United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
2014, while incarcerated at Curran-Fromhold Correctional
Facility (“CFCF”) in Philadelphia, pro
se plaintiff Charles Talbert sued Corizon Inc. (Compl.
¶ 8). Corizon is a private corporation that contracts
with correctional facilities to provide medical services to
inmates. In April of 2016, plaintiff settled his 2014 case
against Corizon. (Id.).
5, 2016, plaintiff was released from CFCF. (Id.
¶ 9). Less than two months after being released from
CFCF, plaintiff was arrested for violating his probation and
transferred back to CFCF. (Id. ¶ 10). At some
point after being returned to CFCF for violation of
probation, plaintiff was “waiting in the Corizon
medical triage to be seen by a Corizon medical staff member
to be medically screened.” (Id. ¶
While sitting in the waiting room, an unidentified and
unknown “Corizon employee” threatened to stick
plaintiff with a needle that was said to be contaminated with
the HIV virus. (Id.). Before threatening to stick
plaintiff with the needle, this unidentified person made
comments about plaintiff's prior lawsuit against Corizon
that had settled. (Id. ¶ 12).
then refused to be medically screened or treated by Corizon.
(Id. ¶ 13). He claims he refused for fear of
being stuck with a needle contaminated with HIV.
(Id.). Plaintiff was then placed in “medical
lock-in” for 24 hours. (Id. ¶ 14).
Plaintiff claims he was placed in lock-in until he would
allow “Corizon employees to stick him with a
this occurred, plaintiff filed several “sick call
requests” and “grievance” forms requesting
to “have an x-ray examination check for tuberculosis
rather than being stuck by a needle from one of Corizon'
[sic] medical staff.” (Id. ¶
Plaintiff also requested to be sent off-site (i.e.
brought to a medical facility outside the jail) to have his
blood drawn. (Id. ¶ 16).
this particular stint at CFCF-from July 14, 2016 to October
6, 2016- plaintiff claims medical staff at CFCF denied
plaintiff's request for an x-ray or to be sent off-site
to have his blood drawn. (Id. ¶ 17).
Plaintiff's complaint avers that “[d]ue to this
deprivation of x-ray and off-site referral, Plaintiff was
subjected to constant isolation which severely caused him
aggravated pain to his prior neck injury, and substantial
mental anguish, depression, stress, anxiety, sleepless
nights, fatigue, and mind altering spells where he began to
become delusional.” (Id. ¶
filed this complaint against Corizon Inc., three Corizon
doctors, and two Corizon nurses. His complaint does not
identify any cause of action.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted examines the legal
sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations must be
sufficient to make the claim for relief more than just
speculative. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether to grant a
motion to dismiss, a federal court must construe the
complaint liberally, accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also
D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d
943, 944 (3d Cir.1984).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff
to plead in detail all of the facts upon which she bases her
claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the Rules
require a “short and plain statement” of the
claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the
plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests.
Id. The “complaint must allege facts
suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Neither “bald
assertions” nor “vague and conclusory
allegations” are accepted as true. See
Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902,
906 (3d Cir.1997); Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transp. Auth., 897 F.Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The
claim must contain enough factual matters to suggest the
required elements of the claim or to “raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of” those elements. Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme
Court defined a two-pronged approach to a court's review
of a motion to dismiss. “First, the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. at 678. Thus, while “Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.
“may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.” Brown v.
Card Service Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,
73 (1984)). Courts construe a plaintiff's allegations
liberally when he or she is proceeding pro se.
Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.