light most favorable to Colon. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

         We also note that no discovery is needed because any further development of the factual record is unnecessary to decide the instant Motion. Therefore, we deny Colon's request for discovery.

         III. DISCUSSION

         The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., “creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and governing the duty to honor agreements to arbitrate disputes.” Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 584 F.3d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 2009). The FAA provides that “‘[a] written provision' in a maritime or commercial contract showing an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'” Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). “Because arbitration is a matter of contract, before compelling arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, a court must determine that (1) a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) the particular dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.” Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2009).

         A. The Agreement to Arbitrate Arbitrability

         At the outset, Defendants assert that any challenge Colon makes regarding the Agreement or the arbitration clause must be submitted to the arbitrator. (See Defs' Brief at 10.) In other words, Defendants claim that, pursuant to the express language in the Agreement, any argument concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of the ...


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