United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
ERNEST CORRRADO, as Administrator of the ESTATE OF ELEANOR CORRADO, deceased and ERNEST CORRADO, Individually, Plaintiff,
TIMBER RIDGE HEALTH CARE CENTER, VALLEY CREST NURSING, L.P., VALLEY CREST NURSING GP, LLC, and VALLEY CREST NURSING, INC., Defendants.
RICHARD P. CONABOY United States District Judge
the Court considers Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Fed. R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and, Alternatively, Fed.
R.C.P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 7.) With the motion, Defendants
asserts the following: 1) because diversity jurisdiction does
not exist, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and
the Complaint (Doc. 1) must be dismissed pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); and 2) should the Complaint (Doc. 1)
not be dismissed based on subject matter jurisdiction, the
parties should be compelled to proceed to arbitration. (Doc.
12 at 3.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court
concludes dismissal is appropriate pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
Decedent, Eleanor Corrado, was eighty-four years old when she
was admitted to Timber Ridge Health Care Center
(“Timber Ridge”) on October 9, 2015. (Doc. 1
¶¶ 9, 10.) She died eleven days later, on October
20, 2015, after she was dropped from a Hoyer lift.
(Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff filed the Complaint on
January 23, 2017. (Doc. 1.)
Complaint states that Plaintiff is a resident of the state of
Florida with a permanent address of 7245 Mahaffey Drive,
Apartment A, New Port Richey, Pasco County, Florida. (Doc. 1
¶ 1.) The Complaint also states that, at the time of her
death, Eleanor Corrado was a resident of the state of Florida
with the same permanent address. (Id.)
from Timber Ridge are attached to the Complaint. (Doc. 12-1.)
A Progress Note dated October 9, 2015, identified as an
“Admission Summary” indicates that Mrs. Corrado
was accompanied by her daughter, Eleanor, and son-on-law, and
that she planned “to live at the facility
long-term.” (Id. at 4.) An “Occupational
Therapy Certification” contains a “Past Medical
History” section which states the following: “As
per chart: 84 y/o female resident admitted to TRHCC for LTC
placement from another SNF in Florida in order to be located
closer to her daughters.” (Doc. 12-1 at 1.)
October 11, 2015, “Activities Assessment” states
that Mrs. Corrado “[m]oved here from Florida to be
closer to family.” (Id. at 2.) A Social
Service Progress Note dated October 15, 2015, indicates that
the Decedent was referred to as “Ellie” and
“Eleanor” and her daughter was referred to as
“Eleanor.” (Id. at 3.) The Noted stated
Ellie's daugher Eleanor visited with MSW to complete
initial paperwork. Ellie is a transfer from Trinity Regional
SNF in Florida. She is diagnosed with COPD, UTI, depression,
anxiety, Alzheimer's. Eleanor is alert and oriented with
some confusion at times, and she is able to express her
needs. Ellie is here for long term care. Her husband is in
the process of moving to Wilkes-Barre from Florida. Her
children live in nearby towns. . . . She has a living will
and POA; copies requested. Eleanor denied any concern at this
(Doc. 12-1 at 3.)
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . [and] possess
only that power authorized by Constitution and statute. . . .
It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Col.
of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of
claims based on the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
District courts “enjoy substantial procedural
flexibility in handling Rule 12(b)(1) motions.”
Berardi v. Swanson Mem'l Lodge No. 48, 920 F.2d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 1990); see also McCann v. Irrevocable
Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Berardi, 920 F.2d at 200). The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals set out standards for reviewing challenges to
subject-matter jurisdiction in Lincoln Ben. Life. Co. v.
AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2015).
The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with
the party asserting its existence. Challenges to subject
matter jurisdiction may be facial or factual. A facial attack
concerns an alleged pleading deficiency whereas a factual
attack concerns the actual failure of a plaintiff's