Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Get-Er-Done Drilling, Inc. v. U.S. Crossing Unlimited, LLC

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

May 11, 2017

GET-ER-DONE DRILLING, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
US CROSSING UNLIMITED, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, and MICHAEL LIND, an adult individual, Defendants.

          OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT VI AGAINST DEFENDANT U.S. CROSSINGS UNLIMITED, LLC ECF NO. 7

          Lisa Pupo Lenihan Magistrate Judge

         Currently pending before the Court is Defendant U.S. Crossings[1] Unlimited, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) the unjust enrichment claim brought against it in Count VI of the Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss.

         I. RELEVANT FACTS

         Beginning on or about November 5, 2014, the parties entered into a series of verbal contracts regarding the provision of services by Plaintiff, Get-Er-Done Drilling, Inc., in the form of horizontal drilling and equipment rentals, to U.S. Crossings on various jobs or projects in which U.S. Crossings was under contract with a third party. (Am. Compl., ¶6, ECF No. 3.) In these verbal contracts, it was agreed that Defendant U.S. Crossings would utilize a number of Plaintiff's pieces of equipment in exchange for 50% of the contract price of any such job or project.[2] (Id. at ¶7.) The parties further agreed that U.S. Crossings would guarantee the return of all equipment as it was received. (Id. at ¶8.)

         Essentially, when U.S. Crossings needed to have a bore drilled at one of its projects, it would contact Plaintiff regarding the scope of the job and the parties would verbally agree on the cost. Once Plaintiff completed its work, it submitted its invoice to U.S. Crossings for the agreed cost. U.S. Crossings allegedly made partial or no payment on the submitted invoices, thus necessitating in this litigation. See, generally, Am. Compl., Count I (Maryland Job), Count II (Rice Job), Count VIII (Caldwell Job), Count XI (Clarksburg Job), Count XIV (Jewett Job), and Count XIX (Moundsville Job), and supporting invoices (Exs. A through R attached to Am. Compl., ECF Nos. 3-1 to 3-18). In each of these counts, Plaintiff has brought claims for breach of contract against U.S. Crossings based on the parties' verbal agreements. In addition, Plaintiff has brought, in the alternative, claims for unjust enrichment against U.S. Crossings, in the event that the Court finds that the verbal agreements referred to in Counts II, VIII, XI, XIV, and XIX do not constitute binding contracts. See, generally, Counts III, IX, XII, XVI, and XVIII, & XX.[3]

         Following Plaintiff's direct work in the Rice Job (see Count II), [4] in September of 2015, the parties verbally agreed that U.S. Crossings could rent a 312 Caterpillar Hoe and additional equipment for four months for a share of the profits (“Rice Rental”). (Am. Compl., ¶40.) During this time, Plaintiff also provided labor to U.S. Crossings by verbal agreement for clearing a bore path for Clearpath Utilities to complete a bore on the Rice Job, at a cost of $10, 000. (Id. at ¶ 41.) In addition, Plaintiff determined that its cost for labor on the Rice Rental was $15, 000, and that a reasonable rate for equipment rental was $5, 000 per month for four months, or $20, 000. (Id. at ¶¶42-44.) Plaintiff submitted its bill for $45, 000 to U.S. Crossings on September 24, 2015 for the Rice Rental, but has not received any payment. (Id. at ¶ 45; Ex. G to Am. Compl., ECF No. 3-7.) These factual allegations are set forth in Count V of the Amended Complaint in support of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against U.S. Crossings on the Rice Rental.

         Alternatively, Plaintiff has also brought a claim for unjust enrichment against U.S. Crossings, in the event the Court finds that a contract did not exist with regard to the Rice Rental. See, generally, Count VI, Am. Compl. In support of this claim, Plaintiff incorporates its previous allegations, and further alleges that it would be unjust to permit U.S. Crossings to gain the benefit of the bargain without compensating Plaintiff for his agreed upon share. (Am. Compl., ¶¶ 46, 48.)

         US Crossings has moved to dismiss the unjust enrichment claim brought against it in Count VI of the Amended Complaint with regard to the Rice Rental. Plaintiff has filed a response and brief in opposition. Thus, the motion is ripe for disposition.

         II. LEGAL STANDARD

         In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Courts apply the following standard, as recently reiterated by the Court of Appeals:

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”. . . . “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n. 27 (3d Cir.2010). Although the plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement, ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, it does require a pleading to show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint that pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant's liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2016).

         Building upon the landmark Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court of Appeals in Connelly reiterated the three-step process District Courts must undertake to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:

First, it must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, it should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. See also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 224 (3d Cir.2011) (“Mere restatements of the elements of a claim are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” (citation and editorial marks omitted)). Finally, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.